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**SECRET AND INEDITED DOCUMENTS.**

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## INTRODUCTION.

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"OUT of sight, out of mind," is one of the truest texts in the gospel of reason. The obvious is always more striking than the devious or the absent. Injustice is less crying and sin less revolting if they are out of sight and hearing. Life is so short, and man so busy, that he cannot give ear to any wrongs and injuries save those that come close home to him. Such, at least, has been the rule hitherto in political and private life, with a few grand exceptions—such as Negro Emancipation—which may frequently be reduced to the rule. And though sundry influences and engines are at work to give us a further range and a longer sight than our fathers, conflicting interests and forces on the other hand neutralise their benefits, and make us as short-sighted as ever.

Though the steam-engine and the telegraph would seem great bonds of fraternity, exalting the valleys and making low the mountains of prejudices severing the nations, yet interested motives and material considerations, ever associated with their promotion, thrive and spread with their increase, not unfrequently to the exclusion of more generous and noble impulses.

There was a time when Britain shook with rage, and rose like one man, at the sight of Continental injustice and Imperial aggression. Napoleon's treacherous invasion of Spain called forth the wrath of mighty Albion, and she showered her gold and lavished her blood in the cause of Peninsular freedom with a magnanimous profusion. We have even seen her, as well as France, roused to generous sympathy and co-operation by the efforts of a mongrel race in Greece, to recover its historical name and rights. Still these cases, as before observed, were obvious, patent, and *in sight*. Every country gentleman and portly alderman felt paternally towards the land that grew his port and sherry, and every school-boy felt his cheek glow and his breast heave at the thought of a second Marathon and another Salamis. But whilst all this sympathy, blood, and treasure

was being in many cases wasted on the ungrateful and the worthless,\* out of sight and further off, treachery, injustice, and ambition, had an open field and made glorious prizes.

England was outraged at the invasion of Spain, whose sons have lately spurned the hand that saved them; yet she has looked on and not raised a finger in the partition and two death-struggles of the gallant Poles, she has suffered the Fins to fall a prey to Northern aggression, she has not raised her voice to protest against the extermination of Circassian heroes. Will she abandon Turkey to the protectorate of the Czar?

Hungary, with its valiant people and a constitution nearer our own than any other, is suffered to be laid waste by the slaves of despots.† Sicily, encouraged by our words to throw off the yoke of a king grown gray in treachery, is abandoned at the eleventh hour; and so we presume matters would go on to the end, unless we turn our minds to what takes place out of sight, and extend our sympathies beyond the hedge-row that circumscribes our native parish.

John Bull is at heart a generous animal—who, though he takes long to rouse, and though he requires a sufficient call to make him stir, yet, when he sees cause for wrath, and has a mind to come to blows, does not often strike short or by halves. He requires facts, and solid arguments, for all he does; and we feel persuaded that an extensive diffusion of popular knowledge on the subject of Northern aggression would soon make him heed the wrongs that are committed out of sight. Yet for popular knowledge to be effective it must be well grounded, and though it should not be prosy or prolix, much substance should be crowded into a small compass for it to take full effect.

\* The dishonesty and ingratitude of Greece, in resisting the just claims of Britain in 1849, and the liberality of Isabella's government in denying the right of burial to British heretics, are still fresh in our memories. Speaking of King Otho's government, Mr. Crowe remarks: "The King's government is arbitrary and corrupt. He has opened at his palace an office, in which his royal self presides, and in which a debtor and creditor account is opened of patronage on one side, and loyalty on the other. And it is this kind of *tripotage*, that his Majesty dignifies with the name of Constitutional Government."—*Greek and Turk*, p. 82. "The Minister of Police was tried as a robber in 1847."—*Spencer*, vol. ii., p. 246.

† Newman's *Crimes of the House of Hapsburg*; Schlesinger's *History of the War in Hungary*; Pridham's *Kossuth*; Spencer's *European Turkey*, vol. ii. chap. 2.



To this end the editor has thrown together, in this Introduction, a number of facts (the best of arguments)\* relating to the religious policy of Russia, and the present moral and spiritual position of that Empire and its neighbours, so that the great mass of the reading public may know the merits of a case which, though out of sight, ought no longer to be out of mind, for disguise it as we may, sooner or later, and the sooner the better, the liberals in Europe will have to form a coalition against the inroads of despotism.

Beginning with a historical survey of the religious policy of Russia, we find that it has been the hereditary and predetermined purpose of the house of Romanoff, ever since Peter I., to annex neighbouring territories, especially south and east. (See Note A.)

Turkish wars and Turkish invasions have been a chronic affection in Muscovy for above one hundred and fifty years,† and the eyes of its Czars have ever been fixed on the Bosphorus.‡ One of the first southern possessions grasped by the Muscovites was the Taurida, or Crimea,§ on the Black Sea, after they had previously,

\* The authority and proofs of the statements advanced in the Introduction, will be found amply illustrated in the documents forming the body of this work.

† Muscovite invasions of Byzantium are recorded even in the 6th century, when Russia was Pagan, and the Eastern Empire Christian. Since then, Byzantium has become Pagan, and Russia Christian, a name justifying all that in a Pagan would be condemned.—See *Gibbon*, vol. viii.

“As early as the first successors of Rurik, the fleets of Russia imposed upon Byzantium the payment of tribute. As soon as a leader had boldness and resources to undertake an expedition against Byzantium, all the tribes rushed to join his standard. The army which, in 904, Oleg led against Byzantium, is known to have been 80,000 strong; and that of Igor, his successor, was swelled in so short an interval, to 400,000. Even the Portzinacites, those natural Tartar enemies of the Russians, united with Igor as soon as the object was to plunder Byzantium.”—*Segur's History of Russia*, chap. v. p. 24. (See Note B.)

‡ “In the old Michailoff palace at St. Petersburg, on large stands, are to be seen all the fortified places in Russia, modelled in clay and wood with great exactness. Among them is a complete representation of the castles of the Dardanelles, with the most minute details of creeks and rocks. By means of these models, the whole plan of attack on the Dardanelles could be directed from St. Petersburg. It is a question whether the English have the like fore-sight. The mingling of the castles of the Dardanelles with those entirely garrisoned by Russian troops, indicates that the Russians already look upon them as their own, and keeps warm the memory of Alexander's saying: ‘Il faut avoir les clefs de notre maison dans la poche.’”—*Kohl's Russia*, p. 101.

§ Captain Sergey Plescheef coolly remarks: “In the year 1774, the Crimean Tartars became *independent* by means of Russia; and in 1783, the whole penin-

by their masterly policy, won over from Poland the Ruthenians of Little Russia and the Don Cossacks. Thus they obtained ports on the Black Sea, and an outpost towards Turkey. This happened under Catherine II., in 1774. Next, after the bloody wars of Suwarrow, she encroached on Turkey, and advanced stealthily down towards the Danube. Shortly after, she turned her eye on Georgia,\* and sought to encompass the Black Sea, and steal into Turkey on that side. Her subtle diplomacy soon brought Georgia into her toils, but during a running war of fifty years have the gallant mountaineers of the Caucasus defied her arms and her arts. If ever a great Epic poet turns his attention to this glorious struggle, the siege of Troy will pale before his strophes. There, amongst the eternal snows and primeval forests of the Caucasus, have these dashing cavaliers displayed a fiery prowess and a steady constancy not unworthy to stand beside the feats of Tell and Winkelried, or the squares of Waterloo. We shall have much more to say of these brave men before we have done. Proceeding eastward, Russia has annexed a piece of Persia, under her great ornament Paskewitch, and other leaders, and forced a number of Turkish Armenians to come within her borders, where those who stayed endured great distress. As to the latest aggressions on the Danube, after 1834, Russia obtained the Joint-Protectorate of the Danubian Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia,† which gave them virtually into her hands, as she could always govern them by her agents and their priests. But this was not enough, for Russia probably aims at nothing short of Constantinople; and under the plea of vindicating the honour of the Prince of Peace, she veils her political schemes with the spotless mantle of religion. Last summer she marched 100,000 men into the Principalities in violation of treaties, she takes full possession of the country, employs the revenues in her own service, and makes the native princes break off their allegiance to the Sultan.

sula came under the dominion of Russia."—*Survey of Russia*, translated by James Smirnov, 1792, p. 314.

\* The same author writes in 1792: "Georgia and Imeritia are under the protection of Russia; and for this purpose there are always some Russian troops stationed in them."—*Survey of Russia*, p. 332. Georgia was annexed in 1801.

† "In 1774, Russia obtained the right of Intercession in these Provinces; in 1826, that of Representation; in 1829, that of Guarantee; and in 1834, the Czar became entitled to a right of Protectorate of the Greek Christians in the Principalities."—*The Cossack and the Turk*, p. 9.

She throws up redoubts and field-works on the Danube, and makes every preparation to invade the heart of the Ottoman Empire, in defiance of her own protestations to the contrary. Such is the present position of Russia in the south. Turning to the north, we first meet with the partition of Poland, once the bulwark of Europe against Turks and Tartars. This occurred under Catherine, and was attended by every circumstance of duplicity, that could reflect honour on the diplomatic tact of its originators; for Prussia and Austria shared in the precious spoils and in the disgrace. Not so easily, however, could this magnanimous race be overcome, and under their hero Kosciusko they made a gallant stand, in 1796, against Russia and Prussia; till, crushed by overwhelming numbers, Poland was swallowed up by its neighbours and erased from the map. Again, this gallant people clung to the shadow of liberty under Napoleon, who deceived them with the promise of a constitution; and after the death of Alexander, who had often been their friend, they made their last desperate stand in 1831, when, after almost superhuman efforts, they were at length utterly trampled under foot, and their noblest sons banished to the Caucasus, or the mines of Siberia, while every endeavour is made to root out their language.\* The last semblance of liberty was extinguished in 1846, by Russia and Austria destroying the little Republic of Cracow, which had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna, and we now hear of the same attempts to demolish Polish nationality by forcing the professors to lecture there in German instead of Polish as before.

But we have not yet summed up the whole measure of Russian aggression. A certain writer says, that in 1807, Alexander, on very insufficient pretences, took Sweden by surprise, and appropriated her possessions in Finland, whose inhabitants, though leniently treated from motives of policy, have never been reconciled to the change, and are now absolute enemies of Nicholas, since he has removed all the privileges that had been left to them till lately. This statement, however, is opposed by Golovin.†

Thus, then, almost half the soil of Russia in Europe (for Esthonia, too, is a conquered and disaffected country) is peopled by races

\* See Fletcher's *History of Poland*, and *Eastern Europe*, vol. i.

† *Revelations of Russia*, and *Russia under the Autocrat Nicholas I.*, by Ivan Golovin.

who are dissatisfied if not alienated ; and so well do her neighbours know the nature of her sway, that the Christian population of Mohammedan Turkey is anything but inclined to submit to the Czar, and has offered its services to the Sultan in the war now pending.

Contemporaneous events in the East have distinctly proved that religion is the principle or the plea of the present measures of Russia, and that an army of diplomatists is the usual and successful instrument of the Czar's parental views in promoting and protecting Christianity in Asia and in Europe. Hence, it is important to obtain a more intimate knowledge of the comparative spiritual, moral, and intellectual development of Muscovy and the neighbouring States, that we may duly appreciate the blessings that would be conferred by the success of this system of policy. For the same reason, it will be interesting to form an acquaintance with the most eminent diplomatic agents of Russia, and to find in them the conscientious and exemplary apostles of their Imperial Master's enlightened views, emulating the self-denial, and exceeding the truthfulness, of the early missionaries of Christianity.

We shall, therefore, begin with a brief survey of the present condition of the Russian Empire and its dependencies, regarded chiefly in a spiritual point of view.

#### RUSSIA.

The progressive increase in the population of Russia is a more important feature of her growing power than is generally supposed. Since 1815 Russia has gained fifteen millions of subjects solely from this source. When her population equals in density that of Austria she will embrace three hundred millions, or nearly double the present aggregate populations of the rest of Europe. To arrive at any proximate estimate of the period when this consummation will take place, we have only to remember that the rate of its proportionate increase very nearly equals that of Great Britain.

Sixty years ago, the most westerly point of the Russian Empire was two hundred miles from the Austrian frontier. At present the Russian and Austrian frontiers are conterminous for a distance of five hundred miles ; and if Russia is suffered to annex the Danubian Principalities, that extent will be doubled. In that case, for a distance of one thousand miles, or one third of its circumference, Russia will clasp into her embrace an empire scarcely equal in

size to the vast territory of Poland, which she has appropriated within fifty years. Hitherto Russia has only possessed the swampy delta of the Danube, and her frontier runs along that of Turkey for eighty miles; but if the annexation take place, the two countries will be conterminous for five hundred miles.

The Russian Empire\* extends over 368,000 square miles, of fifteen to the degree; 100,000 miles in Europe; more than 243,000 miles in Asia; and the residue in America.

This empire comprehends one half of Europe, and a third of Asia; it forms a ninth part of the habitable globe.

Its European division is peopled by 58,000,000 of inhabitants; its Asiatic by 2,000,000; its American by 50,000; the total number is 60,000,000 of souls; † which, however, does not give more than about a hundred and sixty-one persons to each square mile.

In this population, and in Europe alone, we perceive two millions and a half of Fins, less than 500,000 Germans and Scandinavians, and fifty millions of Slavonians, of whom four millions are Poles.

Count de Segur says, that the Russian territory is considered to be capable of supporting 150 millions of human beings, and its population to increase at the yearly rate of half a million.

#### CHRISTIAN RUSSIA.

Almost all the conquests of Russia have been made under the mask of religion, Christianity has been employed to vindicate political measures, and she has professed to interpose and protect her neighbours for the greater glory of God, and in the service of the Prince of Peace. Her Christian Patriarchs and Priests ‡ have been for ages the instruments of her policy. We most sincerely hope that some writers exaggerate the reality. A British traveller states, that the Moravian German missions between the Don and

\* *History of Russia*, by General Count Philip de Segur.

† Up to the year 1819, statistical writers did not estimate the whole population of Russia at more than 46,000,000 of souls. But in 1822, Balbi raised the estimate to 54,000,000; Hassel in 1823, to 59,263,700; and Malte Brun, in 1826, to 59,000,000 at least. It is true that, in 1828, Weydemeyer reduced it again to 53,000,000; but the calculations of Balbi and Hassel had, beforehand, refuted this last estimate, which they look upon as erroneous.

‡ On the Greco-Russian Church and Clergy, see *La Russie Contemporaine*, pp. 196-220.

Volga at Sarepta converted many Calmucks, the object of their settlement in that desert waste, but the Greek clergy interposed, and insisted that the converts should be admitted into their church. The Moravians—thinking, probably, that the Calmucks would be as enlightened as Budhists as if they became Greek Christians—gave up their endeavours. The Government supported the priests in their opposition, and may be congratulated on having aided and abetted a Christian Church in its successful attempt to deprive a whole nation of the blessings of the Gospel. Nor have they made any effort to convert them themselves, which is tantamount to prohibiting all Calmucks from attempting to reach heaven at all.\*

Mr. Oliphant relates that on one occasion, while travelling through the Steppes, he entreated earnestly for assistance in difficulties. The postmaster to whom he addressed himself was at length roused from his apathy to ask if he were a Christian. On answering in the affirmative, he was requested to make the sign of the Greek cross, orthodox fashion. As the cross is made in a peculiar way in Russia, and differs in some sects of the Greek Church, Mr. Oliphant declined; on which the postmaster shrugged up his shoulders, and reserved his sympathies for Christians.†

The same author informs us, that the serfs living in the towns and villages on the Volga, are more degraded in their habits than any other people among whom he had travelled; and they can hardly be said to disregard, since they have never been acquainted with, the ordinary decencies of life. The sums drawn from the monopoly of Vodka (or corn brandy), form an important item of the revenue. He was informed that the police have strict orders *not* to take up any persons found drunk in the streets.‡ The number of tipsy men who reeled unnoticed about the large towns seemed living testimonies to the accuracy of this statement. In excuse of these regulations it may be urged, that the Russian peasant is so degraded, that it amounts to much the same thing whether he be in a state of cultivated intoxication, or of natural incapacity.

But further, the upper classes are wealthy in proportion to the number of serfs possessed by each proprietor. The rapid increase

\* Oliphant's *Russian Shores of the Black Sea*, 1853.

† See an analogous case in Kohl's *Russia*, p. 271. "The religion of the Greco-Russian consists more in outward observance than that of any other people."

‡ Leouzon le Duc, p. 256; E. Thompson's *Life in Russia*, p. 305.

of the population is no less an object with the private serf-owner, than the consumption of ardent spirits is desired by the government. Thus each vice is privileged with especial patronage.\*

After showing that the Russian Government has systematically opposed free trade, and the throwing open of great channels of intercourse with Asia, sorely to its own loss, Mr. Oliphant is led to infer that the Imperial Cabinet is only solicitous for the prosperity of the nation, so long as this prosperity can co-exist with the permanent state of gross ignorance and barbarism in which the people are kept, for it is clear that much intercourse with the European nations would open the eyes of the serfs, and be utterly subversive of the Imperial power. Hence the interests of the Government and of the people are diametrically opposed.

We presume, that it will not be disputed that Christianity and morality are essentially inseparable. Now, many authorities of weight are agreed that, in Russia, among the majority, from the highest down to the lowest employés, dishonesty and falsehood are become a part of the national temperament through the force of circumstances.† We are also aware that no sermons are allowed in the Greco-Russian Church,‡ that its religion consists chiefly in forms, and that in its

\* The price of a family ranges from £25 to £40. (Oliphant, p. 97.) "This refers to the serfs. Other English writers of merit assert that the moral turpitude of Russia, the most unprincipled country on the face of the earth, is more to be feared than its physical strength. It has poisoned the higher classes of European society; and its fatal influence is, we fear, every day extending. Female chastity has never been in much esteem at this most profligate of courts; compared with it, the French court under the old régime was one of purity."—*History of Russia—Lardner's Cab. Cycl.*, vol. ii., p. 267.

† Golovin partially admits the charge of peculation, but mitigates it by attributing it to the machinery of the government, and to the number of Germans employed. Almost all English and French writers assert that truth, justice, and honour, are empty names in Russian employés and courts of law, and throughout the nation, and that the rouble is all-powerful there. Some old book says somewhere: "Ye cannot serve both God and Mammon." *La Russie Contemporaine*, by Leouzon le Duc, p. 153. 1853. *Eastern Europe*, etc. Also E. Thompson's *Life in Russia*, Letter 9, p. 138, where he says: "Indeed, real moral worth cannot exist under the predominating system of peculation and fraud which characterises the whole country, and enters even into the details of private life."

‡ "Vladimir, in 980, conquered the throne by fratricide, had six wives and eight hundred concubines, did violence with impunity to his female subjects, and by an instantaneous conviction becoming a Christian, after fattening his Pagan divinities on Christian blood, he commanded his people to become Christian in one day, whole tribes being pushed into rivers to receive Greek baptism."—*Segur's History of Russia*, p. 32.

catechism the Czar is placed almost on an equality with God. It is painful to find that these statements are not contradicted, though palliated by eminent natives and those travellers who are best informed on the subject.

#### INTELLECTUAL RUSSIA.

With regard to literary talent and general instruction, we cannot expect much from a nation, of whom four-fifths are virtually slaves living in a state of moral, intellectual, and physical debasement. Though Russia has produced a Pouschkin and a Derjavin, her prose literature is in its infancy, notwithstanding her boast of being a civilised nation; and Ivan Golovin seems to think it problematical if what she has produced deserves the name of literature. In this respect she presents a striking contrast to Poland and Finland, where the atmosphere of freedom has given birth to a valuable and interesting prose literature, the test of a nation's advance in thought.

It may be added that a great part of the instructors in the public schools of Russia, many of her literary ornaments, such as Klaproth and Pallas, and most of her artists, have been Germans and foreigners, including her most eminent statemen, Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo. Indeed, almost all her representatives have been found in men, who have abjured country and principle for a pension. A great part of her most eminent commanders have been Esthonians and Germans; and Golovin, a true Russian, attributes many of his country's misfortunes to this cause.\*

\* Some writers attribute all the misfortunes, and some all the glories of Russia, to Germans. Kohl naturally attributes all her honours to the Teutonic population of the Baltic provinces, which Nicholas is endeavouring to denationalise, much to the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants. The author of *Eastern Europe* goes rather too far in underrating the value of German thought, and the German race, and in attributing a decided superiority to certain Slavonic tribes, especially the Poles; but Golovin is certainly correct in asserting, that the principal military and civil employés in Russia—many, if not most, of whom have been Germans—though they may be an honour to Muscovy, would be a disgrace to most other countries.

"Russia owes almost everything to Germany," says J. G. Kohl, "and should think herself very happy to have obtained a little piece of Germany for her own; but if she continues to treat German nationality as she does that of the Tartars and Tungusians, the springs from which flow her best statesmen, generals, teachers, and citizens, will soon be dried up."—P. 399 of his *Russia*.

See *The German Provinces on the Baltic*, in Kohl's *Russia*; *Eastern Europe*, vols. i. & ii.; Golovin's Chapter on *Russian Literature*, vol. ii.; *La Russie Contemporaine*, pp. 169-179.



## THE COSSACKS AND THE CRIMEA.

A vast tract of land inhabited by the most industrious and energetic population of the Empire is reported to be dissaffected. Whether springing from the same stock or not as their masters, the Cossacks are represented as being greatly alienated from the Russians. They have been deprived of almost every privilege which they once possessed; and from being a free republic, responsible to none but their own government (Hetman or President), they have sunk into the same condition of serfdom as the inhabitants of the neighbouring provinces. In former days the distinction of rank was unknown; now there is a Don Cossack aristocracy; then there was a community in landed property, now the whole district has been divided into estates, and serfdom established. Unfortunately for themselves, the Don Cossacks have obtained the highest reputation for valour in the Russian army, for the government tears them from their homes at a moment's notice, and sends them to be targets for Circassian rifles. Most of the army in the Caucasus consists of Cossacks, Poles, or degraded nobles. The Circassians, however, by long experience, have learnt to despise the Cossacks almost as much as common Russian soldiers. It is, perhaps, less by the quality than the quantity of her troops that Russia is formidable. An army of serfs can never be an army of heroes. The Cossacks are no longer the turbulent, unruly men of Mazeppa and Platof, for they are no longer republicans or communists, and have lost the inspiration of nationality.

We shall now briefly notice the annexation of the Crimea, which was governed by Khans tributary to the Porte about seventy years ago. A bloody war between Russia and Turkey terminated in 1774, in the treaty of Kainardji. Devlit Ghiri, the Khan, who had been invested with that dignity by the Sultan, was deposed, and his brother Jehan, devoted to Russia, placed on the throne by the Empress Catherine, which is described as an act in direct violation of the principal article in this treaty, in which the independence of the Crimea, as well as the free choice of its sovereigns, had been expressly stipulated.

But this was not all. The same authority informs us, that not only was an unwelcome sovereign thrust upon the country in violation of the treaty, but the prince being a mere puppet in the

hands of Russia, filled all offices with Russians, increasing the disaffection of his subjects, which was fomented by secret Russian emissaries. A revolt soon broke out, and the prince was restored to power by Russian bayonets. It is pretended that cruelties were practised on the insurgents, and the prince was at length forced to retire on a promised pension of 100,000 roubles a-year, which was naturally transformed into perpetual imprisonment at Kaluga, the pension being withheld from him, on the ground that as prisoner he did not deserve it.

He was at length delivered up to the Turks, banished to Rhodes, and there strangled. An Imperial ukase then proceeded as usual to annex this fine province to the Russian monarchy. Some writers add, that the condition of the Crimea is not improved under the sway of a government professing a higher state of moral and intellectual advancement, than that of its Mongolian predecessors.\*

#### THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES.

The Danubian Principalities under the Protectorate of Russia do not seem to have derived much benefit from the protection, nor are their inhabitants said to be anxious for Russian rule.† If the Russian Government takes such a tender interest in the Christian welfare of the world, why does it suffer its own serfs and *protégés* to be a reproach to Christendom? The church in the Danubian Principalities has always been virtually independent of the Porte, the priests only paying an annual tribute of fifteen piastres

\* Oliphant, p. 151, and *Eastern Europe*. The reader may, perhaps, expect an account of the partition of Poland; but the sequel of this work will do ample justice to that subject. Meanwhile, some will perhaps be surprised to hear that Ivan Golovin, a Russian nobleman, and a true lover of his country, makes the following admission: "As for the rights of certain provinces, incorporated with the Russian Empire on the express condition of the preservation of their privileges, Nicholas swept them all away." He adds the history of the deprivation of White Russia, and of Lithuania, of their liberal institutions, which had been retained under the enlightened but vacillating Alexander.—*Russia under the Autocrat Nicholas I.*, vol. ii. pp. 157 and 285.

† "Not one of the engagements into which perfidious Russia entered was observed, or intended to be so."—*History of Russia*—*Lard. Cub. Cycl.*, vol. ii. p. 292.

† The author of *Frontier Lands* denies that the Russians ever had the right of protection in the Principalities. Vol. i. Chap. 12.

to the metropolitan. Yet they have, according to some authorities, long been secret agents in the cause of Russia, which has been so successful in the diffusion of pure Christianity, that an English consul, resident many years in the Principalities, cites several instances of the degraded state of morals, which, to use his own words, appear almost incredible; though they created no more sensation than the common news of the day. Our authority, who was rather partial to Russia, adds, "The absurdities of superstition which form so great a part of the fundamental principles of the present Greek faith, have gained equal strength in Wallachia and in Moldavia: even the most precise doctrines of the Christian religion are there corrupted by the misconceptions or selfish views of low-bred and ignorant priests, a set of men who have here made themselves a manifest disgrace to the sanctity of the Christian name."\* We are farther told, that the generality of them can neither read nor write; and if a book is seen in their chapels, it is very seldom for use. Perhaps the reader may come to the conclusion, that Mohammedan Turkey is more Christian than some Christian countries.

Thus, as far as the influence of Russia could reach, namely, over spiritual matters, it has not objected to keep a Christian people in darkness. In civil and temporal matters, where her influence has been comparatively trifling, we have testimony for the fact, that the prosperous state of the Danubian Principalities presents a striking contrast to the unhappy lot of Bessarabia, since the latter province has been wrested from Turkey. If this is true, we may judge of the probable effects of the annexation of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia.

An English traveller who has visited and observed these regions, pretends, that the maladministration of the local government, the intrigues and chicanery of the Russian employés, and the introduction of the prohibitive system of the Empire into Bessarabia, which had previously enjoyed a liberal commercial policy, form a combination of evil influences sufficient to account for the unhappy state of this poverty-stricken province. *Special privileges*, and a constitution, were granted to the boyars, but only to be withdrawn. Hence Moldavians and Wallachians shudder at the thoughts of annexation.† (See Note C.)

Once more: Some ultra writers would convince us that the dis-

\* Wilkinson's *Wallachia and Moldavia*, 1820, p. 151. † Oliphant, pp. 341-342.

interested and Christian spirit of Russia is shocked at the thoughts of the corn trade on the Danube rivalling that of Odessa. Hence, we are told, the Provinces must be hers, or the Danube must be stopped up. The Sulina mouth and the occupation are said to show, in clear figures, the Christian charity and tenderness of Russian jealousy and monopoly.\*

We shall abstain from pronouncing any verdict on these exaggerated statements, leaving the reader to form his own conclusions from the sequel of this work ; and we shall now proceed to examine the charity and tolerance of Russia in Poland, and then pass to other matters.

#### THE HOLY PLACES.

It will be fresh to the reader's mind, that the original plea for the Eastern quarrel is some rusty keys and a heap of rubbish connected with the nativity of the Prince of Peace. Also, that when this business was arranged, *d l'aimable*, the next pretensions of Russia related to the protectorate of the Greek church in Turkey—a pure and simple piece of Christian charity. As this charity is likely soon to fold all Europe in its broad embrace, and as, by

\* Urquhart's *Turkey and her Resources*, 1830 ; Spencer's *European Turkey*, vol. ii.

"When the Russians recrossed the Danube, after the campaign of 1829, they took with them nearly thirty thousand of the Bulgarian rayahs, who had most reason to apprehend the vengeance of the Turks, and assigned them fertile lands along the Dnieper. The Russians themselves confess that these slaves could not *acquiesce* under the Muscovite *régime*, and by degrees they all returned to Turkey." —*Ranke's Servia*, p. 456. (Bohn 1853.)

"When Russia marched an army into the Danubian Principalities, in 1848, it was to put down an insurrection of the Christian population against their Christian oppressors the Hospodars—the tools of Russia." —*Ibid.*

"Austria and Russia have repeatedly, by secret agents, fomented insurrections of Christians in Turkey, and incited the Mohammedans to massacre them, in order to profit by the anarchy. When blood has been shed, it has been commonly by *Slavonian* Mohammedan *zaptieh*, or irregulars, the *Turkish nizam*, or regulars, being invariably regarded as their protectors and saviours by the Christian peasants." —*Frontier Lands of Christian and Turk*, vol. i. c. 11.

It is shown in *Frontier Lands of Christian and Turk*, vol. i. p. 246, that Russia has long conspired secretly against Turkey, by educating the children of the Danubian Provinces, through teachers from Kiew in Russia, to regard the Czar as their legitimate sovereign, openly alluding to the incorporation of Bulgaria into the Russia Empire.

some diplomatic misapprehension, we may expect to hear soon of the protectorate of France and the annexation of England, it is perhaps desirable to scrutinise the nature of faith and charity in Muscovy, and to see if it leaves room for hope of a brighter future.

We have avoided dwelling on the annexation of Poland in this Introduction, as the sequel will throw a very clear light on this trifling mistake in Western diplomacy. But a few specimens of the tolerance promised and practised towards the Catholic Christians of Poland, by the Czar and Holy Synod, may give us a foretaste of the reign of peace, justice, and harmony, about to dawn on Western Europe, by the protectorate of the Romanoffs.

“The Empress Catherine, the least tyrannical sovereign who ever ruled in Russia, wrote fifty-one years ago to Repnin, her lover, and Ambassador at Warsaw:—‘This is why I must impress on you to cause the armies now at your disposal in Poland, to act, setting aside all illusions of humanity (*abstraction faite de toutes les illusions de l’humanité*), with the energy necessary to deprive its inhabitants of all means, and of all hope, of revolting. You must not spare any of the inhabitants of these districts, even if they should allege the quiet and retired lives they have been leading, excepting always such as may be taken in arms, after giving proofs of their valour; these you had better incorporate in my armies, as they may prove useful in the war which, as you know, we intend to carry into the South, after the pacification of Poland.’ A few days after, Warsaw was stormed, and Suwarrow, one of the great captains of his age, and by no means the most inhumane of the Russian generals, put to the sword twenty-five thousand of the inhabitants of the suburbs of Praga, inclusive of its defenders, women and children.”\*

“From the returns prepared at the end of Catherine’s reign, it may be seen that not less than 3,160,000 Roman Catholics were then forced to go over to the dominant church. Intimidation and rewards were in turn employed with the Catholic clergy, and when these failed to effect their object, many were thrown into prisons and flogged; and the infliction of corporal punishment was jocularly called ‘the anointing of the disunited brethren.’”

One of the most deplorable features of the present crisis in the East, is the obstinacy of Western diplomacy, in confounding the

\* *Eastern Europe*, vol. i. p. 189.

generous and enlightened policy of the Czar, with ambition, notwithstanding facts like this:—

“A ukase, dated the 3rd of July, 1834, condemned two hundred and eighty-six persons to capital punishments, who had been put on their trials a year before; pronouncing the same sentence on about the same number of fugitives.”

This judgment was an absurd mockery, intended to deceive Europe. At the lowest computation, 50,000 Poles had already by that time been sent to Siberia. The fate of all these victims generally remains unknown.

“By one of those sweeping ukases, in which Nicholas is so fond of indulging, which affect the vital interests of hundreds of thousands, and of which we have no examples out of oriental despotism, he abolished the privileges of four out of seven classes, at a single stroke of the pen; in fact, this ukase reduces the nobleman (who perhaps would have been better designated as a freeman) to the condition of the serf; that is to say, he is wholly in the power of any Russian police official—one of those men who will extort bribes of halfpence, and make arrangements with the lowest thieves, has the discretionary power of inflicting corporal punishment on him at any time, without being amenable to blame or punishment.

“Furthermore, occasional ukases direct that all such ex-nobles as have no lands, shall be forcibly removed to colonise the interior of Russia, or be incorporated with the Cossacks of the lines of the Caucasus, or enrolled in the troops of the line. 45,000 families were thus removed by one ukase; the remainder continue entirely at the mercy of the authorities.”

“A list of upwards of 10,000 estates confiscated, has appeared in the public documents; and as this proscription has fallen heavily on the wealthier proprietors, they are supposed, at the lowest computation, to amount in value to £60,000,000 sterling, whilst others rate them at nearly double.”\*

We are persuaded that many of these vexatious circumstances must have been occasioned by diplomatic misapprehensions, and that if the Peace Society sent a deputation to St. Petersburg, it would be most graciously received, and informed that it was all a grievous mistake, and that all good Catholics should be *protected*, for:—

\* *Eastern Europe*, vol. i., pp. 171, 192, 202, and 201.

"No sooner was the authority of Nicholas re-established in Poland, than he kept his promise, by setting on foot a system of persecution, which gradually increased in intensity, till, in 1839, it was undertaken on a scale of unprecedented magnitude and severity. He determined forcibly to incorporate the United Greeks, or Basilians (that is to say, Roman Catholics to whom the Papal See had allowed the marriage of the priesthood, and other of the usages and ritual of the Eastern Church), numbering 3,000,000 in his dominions, with the Russian Church."

"At the very moment that, with fresh duplicity, Nicholas, by the hands of his son, the Czarovitch, was presenting to the Pope a letter, wherein he assured him of his supremest protection of the Roman Catholics in the Empire, of the respect he bore for their conscience, and of his care for their welfare and peace, he had gained over their bishops to the dominant Russian Church."

"They had finished," says Szyrma, "by signing an act of union, on the 12th of February, 1839, for themselves and for the dioceses entrusted to their care. At once, 13,000 priests (contained in them) were forced to abjure Roman Catholicism, and conform to the new ritual presented to them by their bishops."

"The friar Sierocinski, exiled to Siberia because he would not imitate the apostasy of his bishop, was recently knouted to death at Tobolsk, when detected in secretly administering the sacrament to his fellow-prisoners."

"By a ukase of Nicholas, of the 2nd of January, 1839, he offers an absolute pardon to all Roman Catholics condemned for murder or theft to capital punishment, on condition of embracing the Greek faith."\*

Szyrma adds to his iniquity by divulging the following instances of Christian protection and misapprehension:—"Crowds of the united Greeks were induced to kiss a cross held by a Greek priest, or functionary, being told that nothing was meant by it, whereas all who did it were entered as members of the orthodox Greek Church." He adds: "that they were well dosed with corn brandy, to prepare them for this confirmation. By this means, 2,000,000 proselytes were forcibly gained over, and to commemorate it a medal was struck by Nicholas, with the pathetic inscription:—"Separated by violence in 1596; re-united by love in 1839."†

\* *Eastern Europe*, vol. i. pp. 214, 215, 217, and 218.    † *Ibid.*, p. 221.

These extracts will suffice for the present to prepare the mind of the reader for the interesting history of the protection and annexation of Turkey, shortly to be followed by that of the rest of Europe. Let us begin with Turkey.

#### TURKEY.

The history of Turkey, for the last century, testifies that upon six previous occasions, has she been deprived by Russia of as many separate portions of her dominions; and a moderate acquaintance with the system of Russian encroachments in Persia, as well as Turkey, proves the designs and policy of that Power to have been ever the same, and that it is not alone by military occupation or protection, that Russia may govern nations, but that she seeks to assist or direct their rulers, and influence the surrounding nations through their own governors.

To Persia, we shall attend presently. Meanwhile, we would observe that if the annexation of the Danubian Provinces to Russia takes place, that Empire's acquisitions from Turkey since the Treaty of Kainardji (1774) will comprise a greater extent of territory than all that remains in Europe of the Ottoman Empire from which they have been successively wrested. As regards Asiatic Turkey, Russian aggression in that quarter has made more rapid strides than in Europe, the Asiatic frontier of the Czar's Empire reaching a parallel 200 miles to the south of Constantinople. It is a longer march from the Pruth to Orsova, than from the Araxes to the Tigris, and the Muscovite soldiers on that river are more than half way to Peshawur. The extent of territory separating Russia from British India is not so great as that which she has already wrested from Turkey alone. Some think that a formidable result of Russian aggression in Eastern Turkey will be the severe blow our commerce in the Black Sea would receive by the annexation of the provinces of Kars and Erzeroum. We at present carry on an immense trade through Trebisonde, which is jealously regarded by Russia, who would monopolise it all if she could annex these Provinces.

The question, as to which government is most favourable to civilisation and England,\* Mr. Oliphant solves by one assertion:—

\* In the Appendix to Canto II. of *Childe Harold*, occur the following remarks of Lord Byron:—"The Ottomans, with all their defects, are not a people to be



“Some centuries ago, the Porte tried to improve its commercial relations with Central Asia, injured by the discovery of the Cape. The Ottoman troops then first encountered the Muscovite barbarians, who prevented the formation of a canal from the Don to the Volga, projected by Selim II. That enlightened enterprise, undertaken under Mohammedan auspices, has never been carried out by a Christian Power; while Russia, from that time to the present day, has been occasionally a stumbling-block in the way of true progress and civilisation.” \*

We shall give the reader one more specimen of the spirit with which a British traveller describes aggression as being carried on in Turkey :—

“Erzeroum, in Turkish Armenia, until destroyed by the Russians in 1828-9, had been a flourishing place, and the great mart of trade, especially for Persian traders who came there for European commodities. But when the Russians overran the country, under the mask of deliverance from Mohammedan thralldom, they partly prevailed on, and partly forced, all the Armenian families of Erzeroum, Bezabout, and the vicinity, amounting to 90,000 souls, to leave their homes and enter the Russian territories.”

They were driven, by the orders of Prince (then Count) Paskevitch, into Russian Armenia, the population of which had been scanty under their mild, paternal sway, upon an understanding that they were to be distributed where most room occurred, and protected and encouraged in their trades, etc. By a trifling inconsistency, however, this promise was broken, the poor creatures were

despised. Equal at least to the Spaniards, they are superior to the Portuguese. If it be difficult to pronounce what they are, we can at least say what they are *not*: they are *not* treacherous, they are *not* cowardly, they do *not* burn heretics, they are *not* assassins, nor has an enemy advanced to their capital. They are faithful to their Sultan till he is unfit to govern, and devout to God without an inquisition. Were they driven from St. Sophia to-morrow, and the French or Russians enthroned in their stead, it would be a question whether Europe would gain by the exchange? England would certainly be the loser.

“In all the mosques, there are schools established, which are very regularly attended; and the poor are taught, without the Church of Turkey being put in peril. . . Who shall affirm that the Turks are ignorant bigots, when they evince the exact proportion of Christian charity which is tolerated in the most prosperous and orthodox of all possible kingdoms?”—P. 129, v. 8. This was written *before* Sultan Mahmoud's reforms. — See Hobhouse's *Travels in Albania and Turkey*, 4to, 1810; Dr. Holland's *Albania*; and Hughes's *Albania and Greece*.

\* Oliphant, p. 190.

suffered to remain encamped in severe weather, without even any bread, so that multitudes perished. At last they were sent to Akhishka on the Black Sea, where they were disposed of in places already filled with inhabitants, so that their condition was little improved. Many more died here from distress, and diseases arising from the swamps of those parts, which told with fatal effect on constitutions used to the free hill air. Still every application of the poor people to be allowed to return was rejected, and those caught deserting were severely punished. No wonder, therefore, that the Turkish Armenians bitterly hate the Russians, and their hatred is represented as being as bitter as possible.

The escape of the remaining exiles was afterwards said to be winked at, and many survivors returned; so that this act of Russian charity to the Armenian Christians failed utterly of any effect save destroying multitudes of innocent people, and exciting the wrath of their fellow-countrymen. But such phenomena are by no means rare in the foreign policy of European Empires, which have practised injustice alike on Christians and Moslems in the name of the Cross of Christ.\*

The number of square geographical miles in Turkey is—

In Europe . . . . .	92,000
In Asia, including Syria, Armenia, and Mesopotamia	350,000
In Egypt . . . . .	116,000
	<hr/>
	558,000

The population in 1854 is—

Turkey in Europe . . . . .	15,500,000
Asia . . . . .	16,200,000
Egypt . . . . .	3,300,000
	<hr/>
	35,500,000

Of the inhabitants of Turkey in Europe, about 9,600,000 are Greek Christians, less than 1,000,000 Roman Catholics, Armenians, and Jews, and the rest, about 4,600,000, Mussulmans.\*

\* "7,000,000 Slavonians, 4,000,000 Moldo-Wallachians, or Roumani (a people of mixed origin), 2,500,000 Greeks, 1,000,000 Albanians, 750,000 Jews, Gipsies, and Armenians, compose the tributary race of European Turkey, governed by about 1,000,000 Osmanlis."—*Eastern Europe*, p. 255, 2.

"The independence of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, having been effected,

## RELIGIOUS GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY.

The Divan is a Council of seven or eight chief Ministers; the Kiaja-Bey is the Minister of the Interior; and the Reiss-Effendi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Oolama are considered the highest order in the nation. They have the best education, and can become priests, professors of the law, or ministers of justice. Their persons are sacred, and all members of those professions are supplied by them; they teach and expound the Koran, devoting their lives to its study, and to the commentaries of the sheiks; they are responsible for all matters relating to the administration of justice. The Muetzlims perform the administrative functions of the different districts under the Pashas.\*

The supreme head of the religion of Turkey is the Sheik-ul-Islam, who takes the precedence of the Grand Vizier. Every mosque has its Sheik, Katib, Imam, and Muezzin, or preacher, schoolmaster, prayer-leader, and summoner to prayer. In the villages one man performs all these functions.

All Jews and Christians are called rayahs (signifying, in Arabic, subjects).† There are 200,000 Greeks in Constantinople and its precincts.

These religionists maintain that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father only, and they do not worship statues, but paintings alone. The Patriarch of Constantinople is the head of the Greek Church, which contains a monastic and a secular clergy, the high offices being filled from the first. The secular clergy are allowed to marry but only once.

300,000 Armenians live in or about Constantinople, of whom

recognised and honourably respected by the Porte, their people have no cause to fear its violence, and now transfer their dread to the Russian Protectorate."—*Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 261.

"The Slavonic race in the Ottoman Empire embraces, according to the author of *Frontier Lands*, 7,000,000; but of these Bulgaria alone contains, 1,500,000 Mohammedan Slavonians, the cause of Islam having made great progress among this subject race."—P. 268.

\* Adolphus Slade's *Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, etc.*, 1829-31.

† "By the *tanzimat*, equality before the law and religious tolerance are guaranteed to the Slavonian and Greek Christians of the Ottoman Empire. The Armenians were always the most peaceable of subjects, and quite satisfied with the Sultan's rule."—*Frontier Lands*, vol. i. p. 66.

about 30,000 are Catholic Armenians. They have two languages, whereof the old differs as much from the new as old Greek from Romaic. They relate that their King Abgarus sent the cloak to Christ that was divided by the soldiers, and that he offered the Saviour his kingdom of Armenia and Assyria, which Christ refused. St. Thaddeus went to convert them soon after, healing and baptising Abgarus. St. Augustine says that the letter of Abgarus to Christ is genuine. The Armenians separated in 535, eighty-four years after the Council of Chalcedon, from the orthodox church, maintaining the Monophysite doctrine.

They have five Patriarchs; *i. e.*, those of Cis, near Tarsus, of Constantinople, Jerusalem, Aghtamar, on the great lake of Van, and the monastery of Etchmiazin, near Erivan. The Patriarch of Constantinople is the temporal, and the Patriarch of Etchmiazin the spiritual head of the Church, the latter being styled Catholicos. In the Armenian clergy, every secular priest must be married; they do not preach, but the vertabieds are appointed for the purpose; they sacrifice to the Lord occasionally, as an eleemosynary gift, not as a propitiatory oblation. They believe, moreover, that the true cross is a powerful intercessor with God for them. They worship relics, etc., after immersion in water and wine, not before, which they say is a breach of the commandment, but after Christ has been thus united to them, they think it allowable.

The author of *Eastern Europe*\* asserts that Mohammedanism is less oppressive in its spirit than Christian despotism, and that the Ottoman Porte never vexatiously interferes in the municipal

\* Spencer, in his *European Turkey*, corroborates this statement in many respects, and informs us that all religions are now equal in the eye of the Turkish law. In short, Turkey is now socially and politically the freest country on the Continent after Switzerland and Sardinia. It should be added, that on the testimony of Mr. Macfarlane, no friend to Turkey, the ruinous state of Turkish finances is mainly owing to the Christian (Armenian) bankers who manage them, and who are great knaves.—*Eastern Europe*, vol. i. p. 155.

Of the four existing Powers beneath whose dominion the Slavonians linger, it may appear strange, but it is nevertheless true, that they have always been ruled most gently by the Turks.—*Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 254.

It has been the fashion to consider the despotism of the Turk, as well as his other vices, as the fruit of his creed. (*The Greek and the Turk*, p. 334.) But in truth, some of the worst features of the Turkish regimen may be traced to the Greek ones which they superseded, which in cruelty, immorality, corruption, etc., were not vastly different from or widely superior to the Turk, who redeemed many of his adopted vices by the military virtues.

liberties, or in the exercise of the religion, of its Christian subjects. As a general rule, it allowed habitual liberty, by declining all attempts to govern. Throughout the Empire, municipal privileges had never ceased to exist; and, on the whole, the Slavonians are far better treated in the Turkish than in the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian monarchies. (See Note D.)

#### PERSIA.

Turning to Persia, we are informed that Russia, by some diplomatic misapprehension, has had a considerable portion of the Shah's dominions annexed to her sorely against her will, and that the ancient monarchy of Farsistan is virtually under the protection of the Czar.

Mr. Frazer, who, as British diplomatic officer, had occasion frequently to visit and familiarise himself with the state of affairs at Teheran, records that the Persian provinces annexed to Russia after 1829, have, like Finland, been treated with great mildness; and he has the unkindness to insinuate that this originated in the insidious policy of the Muscovites, who, by contrasting the state of those provinces with the oppression and penury that prevail under the Shah's administration, would alienate the Persians from their lawful rulers. He proceeds emphatically to advance that the Imperial Government was busy in sowing dissensions and the seeds of discontent in the minds of the Shah's liege subjects, and ventures to suggest that it had some ulterior object in view in this system of policy. We shall refrain from coinciding in the uncharitable conclusions of Mr. Frazer, and infer the paternal care and benignant spirit of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, without suffering our deductions to be shaken by the misapprehension that disturbed Catherine's intentions in the partition of Poland.

One of the terms of the treaty of Turkomanshaee at the conclusion of the last war between Russia and Persia,\* was an article

\* Persia is represented by Mr. Frazer as having been deprived of numerous provinces by Russia in recent wars, and especially in that which terminated in 1828, on which occasion she gave up the Khanats of Erivan, and that of Nashirvan, the greater part of Talish, and the islands of the Caspian that fall within its direction. Ten crores (of 500,000 each) of toman were also to be paid as an indemnification. Mr. Frazer is puerile enough to insinuate that Russia forced Persia into this war by insidious intrigues, and that Persia relied on the friendship, protection, and sympathy of Britain, which as usual deserted her in the hour of her agony.—*James B. Frazer's Persia*, p. 278.

binding the latter to pay the Muscovites the sum of 5,000,000 tomans.

This debt has not been liquidated ; and the Czar's government, with the generous and magnanimous spirit of the Romanoffs, is reported to have consented to forego the balance due, provided the Shah is willing to declare war on Turkey ; and it seems not improbable that this sacrifice will be crowned with success. Yet we are free to confess that we can scarcely bring ourselves to believe that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has gone this length of self-denial, notwithstanding the abundant evidence that we possess of the forbearance and charity that have long characterised the policy of the Czars. It is refreshing, amidst the venality and egotism that have not unfrequently coloured the political transactions of Christendom, to find one state guided by the principles of eternal justice, accessible to pity, and imbued with the sublime spirit of the Prince of Peace.

#### CIRCASSIA.

We come now to speak of this remarkable region, on which Russia has been encroaching for the last century. Turkey, deserted by Western Europe, and, though the only barrier against the Czar, abandoned to his protection, was obliged, at the treaty of Adrianople, to give up the last relic of Circassia, to which she had no real right, for the country was always virtually independent. But Russia forced Turkey to sign what she dictated, and took advantage of a compulsory signature to obtain a right to the whole of the Caucasus, as her own property. Hence the bloody wars and the blockade of the last twenty years, in which the Circassians have exceeded the heroism of the fabulous ages of Greece and Rome. Let the English reader bear in mind that the Caucasus mountains, inhabited by the Circassian tribes, present the only effectual barrier against Russian advance in Western and Central Asia. These once in her possession, she is on the high road to universal empire ; a few steps lead her to Egypt, Persia, and eventually India, and our Eastern Empire lies open to her. These considerations will add the strongest motives of interest to our admiration of a gallant people in its death-struggle for independence, in directing our attention to the Caucasus.

Notwithstanding these plausible suggestions, it is impossible too

strongly to condemn our wavering foreign policy, in distrusting for a moment the honest and pacific intentions of Russia, especially since Sinope. Some writers would have us believe that our name has become a bye-word to the nations and a disgrace to history. We are told that our foreign policy has been of late an opprobrium to the sons of Cromwell and Sir Philip Sydney. For long years, it is said, have the martyrs of liberty been sighing their souls away in dungeons, or on gibbets, extending their manacled hands to Britain, who they imagined would not fall off, deny, and betray them in the eleventh hour. For had she not encouraged and abetted them in their painful struggle against temporal and spiritual darkness? Yet Poland gasps her life away; Hungary bleeds to death; Italy lies groaning under the heel of the Croat, and weighed down by the spiritual despotism of the Vatican, thrust upon it by French bayonets; and England held forth no helping hand, but, with its fleet in sight, suffered Sicily, whose insurrection she had fomented, to be enslaved by a monarch notorious for bigotry and illiberal principles.

Since, however, generous emotions are now regarded as a matter of tradition in this country, some authorities would urge her, by motives of interest, not to neglect what concerns us most nearly. To every man of common sense it is evident that, before long, there will be a severe contest between liberalism and despotism in Europe. Some visionary men represent that every drop of Circassian blood which is wasted will have to be bought with a double allowance of our own blood and treasure. They are the finest light cavalry in the world; their hatred of Russia is deadly; they will fall to a man rather than surrender; but Russia has men enough to overwhelm them at length, and they are in want of powder. Sanguine men assert that if helped in time—if we did not waste our time in fruitless negotiations (answered by massacre and desolation)—a few steamers and loads of ammunition would set the Circassians in a ferment, and send forth a mighty host of chivalrous highlanders, who could ride in a month into the heart of Russia.

It is certain that Russia is *very vulnerable* in this quarter, her hold on the greater part of Circassia being limited to a chain of forts along the coast of the Black Sea. Blockaded by British sailors to seaward, and the bold mountaineers on the land side, their fate

would soon be decided, and Georgia cut off.\* A sword still hangs over the head of the Muscovite Empire, and a British fleet on the coast of Circassia would speedily bring Russia to our feet. Some men would have us remember the case of the *Vixen* brig, seized by Russia eighteen years ago, in defiance of all law and justice, and ask if England will submit to the Black Sea becoming a Russian lake, and to the Danube being closed to the Union Jack. Inspired with the spirit of Rodney and Nelson, we are evidently insensible to wrongs and blows, unless they come from France, though Russian ambition is probably not less selfish than any other. "Let us," proceed these advisers, "face the question ere it be too late, and adopt the easiest and cheapest way of restoring that tranquillity in the East which has been so unaccountably disturbed."

Without stopping to answer such arguments, let us proceed to examine some farther facts bearing on the religious and moral character of Circassia, with a brief summary of its physical features.

The native name for Circassia is Adighé or Atteghiei. Its population amounts to about 3,000,000, and, with the tribes subject to Russia, to 4,000,000; for Russian gold and diplomacy, here, as elsewhere, by sowing discord, have reaped a crop of vassals, who sometimes repent the step they took. The free tribes can muster 200,000 well-armed troops with great ease.

The Caucasus is called by the Persians Seddi Iskander, the Barrier of Alexander (the Great); the Georgians call it Kohkaf; the Turks Kaff-Dagh; the Circassians Aouz. The Elberouz is the highest of the Caucasus range, being 500 fathoms higher than Mont Blanc: its native name is Azoua Thagh (Mountain of Snow). The Mkinvari is another of the highest mountains; and the Terek and Kouban are the chief rivers rising at the foot of the Elberouz, and flowing, the first eastward into the Caspian, the last westward into the Straits of Yenikalê, in the Black Sea, and separating Circassia from Russia.

Circassia presents a coast of about 200 miles to the Black Sea, and lies between the  $43^{\circ} 28'$  and  $45^{\circ} 25'$  N. lat., and the  $37^{\circ} 10'$  and  $42^{\circ} 30'$  E. long., presenting two passes, one of which, the most

\* In 1800 Georgia was incorporated in the Empire, having been gradually protected and annexed.—*Frazer's Persia*, 1834.



casterly, the Vladikaukas, has been unlocked by Russian prowess, while the other, that of Derbent, is still jealously kept by the natives. The whole district is surrounded by a belt of Russian forts, those of Anapa and Redout Kale being the principal ones, where the Russians *permit* other nations to trade with the Circassians under very strict regulations. The bays of Ghelenjik and Sujuljak are represented by British authorities as good stations, which might be made to rival Sebastopol, especially the former, which could be rendered impregnable. Most of the country consists of mighty mountains, deep ravines, containing raging torrents and grassy upland, on which the Circassians tend their flocks, for they are a pastoral people, the principal kind of corn they grow being a sort of millet, which they eat as a porridge.

Returning to the people, we are informed that Tcherkess, the Russian and Turkish name for Circassia, means *cut the road*, to show that they will not allow foreign troops to enter their country. The Georgians call them Kazakhia (Cossacks). The native name, Attighei, is compounded of *Atti*, a defile, and *Ghei*, the sea.

Passing to their manners and government, and beginning with religion, we find that the creed of the Western Caucasus is a pure Theism: Mohammedanism not having made much progress there.\* The Circassians believe in the immortality of the soul: the name of their God, is the Great Spirit, Thka, and we find that Tghka is the name for the sun in their language. Unsophisticated, innocent of inquisition, and the stake, of the pride of reason, and the foolishness of man, these children of nature have attained intuitively and instinctively to the highest truths of philosophy and faith. They believe also in the saints to whom the Thka has given power over inferior things. Leozeres is the most powerful of these to whom the wind and the waters are subjected. He is also the protector of flocks and herds. Merissa is the protectress of bees. Thunder and lightning, as it emanates directly from Thka, is regarded by the Circassians with the greatest veneration. When they hear the thunder (chebli) rolling, they think it is an angel

\* It is imagined by some writers, rationally enough, that some rays of Christianity penetrated at an early period into the Caucasus, and left traces of the spirituality of that creed. Possibly, also, it may have resulted from primeval tradition at an early age; the Caucasus not being very remote from the cradle and nursery of man where the Great Spirit walked and talked with our fathers.

travelling in his fiery chariot, and rush out of doors to thank him for bringing rain. Perchance they are nearer the highest wisdom, as well as poetry, in this sublime view of the mysterious imponderables.

Their clergy do not form a distinct body ; but the aged, and those respected for virtue, etc., are chosen as the fittest for offering prayers and for other religious duties, a system that would not be acceptable to the Vatican, to the Bench, or to Pluralists, but which is, perhaps, the nearest existing approximation to the Clergy of Reason, and of the Apostolic age. All ceremonies are performed in their sacred groves, temples not made with hands, which are very beautiful. The officiating priest is attired in a dress styled Tchaouko.

The nation is divided into tribes or clans, of which the principal are the Kabarda or Tcherkessi, the Lesghis, the Nogai of Kouban, the Abhazi, the Kistentzi, the Ossetintzi, and Konnigki. The Notta Khaitzu tribe is reckoned the bravest, handsomest, and purest in blood of all. They live on the banks of the Kouban. The Ossetintzi are partly subject to Russia. Twelve or thirteen tribes, about ten years ago, swore to independence like the Swiss at Rütli, and adopted the national standard, the Sanjiak Sheriff.

There are three classes of society in Circassia :—chiefs, nobles, and clansmen—besides slaves, chiefly Russian deserters. The chiefs are called Khanouks, Khans, etc. Their authority is not despotic ; they are like petty magistrates, and can be deposed.

The nobles are called Vourks. The dignity both of chiefs and nobles is hereditary. The clansmen's property is free.

The Assembly of Elders, to judge disputed and criminal cases, is called Ifokothles, and can cite even the chiefs to appear before it. Within the last twelve or fourteen years, no prince, chief, or tribe, has been allowed to carry war into the territory of another, without the consent of the General Assembly of Elders. Their government is a kind of aristocratic system of republics.

So much for their government ; let us now attend to their character and customs. Courage, *ἀνδρεία*, *virtus*\*, is the first of all

\* Golovin, Lieut.-Col. Cameron, and other authorities, represent the Circassians as more bloodthirsty and thievish than they are described by those of our countrymen who have visited them, and viewed them more closely—such as Spencer, Bell, and Langworth. We shall let the reader judge which description is most reliable.

virtues in the estimation of a Circassian. Without the most distinguished courage, a prince entirely loses his influence ; the brave, of whatever class, being always the most highly respected by his compatriots. They choose their leaders in war, and their judges in peace, for courage and wisdom, not for rank—appearing in this, as in so many other things, to have been led by God and nature to higher and wiser principles than our Defenders of the Faith, most Christian Kings, and Consecrated Czars.

A Circassian during the prime of life, appears to avoid everything that may tend to render him effeminate, even the society of his wife and children. On the same account he braves weather, and practises the greatest abstinence.

The education of youth in Circassia, as in the heroic times of Greece, is confided to an attalick (foster-father). When a few years old, they leave their homes, and are taught all martial exercises by a warrior bearing this title. During this time they are not allowed to visit their parents, as they think that this would have the effect of enervating them by indulgence, great affection, etc.

Mr. Bell, who resided amongst them, says : “ From all I have seen, I feel inclined to pronounce the Circassians in the aggregate, the most genuinely polite people I have ever known or read of.” This unprincipled race, branded as a gathering of thieves by many travellers, and all Russians, showed the justice of the charge in the case of Mr. Bell, for though a high price was set on his head by the Russians, he slept alone in safety among these robbers with his door open, without arms, and with a bale of goods beside him.

The brotherhood of man seems better understood by these heathen, than in some civilised countries, for owing to the fraternities, and mutual presents, etc., such a sight—the reproach of civilisation—as persons perishing, or in danger of it, from want, is no where to be found.

“ As far as I can learn,” adds Mr. Bell, “ insanity is almost unknown in this country. It appears to be a curse attendant on the complication of civilisation and commerce.”

After the previous remarks, we leave the reader to infer if the Circassians would gain in morality and happiness by annexation to Russia. (See Note E.)

Our space only permits us to add, that Schamyl Bey, the great

warrior-prophet of the Caucasus, is acknowledged by all the Eastern tribes, and has his head-quarters at a place called Dargo. This hero of a hundred fights, is the Abd-el-Kader of Circassia, and has formed the bold and original design of uniting the Sunnite and Shiite sects of Mohammedanism. As a religious reformer and a patriot, he has shown himself a great man.

#### AUSTRIA.

Let us next cast a glance upon Germany.

The author of *Eastern Europe* has attempted to show that the Slavonic race numbers 80,000,000, whereas there are only about 35,000,000 Germans, and he seems to find in this fact the best augury for the resuscitation of that benighted race. There appears to be some error mixed with much truth in this statement: for though the 10,000,000 Ruthenian Cossacks of Little Russia, the 20,000,000 Poles, and the Serbs and other Slavonians of the Turkish Empire, may entertain no friendly feeling for the Muscovite, yet the bond of a community of faith and ignorance renders this population a useful instrument in the hands of the able and enlightened Cabinet of St. Petersburg. Hence the danger of Turkey and Austria. We have seen that European Turkey is chiefly populated by members of the Greek Church, and it remains for us to observe, that out of the 35,000,000 or 40,000,000 composing the population of Austria, 18,000,000 are Slavonians, consisting of Illyrians, Dalmatians, Hungarians, Transylvanians, Moravians, and Bohemians, who are reported to be disaffected to the Austrian government. Now, though all these men might wish, on many accounts, the formation of a Panslavonic Empire, yet it will be evident that the mass of barbarism and superstition that assimilates them to the Muscovite, renders them, like the Serbs and Romaine population of Turkey, almost as much the subjects of the Czar as of their legitimate Sovereign. It will be evident on a little reflection, that the Russian government, with its usual interest in its neighbour's welfare, has represented this source of weakness to the Austrian government in the most friendly manner, so as to deter it from interfering with its designs.\*

\* The reader will also find interesting remarks on the Slavonic race in *Frontier Lands of Christian and Turk*, vol. i. p. 57 and following pages; but we are disposed to think the author too easy of belief in attributing an Assyrian origin to the race, notwithstanding the etymology of Nebuchadnezzar. This author assigns

Any person at all acquainted with the recent history of Europe, must be aware that Hungary in 1849, to use the words of Marshal Paskewitch, lay at the feet of his Imperial Majesty the Czar. Hence, the existence of the Austrian Empire depended, and still depends, upon the forbearance of the Muscovite. The reader will also remember, that the Croats, Serbs, and other Slavonic populations of Austria, were the primary instruments employed in 1849, by the Hapsburg family and the Russian Cabinet, to put a stop to the natural and necessary reforms of Hungary and Austria; and can we doubt that a masterly diplomacy might at any moment convert them into equally efficient tools for undermining the Austrian Empire itself, and making it dissolve in the embrace of Russia? It is possible that a perusal of the despatch of Pozzo di Borgo in the sequel, will be thought to establish the correctness of this conjecture, and convert our surmise into certainty.\*

With regard to matrimonial alliances, we are fully aware of the feeling which has induced the Romanoffs to bring Prussia, and most of the German Principalities, under Russian influence and protection by intermarriage.†

#### DIPLOMACY. †

The whole history of Russian diplomacy, since that Power first to the whole race 85,000,000 of men, whereof 18,000,000 are in Austria. He agrees with the author of *Eastern Europe* that since the *tanzimat*, the condition of the Slavonic and Greek Christians in Turkey is vastly superior to that of their countrymen in Russia, Austria, and Prussia.—*Eastern Europe*, vol. i. p. 150.

\* P. 44.

† "The grand duchesses of Russia are pre-eminently tools of policy in the hands of the Czars. Whoever they marry, they never change their religion, whose absolute head is the Czar, their father. Hence, their husband has but little authority over them, and their father rules supreme; an alliance with them is not a marriage, but a Russian protectorate and occupation. The Grand Duchess Olga has married the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg, which is thus protected, though not yet annexed. Denmark would similarly have been called upon to give up the keys of the Sound, if death had not severed the alliance. The marriage of the Grand Duchess Marie with the Prince de Leuchtenberg extends Russian influence over the Court of Bavaria. The Empress of all the Russias, is a sister of the reigning King of Prussia. The Czarovitch is married to a Princess of Darmstadt, whose sister is Queen of Greece. The Emperor Alexander was married to a Princess of Bavaria. In fact, where are we to stop in this web?"—*Leouzon le Duc*, p. 96.

‡ See Appendix, on the Republic of Cracow.

emerged from the frozen fastnesses of the North, to enter upon the political stage of Europe—since the first metamorphosis of the Czar of Muscovy into the Emperor of Russia—shows that universal empire is its invariable aim. We shall, however, form a very inaccurate estimate of the nature of such an empire, if we trust the descriptions of those who have seen and heard most:—“If you can bring yourself to imagine the all but complete triumph of the will of one man over the will of God, you will understand Russia.” It is, moreover, imagined by liberals, that whilst imbecility and indecision have characterised the foreign policy of most European states before and since the Peace, Russian diplomacy since Peter the Great has steadily and consistently overthrown the bulwarks of surrounding states, and made lodgments in its neighbours’ territory, by the machinery of treaties, protocols, and declarations.

Both here and on the Continent, it has been customary to misrepresent the aggressive power of Russia; but connected with the little incident of Cracow, there were some circumstances, trivial in themselves, which rather draw attention to the fact, that the only natural frontiers upon which Prussia, and even Austria, can rely, are the prudence, poverty, and forbearance of the Russian Emperor. Nay, more recent events have shown that Austria only exists on the sufferance of Russia, which finds it more convenient and safer to govern her neighbours under their own name. Similarly, the Courts of Constantinople and Teheran have long been assisted by the Russian Embassies, and all their officials for years past had learnt to value the influence, or smile at the caresses, of Russian diplomacy. It is only by a convulsive effort, that Turkey has at length been roused to resistance, for the protectorate had long stretched its arms around the Ottoman Empire.\* “Russian diplomacy has been a double-edged sword, with the hilt in St.

\* For specimens of the influence on Turkey at the time of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, see Auldjo’s *Visit to Constantinople*, 1833. It is needless to repeat that Austria, since 1849, is under the protection of Russia, and has lost its free will. Persia appears, likewise, to be docile to Muscovite diplomacy, which is reported to be engaged in influencing the Courts of Bokhara and Cabul, and to have forwarded a note to Stockholm, insinuating the propriety of closing its ports to British ships. It remains to be seen if these northmen, the descendants of the Varendians, the ancient masters of Muscovy, will become its servants. News from the Pacific announce, moreover, that a Russian squadron is scrutinising Japan and China.

Petersburg, and its blade through the heart of Europe.”\* It is, perhaps, unfortunate, that in England, for many years, there has existed an almost entire indifference about matters of foreign policy, except in cases where religious fanaticism or commercial interests are involved. A storm can be raised about Mr. Pritchard, Miss Cunningham, or about Oregon; but Hungary and Poland may perish through a combination of accidents, without ruffling our serenity. This apathy and non-interference might be highly justifiable, if we had an abler diplomacy and a national representation. But England often commits her honour and interests to inefficient functionaries, who carry on their secret machinations in the diplomatic laboratory, mining and countermining with protocols, secret despatches, and *precis*, as their implements. Happily, our aristocracy has too much public spirit and generous blood, to intentionally profit by the national confidence, in thus intrusting its dearest interests to the care of a class, without supervision, and with closed doors; and many of our foreign ministers and envoys have been equally distinguished for ability and integrity. But the secondary instruments and minor wheels of our diplomacy are utterly unfit to compete with the experienced veterans of the Muscovite and Vienna schools.† England has no worthy army of diplomatic representatives, and till she has, she will be exposed to be foiled and over-reached. Nor is it by resorting to the Manchester School, that this evil will be remedied. As well seek for strategy in a Quaker. Well-meaning and even high-principled men are not enough to meet the bureaucratic champions of Russia on equal terms. Diplomacy is not learnt in a day, and the most artful and dexterous envoys and agents are not to be defeated by millowners or the oracles of Exeter Hall.

\* *The Topic.* M. Leouzon le Duc informs us, that the high Russian police assumes Protean forms in all countries. It appears in kid gloves and black coat at balls; in shops under the livery of shopmen or clerks; in theatres as ballet-dancers; in the streets and *emeutes*, under the mask of patriotism and democracy! He saw one of its most noted agents with a large red cockade frequenting the streets of Paris in February, 1848! Russians are even mentioned who found agents of this police under the most seductive forms in the most secret and private rendezvous. This police is seen roving about everywhere, where a conscience is to be corrupted, or a pen to be bought. With hands full of gold and seductive promises, it marches to its goal. It was through its corrupting influence that the whole scheme of the campaign of Napoleon, in 1812, was revealed beforehand to Tchernitcheff, aide-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander.—P. 386.

† See Despatches of Mr. Wroughton.

Equally injurious to our foreign policy have been the contracted reasonings and pusillanimous spirit of the latter party. Never will our national dignity be truly upheld in foreign lands till our educated classes cast aside the fables of the Peace Society, and the tutelage of men who, professing to advocate the cause of justice and humanity, are the most efficient instruments of despotism, spiritual as well as temporal. We commend the perusal of the following despatches to the visionaries of the Peace Congress, and if they rise persisting in the belief that non-resistance is possible to men under certain existing circumstances, we should be disposed to fear that a considerable class of the population of this country is beginning to lack that common sense for which it was once thought to be remarkable.

Most of the documents contained in this work have not appeared in print in Western Europe before, though several of them have been well known in Poland, and elsewhere, for half a century.\* It will be found that they are characterised by the usual ability of Russian diplomatic documents, and that they display throughout certain uniform and broad principles which cannot be mistaken.

The honour of Christianity, which is naturally confounded with the Greek-Russian Church, is to be supported and promoted at the expense of peace, and in violation of treaties. That religion is to be consolidated and established on the ruins of order, and watered by the blood of generations. The glory of God is to be made the pretext for protection and annexation, with or without the consent of the people on whom these blessings are conferred. We trust that it will be interesting to the reader to find in these

\* The great ornaments of Russian diplomacy for the last thirty years, whose names appear chiefly in the sequel of this work, are—General Pozzo di Borgo, Count Nesselrode, Prince Lieven, and at an earlier date, Prince Repnin.—General Pozzo di Borgo was a native of Corsica, and whilst his compatriot Napoleon went forth to establish a brilliant and solid despotism in the West, and to bless Italy and France with an enlightenad code, he forswore his country, and associating himself with the Northern Courts, we behold him a pillar of unholy alliances and the representative of hyperborean obscurity at the Court of Paris.—Count Nesselrode appears to be a kind of amphibious being, presenting many Protean phases of development. He was born of German parents, on board a British ship, on the coast of Portugal, and christened according to the rites of the Anglican church. Originally a lieutenant of cuirassiers, he was transformed into an attaché of Tchernitcheff, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, under Napoleon the Great, and he has ultimately become the glory of the Russian Cabinet.



memorials of Russia's past, the proofs of the interest with which she has uniformly promoted her comprehensive views under the veil, and in conformity with the spirit, of the Gospel.

Let us sum up what has been said.

The merits of the dispute between Russia and the West seem to rest mainly on two points. Russia and her advocates vindicate her encroachments: 1st, on the ground of utility; 2nd, on that of principle. They maintain: 1st, that the protection, occupation, and annexation of neighbouring countries is a boon to them; 2nd, that the protectorate of the Greek Church in surrounding states, calls for the interference, and falls to the lot of Russia. It may be worth while to analyse these points a little more closely, and endeavour to set the matter at rest. Impartial writers inform us "that Russia cannot bear the least comparison intellectually with the other states of Europe. Forty million serfs are plunged in the most brutal ignorance, and her nobles have only superficial accomplishments. Russia affects equality with the West, yet her *chefs d'œuvres* in literature would rank as third-rate in England, France, and Germany. The number of eminent Russian writers does not exceed twenty or thirty: compare this with the constellations of the West. This is confessed by honest Russians themselves. The censorship alone destroys all intellectual life—the most inoffensive works being condemned as liberal. The human mind only bears fruit in proportion to its cultivation, but not more than 400,000 receive any instruction in the Russian Empire. How can learning and instruction flourish in a country where their fruits are discouraged, and lead to ruin and dishonour? Better trust in gold and intrigue. These are the true secrets of fortune and honour in Russia. To buy a riband or a place, is wisdom! To seek to deserve them, is folly! As for religious instruction, it is a mere system of gymnastics, having for its object to exercise the people in genuflexions and making orthodox signs of the cross, the whole being crowned by a sort of dogmatic theory, of which the two extreme points, which are almost identified, are—God and the Czar."\*

\* As an illustration of the intellectual characteristics of Russia, we take the following specimens from the pages of Baron Haxthausen, a warm partizan of Muscovy:—"Amongst the Russians, every social power makes its authority respected by blows, which however do not affect friendship or love in the least. Everybody thrashes in Russia; the father beats his son, the husband his wife, the lord or his steward the peasants on his land, without provoking the slightest

"The Russians, of all European nations," Mr. Kohl observes, "seem to place most value on exterior show, and the least on inward worth. The Russians swim like dolphins on the surface, and shun the deep waters. They stand, in this point of view, as in many others, alone in Europe; and all other nations, even the French, Italians, and Spaniards, form a striking contrast to the Russians, who touch only the surface of justice, truth, or science, but work most elaborately at the details of the outward casing. This makes itself felt in their tribunals, where the whole hierarchy of presidents, upper judges, lower judges, secretaries, etc., are in the best order, but where no justice is to be had. It is the same in the army, commerce, and education, where the outward appearance is irreproachable, but the very heart's core is worthless." \*

Thus, from the avowal of impartial and even friendly pens, the aggression of Russia is the encroachment of ignorance on knowledge—of darkness on light. We leave the reader to infer the utility of such a progression.

But, secondly, Russia advances her pretensions of protectorate over Turkey, as she did over Poland, as the representative and right arm of the Eastern Church. Yet, if we may believe respectable authorities, the Russian Church has undergone such changes since the period when it was first founded as a branch of the Byzantine, that it presents scarcely a trace of resemblance to its parent. The Greek Church uses the Greek tongue, the Russian the Slavonic. The Russian Church has suppressed the patriarchal authority, which Peter the Great added to the crown, avowedly because he feared a spiritual rival like the Mikado of Japan, or, rather, because he wished to appropriate to the imperial dignity all the lustre accru-

bitterness or ill blood. The very back of the Russians is accustomed to stripes, and yet the stick makes a greater impression on the nerves of their backs than on their souls!"—*Leonzon le Duc. Instruction Publique et Littérature.*

\* Kohl's *Russia*, p. 146.—If the reader wishes for a graphic account of the knout, and of running the gauntlet, let him read *The Knout and the Russians*, by M. de Lagny. After this perusal, he will have a partial notion of the *Plitt* and its victims, with their flesh harrowed and cut into stripes, with starting eyeballs, foaming mouths, and green or blue skin like a rotten corpse, while the executioners (often soldiers of the Imperial army) have to administer the balance of the strokes on a festering carcass. Perhaps, after this perusal, he may be less fascinated by the bland advances of Russian diplomacy. Compared with such horrors, the bow-string and the scimitar are the emblems of mercy, if we are weak enough to give ear to the evidence of facts.

ing to a supreme ecclesiastical office. Thenceforth the Czar could not only say, "I am the State," but also, "I am the *Church!*"\* As a blind and a pretext, the Holy Synod was charged with the suppressed patriarchal duties. But what is this Synod? As more will be said on this point in the sequel, it suffices to state, that it is a real bureau, whose employés are inspired, directed, and controlled by a procureur appointed to represent the Czar. This procureur is now a general of cavalry, who would appear rather out of character representing the Russian Church at a Byzantine œcumenical council.

Passing to the Greek Church at Constantinople, we find that, though placed under the Mussulman sceptre, it preserves its freedom of action, and all its faculties of spiritual independence, whilst the Russian Church, under an orthodox sceptre, has lost all life and spirituality, the bulls of the patriarchs being replaced by the ukases of the Czars. Hence all assimilation between the Russian and Byzantine Churches is impossible. We are told that Russia loves to style herself holy. M. Leouzon le Duc, a very gentle writer, who lived long in Russia, confesses that he could never obtain a clear insight into this sanctity. "Without dwelling on the frightful immorality infecting the towns and country, the hosts of bastards, swelling to the amount of 12,000 annually, in the Foundling Hospitals of St. Petersburg and Moscow, founded by the Empress Catherine, the modern Messalina, and styled *blessed sanctuaries and temples of humanity*,—without speaking of the infidelity of the

\* Extracts from the official Catechism, relating to the duties of the orthodox to their Sovereign :—

*Question.* According to religion, what do the subjects owe to the Autocrat of all the Russias?—*Answer.* Adoration, submission, obedience, fidelity, the paying of taxes, service; love, boundless thanksgivings and prayers to God; in short, all that may be summed up in these two words, adoration and fidelity.

*Question.* How is the Autocrat to be worshipped?—*Answer.* By all the means that man possesses; by words, signs, actions, and proceedings; in short, by the inmost acts of the heart.

*Question.* How are we to prove our love?—*Answer.* By helping, according to our ability, in the boundless success of our Autocrat, of his empire, which is our country, and of all his family.

*Question.* What are the supernatural motives?—*Answer.* First, the Autocrat is an emanation from God; he is His viceregent and minister; disobedience to his authority is direct disobedience to the Divine Will, from which all power emanates.—*Leouzon le Duc*, p. 96.

upper classes, and the indifference spreading among the clergy,\* this French author fixes upon slavery,† and says we must have a strange notion of the holiness of a nation which leaves forty millions out of forty-five in a state not far removed from the brute. Did not Christianity emancipate the Roman serfs? Before proclaiming herself a holy nation, it would be well for Russia to strive to become a nation of men."

Whilst the public mind is anxiously engaged with the immense crisis now pending, it appears that we may advance the cause of wisdom and justice, by publishing, in the following pages, a series of documents containing salutary warnings and marvellous analogies with existing circumstances. These documents are, many of them, buried in obscure recesses, or have only been saved from destruction by a lucky accident, or Providence. The source whence they have been derived will be generally referred to in a note attached to each.

It only remains for us to add that the ensuing papers were originally collected, translated, and published in France, and that strong internal evidence shows the Editor to be a Pole, who appears to have been practically, as well as theoretically, intimate with the diplomatic history of Eastern Europe in general, and of Poland in particular.

Reverting to the Byzantine Church, we ask, once more, how can Russia claim any protectorate save one of a purely political character? Every protectorate implies a brilliant superiority in the protector over the object protected, and a decided improvement secured thereby to the latter. But, with the foregoing facts, how can this state of things harmonise with a Russian protectorate of the Greek Church? To accept the Russian protectorate would not be to

\* "If any one ask a Russian who may have already dined, to eat again, he will often answer, 'Am I a priest, that I should dine twice over?' This is almost a proverbial expression. A Russian driving out and meeting a pope, holds it for so bad an omen, that he will rather turn back, if he have not by immediate spitting warded off the evil influence."—*Kohl*, p. 263.

† "The Russian Church, in the Council of Moscow, 1595, confirmed the institution of slavery which had been established a year before by Boris Godounoff; and it did not scruple to give its assent to the severest regulations subsequently introduced into slavery, especially those of Alexis Michaelowitch,"—*La Russie Contemporaine*, p. 203.

emancipate the Byzantine Church from the Sultan, but to surrender to the Czar.

We shall conclude this brief attempt to hoodwink and set to sleep the suspicions of Britain regarding Russian policy, by observing that it would be idle to seek for the cause of the present crisis in the East, in accidental, temporary, and local circumstances, and to trace it all to the ambition of one Emperor. This good or evil is of remote origin. To know its cause, we must go back three centuries, and abjure some of the favourite maxims of modern political philosophy. In proof of this, we beg the reader to observe that the enemy who now provokes the united opposition of the civilised world, has long been held to be the protector of order, and the security of the world; whilst, fundamentally, there seems some slight reason to believe that, ever since its first existence, it has done nothing but sow the seeds of troubles and revolutions. It is the Government which, bound by treaties to all the Cabinets, always managing to stand at the head of European diplomacy, lays snares in every note and protocol, with consummate craft, and brings them to light at the proper time and place. This enemy is the Empire which lately proclaimed itself the defender of the independence of nations, whilst it has only grown and risen by annexing surrounding cities, republics, and kingdoms, in order more effectually to protect all the other states that it approaches in its rise. This enemy is a Christian church, which has just begotten and fostered the present tempest, and whose heads, for long years past, have been the recipients and propagators of hereditary fraud—*avitam fraudem*.

Europe knows this, and remembers ancient Rome; and she holds 2,000,000 of men in readiness to stem this foe.

Rome, the mistress of the old world, likewise provoked the curse of captive nations. But Rome, whilst pursuing her providential career, carried all the blessings of civilisation into the conquered countries, and in her zenith she bore a growth of sublime virtues, which she has bequeathed as a legacy to humanity.

Russia, emerging from the chaos of barbarism, armed with a material force borrowed from civilisation, whilst stifling its divine principle on all hands, leaves, as its legacy to the vanquished and to posterity, the organised stagnation of society, and the passive obedience of individuals.

A universal monarchy is not the destiny of nations. Barbarism overthrew it in former times—will civilisation do its duty in the present day?

The library of the British Museum contains the prophetic advice of one of the Kings of Poland:—"Beware," wrote Sigismund Augustus to Queen Elizabeth, "of suffering your merchants to furnish the Muscovite with your cannon, your powder, and your industry; do not suppose that he is my enemy alone—he is also that of CHRISTENDOM."

The British and French fleets in the Bosphorus await the signal for the struggle. Russia advances without heeding them; she does not fear reverses. She has already suffered terrible disasters, but always rose from them with greater distinction. *Mersus profundo clarior erexit.*

What she fears is a consecutive system observed in the attacks of her foes, and the choice of means adopted by them—what she fears is a signal retribution inflicted on her, after defeat—a *Deus Terminus* to her ambition.

## SECRET AND UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

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LETTER OF HELEN, WIFE OF ALEXANDER JAGEL-  
LON, KING OF POLAND, TO HER FATHER, IVAN  
WASILEWICZ, GRAND DUKE OF MUSCOVY.

DATED FROM WILNA, 1502.

The Queen complains that, notwithstanding the Treaties and Oaths formed with Russia, Poland should still be subjected to its incursions and invasions—Her Marriage even is considered in Poland as a precursor of sinister intentions—Full liberty is allowed her in the profession of her schismatic religion.

ALEXANDER, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Lithuania, my lord and husband, has sent his ambassadors to your Serenity to complain of the injuries which his dominions, as well as his numerous towns and dependencies, suffer at the hands of your subjects.

By the permission of God and the audacity of wicked men, much blood has already been shed, and continues still to flow, women and children are dragged into slavery, the holy faith decays, our churches are deserted; *and all this notwithstanding your treaties, your oaths and alliances, Christian monarchs!* Remember, my lord and father, that

I am your servant and your daughter; that you have given me in marriage to a king who is your brother and your equal.

You know, my lord and father, what I brought him as my dowry. Yet he received me from you without hesitation, and has kept me all these years in abundance, whilst his respect and affection have been unceasing. *He has allowed me full liberty to follow my religion according to the rites of the Greek Church, to have popes, deacons, and singers at my court, to frequent the churches of my communion, and in all respects to follow our liturgy as well in Lithuania as in Poland, in Cracow, and in all the other towns of Poland; and in this, as in all other things, I cannot discover the slightest infringement (on his part) of the treaties made between you.*

My lord the king, his mother, and all here, thought that from Moscow I brought them every kind of good—peace, affection, alliance, help against the Pagans—but it is now only too certain, my lord and father, that my sole escort has been murder, rapine, and violence, the effusion of much Christian blood, women made widows and children orphans, slavery, tears, and sighs.

Is this your love for me, my lord and father? I, who am your servant and your daughter? I should prefer to die in your country at your feet rather than to hear it said—*he has sent his daughter to Lithuania the more easily to ensnare and enslave the country! . . .*

Reflect, lord and father, I pray you. Cease to nourish an unjust wrath against a brother and your son-in-law, and return to the former state of friendship and of brotherhood which you swore in the treaties to observe towards him. So that the Pagans and traitors, whose fathers in the past betrayed your ancestors, as the sons now at this time betray us, may no longer have cause for joy. They it is who have



brought about this unsettled state of things between us ; as, for example, that second Judas, Semen Bielski,\* who, since his stay in Lithuania, has alienated his brother Théodore from us. Think only, my lord, how impossible it is to place any confidence in these modern Cains, who do not hesitate to massacre their own brothers, and are also plunged up to the neck in blood ! You will learn from the ambassadors sent to you that the King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania, has in no way infringed the treaties. . . . Do not refuse him your former love as to a brother and a son-in-law—so that my bitter tears may be changed to joy ! . . .

\* “ We admit that Ivan violated the clauses of the treaty of peace in receiving the homage of the Princes of Lithuania, but he found *an excuse sufficiently weighty in the necessity of protecting his brothers in religion.*” It is the celebrated Russian historian Karamzin who makes this naïve avowal, without troubling himself to furnish proofs of the persecutions carried on against the traitor Bielski.

## PRIVATE DESPATCH OF GENERAL POZZO DI BORGIO.

DATED FROM PARIS, 4TH (16TH) OCTOBER 1825.

General Pozzo di Borgo being requested by the Imperial Cabinet of St. Petersburg to pronounce his opinion upon the Union which appeared to be formed between the European Powers, and the project of the Emperor to put an end to diplomatic tergiversation, draws a picture of the tendencies of the different Courts, and deduces, "The necessity to show ourselves inexorable, and uphold by force against force the rights which they presume to contest with us—We should resolve to retaliate all the evil premeditated against us, without fearing the vicissitudes that war may bring.—This resolution formed, use must be made of the Greeks and Servians—By secret agents we must penetrate to the capital, and act with promptitude."

YOUR Excellency announces to me in one of your private despatches, dated the 6th (18th) of August, that the Imperial Cabinet, convinced by experience of the impossibility of persuading the Allies to contribute effectually to the pacification of the East, has decided to break off negociations, which henceforth can only lead to an interminable controversy.

This course being adopted, his Majesty has been pleased to order his Representatives at the Courts of Austria, France, England, and Prussia to assume an attitude of reserve, guided by instructions upon the subject.

The Emperor also desires that, in a secret and confidential despatch, my opinions should be made known to him respecting the nature of the union which appears to be formed between the other Powers in order to paralyze the enlightened views of his Majesty relative to the pacification of the

East; upon the degree of force which the opposition we meet may attain; upon the part which England may take in this; upon the best means of disconcerting their plans; and, should the apprehensions expressed in the despatch be realized—upon the measures most likely to ensure the rights, the interest, and the dignity of the Russian empire, without endangering the general peace.

The task which his Majesty has enjoined I should consider as the most *marked* favour, if the difficulty it presents did not inspire me with distrust of myself, and in some degree with terror.

The question upon which your Excellency desires me to give an opinion, embraces the dignity and the most precious interests of the empire: the way in which it shall be decided will have a great influence upon the world in general. The complication of difficulties with which this eventful period, and the false political schemes of our Allies, have enveloped it, increases the danger, and it is only from obedience that I dare approach it.

There is, however, a consideration which ought to put an end to all hesitation: this is the necessity which obliges it. It is impossible for us to remain any longer in the position in which we are; neither can they who for four years have surrounded us with their entanglements, and who reckoned erroneously upon the success of their calculations, expect to keep us there. Both honour and interest command us to leave it. The only question is, the most prudent choice of means by which we may arrive at the most suitable decision, and one the least likely to endanger general tranquillity.

This last clause, however, cannot be absolute; otherwise both argument and measures would become impracticable. The question must be treated in two distinct parts: the resolutions which the Imperial Cabinet may adopt, and the man-

ner in which these resolutions will be viewed by the Allies, or a part of them. The first depends on our judgment and sagacity; the second on that of others. Our duty, therefore, in this position, is to do nothing likely to call forth either complaints or resistance; but if, after having acted in a manner conformable to the dignity of the empire, and with justice and equity in general; if, after having scrupulously observed all the precepts of good faith, and demanded the confidence which we have a right to expect; if foreign injustice or jealousy should aspire to inadmissible exactions, then everything would enjoin the necessity to show ourselves inexorable, and to sustain by force the rights which force should attempt to contest with us.

Your Excellency will permit me to add, that nothing, in my opinion, has contributed more to encourage our Allies in the treacherous conduct, and in the false system of politics which they have pursued in respect to the affairs in the East, than the certainty they have felt, that war or coercive measures on the part of Russia towards the Porte were in no wise to be anticipated. Strong in this conviction, and far from seeing in the generosity of the Emperor another reason for entering into the benevolent views of his Majesty, they, on the contrary, have taken advantage of them to ensure the success of their own; that is to say, to procure for the Turks both time and means to make good their side of the question, and to settle it, not according to the treaties and a reciprocal adaptation resulting from circumstances, but exclusively in accordance with the interests and pretensions of the Porte.

The tendency of this observation is not to counsel an open rupture without taking every precaution indicated by prudence in order to avoid it, but to familiarize us with the idea that we are ready to undertake it; and, I may add, to risk everything, if necessary, in order to uphold that which

we consider indispensable to the maintenance of our rights, of our dignity, and of that consideration which our Allies appear for some time past disposed to ignore.

The reproach of disturbing the alliance, or of exposing it to serious alterations, cannot affect us. The world is convinced, as are also the Allies without exception, that the Emperor is far from wishing to abuse his power, or to make a trial of theirs. If, then, his Majesty decide to take such measures as are most likely to bring about a solution of the question which now occupies us, the other Cabinets, if they are wise, far from feeling any alarm, will take advantage of it as a fit argument for deciding the Porte to enter into the views which they themselves have regarded as the most desirable, and which they have presented to it under different forms. Such is the line of conduct which diplomacy, united to gratitude, ought to dictate to them; but if, notwithstanding the well known disposition of our august Master, the other Sovereigns, or some of them, should take up arms against us, less on account of our violation of peace than because of the decision of our Cabinet, to put an end to their tergiversation and to its own forbearance;—we should then resolve to defend ourselves to the utmost, and to inflict on them the evil they would do unto us, without fearing the vicissitudes which war or fortune may bring, more than they themselves would fear them.

The aim of the alliance is specified by the fact of its formation, and in the others which have followed. The affairs of the East in their present state are in no wise included in the alliance. Strictly speaking, his Majesty the Emperor had the right to maintain this exclusive principle, and to interfere even as regards the outbreak of the troubles in Greece, without any other intervention: his generosity, however, decided otherwise. But far from appreciating a

policy entirely European and disinterested, it has been made use of by the other Powers as a weapon against Russia. This conduct replaces us in our original position, and we resume our rights with entire liberty to regulate our conduct according to our own judgment, and without other limits than those fixed by our own prudence.

It is well known, concerning the general principles of the union of the European Powers, that the Imperial Cabinet has been its most firm supporter. All the continental states have felt the effects of this; and it is under the auspices of a peace which we have maintained and fostered, that England has freed herself from intestinal difficulties, and has seized the opportunity for advancing her commercial interests throughout the world. Public prosperity and general security, far from confirming the Powers in the observance of the principles which first originated it, have more or less inclined them all to overlook it. Great Britain separated herself from the alliance as soon as she thought she had derived all possible advantage from it; Austria invoked it when the preservation of Italy from a revolutionary movement was in question, then neglected it, and made it answer her own ends in the affairs of the East, and deserted it entirely in those of Portugal and Brazil. France on her part, or M. de Villèle who governs it, appears to be tired as well as almost ashamed of it. His first object seems to be the desire of persuading every one that he acts independently of general co-operation, and that he acknowledges no other system than that which he believes expedient for the exigencies of the moment, for the position he fills, or for the liberal principles to which he offers up a sacrifice of every other.

The recognition of Hayti's independence eight months after the most solemn promises had been made to the contrary, the secrecy with which the operations had been carried on, the

scandalous circumstances which accompanied them, the advantages which the liberals of France and of all other countries have derived, the consequences which cannot fail to be the result, far from stopping this Minister in his career, serve only to advance him in it. He is already prepared to acknowledge the governments formed from the debris of Spanish power in America; and if he hesitate, it is not out of respect either for the alliance or from principle, but solely because France even more than England requires the co-operation, or at least the sufferance, of Spain, on account of the political and moral position of that country, and of the influence which all events relating to it have in France.

Your Excellency will understand that my aim in making these preliminary observations is not to cast odium on our Allies, nor to excite feelings of irritation against them. They are merely intended to define the present position of things, in order to form the most important resolution which, since the peace and the establishment of the new order of things thus brought about, we have been called upon to determine.

The nature of the question, the rapidity of events, and the attitude we have assumed towards Europe, will not permit any further delay in making known the course we shall judge fit to adopt.

The Emperor has wisely put an end to negotiations which can lead to nothing but unending dispute. His Majesty has further enjoined his Cabinet and Representatives to the strictest silence and reserve. If we do not assume an imposing attitude, take effective measures, and make known our determination of carrying them out, we shall lose by our present position the object we have in view. I submit to the penetration of the Imperial Minister the effect which our inaction and the position in which we have placed ourselves, will have upon our Allies and upon the world in general.

There is one very singular circumstance, which cannot fail to excite our attention.

At the commencement of the troubles in Turkey, Europe as well as the belligerent parties had their eyes turned towards Russia, though with sentiments widely differing. This was naturally the case, Russia having of all the Powers the greatest interest in attending to these movements. After four years of conflicts, of intrigues, and a thousand other incidents inseparable from a state of affairs which excludes no one interest, and which allows our feelings no repose, Russia alone is considered unworthy the notice of either Europe, of Turkey, or of Greece.

England furnished succours through the medium of her liberals, and gained influence by her squadrons, and by her government of the Ionian Isles. The Greeks or some of their chiefs implore her protection and are ready to give themselves up upon any terms. Whether this offer be accepted or not, the fact of its existence is very remarkable.

France on her side sends officers to Egypt to discipline the Arabs destined for subduing the Greeks, whilst she tolerates committees at Paris in their cause.

In the conferences at St. Petersburg, Austria associates herself with the pacific intervention, and at the same time combines with the Turks in forming plans for a campaign. She sends agents in secret intelligence with Ibrahim Pasha, orders her navy to show itself favourable to the Mussulmans, and paralyzes the united operations of the Allies, by the hope of seeing the question decided by the sole agency of the Porte.

In this drama Russia alone has neither part to play, nor place. She is left out of all associations, or rather there seems a tacit agreement to keep her in this position.

Your Excellency's despatch announces the decision of his



Majesty to bring this state of things to a conclusion, and therefore the only question left to determine is the choice of a line of conduct most suitable to the views of his Majesty.

If the Russian Cabinet consults only its own strength, and permit me to add, its own interests, exclusive of every other consideration, war with Turkey would be the most decisive and perhaps the safest part to take, but on the other hand the advantages of a more cautious though firm mode of procedure, are also very great, as by affording our Allies the power of joining in it, a refusal on their part would render them more odious, and because it is wiser not to renounce the character of peacemaker in Europe, with the support of motives whose justness no one could contest.

In taking this principle as guide, my opinion is, that we should adhere fundamentally to the principle proposed by us and accepted by the Allies, respecting the pacification of the East, whilst we virtually adopt of our own accord those measures, which we should prefer to employ in conjunction with the Allies to force the Turks to peace.

It was agreed at the conference at St. Petersburg, that it was both just and prudent to propose a collective intervention to the Turks. The Imperial Cabinet further suggested the expediency of coercive measures in case the Porte refused to listen to more amicable insinuations.

The Allies have declined this overture, and the Divan in the meanwhile has rejected their counsels and demands as well as ours.

It was the duty of the Sovereigns who in a great measure had taken upon themselves the responsibility of the conduct of Turkey towards us, to enter into our views as soon as the Porte refused compliance, but they found it more convenient to remain quiet. In this position we have the right to employ alone the means requisite for carrying out a plan

already accepted by all, and to employ the same coercive measures which we have declared indispensable in case of a refusal from the Porte to accede to them.

In the original state of the question, the Emperor desired to act entirely as a member of the Alliance, and according to plans formed by general agreement. Now that this hypothesis, which would have suited every one, has not been realized from the opposition of our Allies, his Majesty will decide on these measures by himself, though always with the same end in view—viz., the plan of pacification which has been acknowledged as desirable, but which has not yet been put in practice because they refused to have recourse to it.

If the Allies had preserved the union which has cost us so many sacrifices, and if they had consented to employ coercive measures, the Emperor would have occupied with his troops the Danubian Provinces of Turkey, and justified the proceeding by its necessity for the tranquillity of Europe and the preservation of the Ottoman Empire itself.

It is my opinion, that we should ourselves do that which has not been done by the previous consent of the others, without changing either purpose or language, and leaving at the same time an opening for united action and intervention, at present illusory from the duplicity of our co-operators, and which would not fail to become decisive if they applied to it the energy that the generous principles of his Majesty and the strong position he would take could not fail to inspire.

In occupying the two Principalities, the Imperial Cabinet could declare—

That persons not belonging to these Provinces having disturbed their tranquillity, the Court of Russia consented four years ago that forces might be sent there by the Porte to restore order.

Several engagements having taken place, the Russian troops on the frontiers observed the strictest neutrality.

That at the end of these disturbances and of these events, the insurrection was suppressed, and the Provinces delivered from the troubles which had agitated them.

That the accidental causes of disorder having disappeared, Wallachia and Moldavia regained by right their accustomed government and privileges, which had been secured to them in the treaties, and which Russia pledged herself to see enforced.

The inhabitants of the two Provinces had the more right to demand the execution of the above-named treaties, and to claim the protection of Russia, as neither of them directly nor indirectly had taken part in the troubles which had happened.

That far from yielding to such representations, the Porte persisted in keeping there a body of troops, and subjecting the people to ruinous exactions and sanguinary executions.

That the Emperor had the right to put an end by force of arms to so evident a violation of the most sacred engagements, but having taken into consideration the position in which several of the European States were then placed, his Majesty decided to tolerate conduct which he would otherwise have put a stop to instantly.

That to facilitate the restoration of a state of things admissible by the Court of Russia, it had confided its interest, and the entire negotiation, to the zeal and impartiality of the Allied Sovereigns.

That their representatives at Constantinople had insisted upon the re-establishment of the treaties between the two empires, which after many delays and unending tergiversation, was promised by the Porte.

That, notwithstanding this solemn promise, the Porte still continues to occupy the Provinces, and at this present

moment maintains a body of troops there under the denomination of Bach-Beschys-Aga; whose presence and authority is an express contravention of the above-mentioned treaties.

That the Cabinet of Russia made direct application to the Divan, to demand the cessation of this infringement of the contract existing between the two empires, and of the promise made to observe it, but that this proceeding, the last trial which the forbearance of the Emperor has thought fit to make, has met with the most obstinate refusal.

That in keeping troops in the two Provinces, and exercising an authority contrary to the treaties, the Porte could not use the pretext of protecting the country against an insurrection, which for three years had been quelled.

Its aim, therefore, is to change the state of politics, and efface the different transactions which have been determined in so clear and unmistakeable a manner.

That, this being the case, the Emperor is determined to uphold his rights by proper means, and no longer to permit them to be violated with impunity, against both justice and the representations made on the subject by the Allies as well as by his Majesty.

It may be added, that immediately after the troubles in Moldavia and in Wallachia, the massacre of the Greek clergy at Constantinople, and the insurrection in the Morea, having taken place, the Court of Russia hastened to represent to the Porte and to the Allies the gravity of these events, and the complications to which they would give rise.

His zeal and the delicacy of his procedure were misunderstood by the Porte to such an extent as to oblige his Majesty to break off diplomatic connections with it, but neither the violence of the Turks nor the immense losses which Russia experienced in her interests, could decide the Emperor to put an end to the sacrifices he made, and still

continues to make, from the desire he has not to occasion any change in the general position of affairs in Europe.

The knowledge of his rights, the nature of his relations with Turkey, of those existing after the conventions relative to Greece, and the maxims of a general and disinterested policy, led the Emperor to excite the zeal of his Allies in order to terminate through their intervention the exterminating war which desolated the two nations. His Majesty did more. He consented, at their desire, to re-establish the diplomatic relations which the conduct of the Divan had rendered impracticable, hoping by this condescension to dispose it to respect the treaties, and to listen to more pacific counsel.

After numerous unsuccessful attempts on the part of the Ambassadors at the Porte to effect any change, the Courts of Austria, of France, and of Prussia joined a few months ago with Russia, in conjuring it to allow them to use their good offices and their influence in bringing about a reconciliation compatible with the future security of both parties; and, above all, to obtain in the meanwhile a suspension of the ferocious hostilities which menaced the destruction of the present generation, and which excited the interest and animadversion of the whole world.

This overture was rejected by the Porte without eliciting a hope that either the sight of its own danger, or the rights which it attacks, and the interests which it compromises, might induce it to relent in its obstinacy.

This state of things having convinced the Court of Russia that neither its own forbearance, nor the intervention of the Allies, could effect any improvement in circumstances now become intolerable in every respect, it at length decided to put an end to the abuse of authority which the Turks now exercise in the two provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia contrary to

the treaties; and, as neither the remonstrances of the Allied Sovereigns, nor those of Russia, have been able to obtain the desired object, it is found requisite to employ the only means left in order to gain it, and to occupy the two above-named provinces with Russian troops.

In coming to this determination, the Emperor by no means intends to change the political state of the question. His Majesty is always ready to re-establish his relations with the Porte, such as they ought to be according to the treaties; and he thinks it requisite, both for the interests and the general tranquillity of all, to induce the Porte, by such means as are necessary, to adopt a system of conciliation towards Greece.

The Allies can make use of this proceeding on the part of Russia as another motive for renewing the negotiations, and the same arguments which the Porte so imprudently re-

This, your Excellency, is an outline of the explanations which it appears to me it would be prudent to communicate to all the Allies—without even excepting England—exhorting them to make the Divan estimate them so as to avoid a decided rupture, and, on the contrary, use them as a means of re-establishing negotiations.

Should this plan be accepted, it would be equally advisable to have an explanation with the Porte in most cautious terms, and to assure it, that if it does not precipitate us into war, the Emperor is ready—as his Majesty has always been—to terminate all differences, and to calm the troubles by conciliation. We ought, likewise, to notify all these acts to the United States of America, as a proof of regard on the part of the Imperial Cabinet, and of the value it sets on their opinion, and even on gaining their suffrage.

Respecting Sweden, we might make an exception towards it in our way of proceeding; and, by using a more confidential tone, flatter the self-love of its ruler, without neglecting any of the defensive precautions in Finland.

The project that I submit to your Excellency seems to offer no serious objection, either as regards its immediate execution, or relatively as to its principles. I own, however, that the work would be incomplete without an equally attentive examination of its consequences.

In order to obtain a correct appreciation of the obstacles that the other Powers might be inclined to oppose to us, it seems to me indispensable, in the first place, to obtain a definite notion of the attitude that we should assume towards them, because the evil that we shall experience at their hands will always be in inverse proportion to that which they will have to fear from us.

On the side of Turkey, we must, therefore, have all things

in readiness to penetrate as far as the capital, if we are reduced to the necessity of taking this resolution. The promptitude of the step would diminish its dangers, and defeat the combinations of our adversaries.

It would appear to me equally indispensable, in this case, to turn the Servians to account, as well as all the Christians generally, who might be willing to join us.

Directly that we decide on occupying the Provinces, there can be no objection to our establishing relations with the Greeks. All the Allied Sovereigns are already holding relations with them, and not one of them would be entitled to complain of our fomenting their insurrection after four years of unbroken reserve on our part.

In offering this opinion, I do not presume to suggest a measure that would imply an acknowledgment of that people, or any other engagements whatever. It would be sufficient to give them to understand, by secret agents, that their safety depends on the resolution adopted by his Majesty the Emperor, that they must be prepared to follow his directions, according to the course of events; and that they can, in the meantime, defend themselves against the Turks by all the means in their power, and all the more successfully, because the attitude assumed by Russia will prevent the Porte from directing all her forces against Greece.

Our army in Georgia ought likewise to be held in readiness. If we were obliged to carry on an uncompromising war with Turkey, it would be desirable, if possible, to draw Persia into it.

Being thus prepared on the side of Turkey, it is indispensable to be on the same footing towards Austria. When such great interests are at stake, policy requires a government to trust above all in its own strength; this is the surest



method of restraining that of other Powers, and of retaining their friendship, because peace becomes in that case their best interest.

Consequently, on the hypothesis that our troops have crossed the Danube, that we have made known the motives and object of this step to the other Powers, that they see our attitude and our determination to support it: let us examine what we have to fear from the rest of Europe, and what would probably then be the conduct of the Courts of London, Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, towards us, considered apart and united in the event of such a crisis.

If we might reckon on their sagacity, it would be the true policy of the three continental Courts to declare to the Turks, that the tempest hanging over them is the result of their own injustice and obstinacy; that their only means of safety is to accept the mediation, to consent to a truce with the Greeks, and to negotiations under the influence of the great Powers, in order to put an end to the troubles and to restore a state of things compatible with the preservation and safety of all parties. But we must not only reason on this hypothesis. If it really came to pass, it would offer us a very simple and easy course to follow. There is, however, another point of view, more obscure and more complicated, which we must discuss and analyze—*i. e.*, the possibility of an opposite disposition being manifested by the Allied Powers, collectively or separately.

England, three years ago, was entirely incapable of recommencing the war. Her situation has improved since that time; her embarrassments have ceased, her treasury has been enriched, and her pride enhanced, by a flood of real or factitious wealth.

The entrance of Mr. Canning into office, and his influence, as leader of the House of Commons, have weakened the old

relations subsisting between Russia and the British Cabinet. The difference of the principles advocated by the two Governments has almost destroyed those relations. Mr. Canning's line of conduct in Turkish affairs, proves that his feelings and policy with regard to us have not been modified by our unbounded trustfulness and our most evident sacrifices. His policy, as regards Russia, has been suspicious and jealous, which implies that it may ultimately become hostile.

It cannot be proved that this hypothesis will be changed into a reality ; but we must prepare to encounter this danger. Otherwise, we should be taken too much by surprise, if it came to pass.

Having once come to a clear understanding on this subject, we can, at the same time, reason on the opposite data that now exist, and that are calculated to suspend the hostile determination of the British Cabinet.

Notwithstanding the prosperity of the country, its development will be always more or less crippled by war. The English capitalists and manufacturers have employed immense funds, and formed gigantic enterprises in America. A rupture with us would, in some measure, create a panic affecting the rate of interest, it would increase the fall in the public funds, which has already commenced, and by rendering money, or what they call the *circulating medium*, dearer and more rare, it would occasion the failure of all those who have speculated on the prospect of its being cheap and abundant—i. e., at a low interest.

This war may do no harm, but it will not yield them any compensation, because they have no positive hold upon us. They will reap no benefit from it, save that of annoying us.

As soon as hostilities begin, the British will blockade our ports, and will attempt to put into practice the so-called right of search towards neutral states. The United States of

America will not endure this, which may give birth to angry discussions and a critical state of things.

If the British Cabinet declares itself in favour of the Turks, it will give up the Greeks to us, and under this hypothesis, it will be necessary for England to act against the latter. The conquests that it may make in the islands, or elsewhere, will rather increase its difficulties than its power. Already in the possession of Malta, Corfu, etc., it cannot be stronger than it is already, whilst we should, under those circumstances, unite all the Christians of European Turkey in our cause. Supposing, in the opposite case, that Great Britain should seek to aggrandize herself, and to assist, as it were, in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, it will, then, in a great measure, coincide with our system, and if its influence prevails at sea, on the theatre of war, ours will have the upper hand by land.

There is another circumstance which cannot fail to have a great influence on the decision of the British Cabinet. I mean the possibility of forming continental alliances against us. If it stood alone, it would undoubtedly feel more hesitation in declaring war upon us; or, at all events, though its efforts might be very annoying, they could not produce the desired end. We shall examine this question, as far as possible, by reasonings based on the ground of mere probability, when we come to speak of the dispositions of the other Powers.

The observations that I have now submitted to your Excellency with regard to what we have to expect from England, in case the proposed plan is put into execution, must lead us to infer that she may possibly declare herself against us, and that it is prudent on our part to prepare against this event; but they also show that her hostility, especially if unsupported by a co-operation of the continental Powers, will not hinder

the advance of our armies, and will not inflict upon us any intolerable evil; and that these circumstances will incline her to seek for a settlement, even after the rupture has taken place.

Austria is, in my opinion, the principal cause of the present critical state of the question engaging us. As early as the first year when the troubles broke out, Prince Metternich and Lord Castlereagh met at Hanover. The memoranda which they drew up together, clearly prove the plans which they adopted at that time; namely, to prevent the interference of Russia, either alone or in conjunction with other Powers, in Eastern affairs.

It would be useless to relate all the subterfuges by which the Cabinets of London and Vienna have had the address to attain their end; nevertheless, hitherto, notwithstanding their success, so far from removing the crisis, they have only made it far more probable and necessary.

It is true, that when Mr. Canning decided to have no share in the conferences at St. Petersburg, and he sent Mr. Stratford Canning to Vienna, to bring over that Court to his views, Prince Metternich rejected the proposition, and charged the British Minister with imprudence; but this conduct, though it appeared conformable to our own wishes, was dictated by entirely opposite motives.

The Court and State Chancellor regretted the absence of an English representative at the conference, in the light of an auxiliary opposed to our views, and not at all because he wished to become identified with our policy. If it had been otherwise, he would have adopted the latter; but since he has always combated, and still combats it, we must naturally infer that he would have encouraged the British Ambassador

of the British protectorate of Greece, results from the same principle. Prince Metternich does not wish the Turks to be checked or molested in their war against the Greeks, until the latter are subdued or exterminated. His great art has been to gain time for this conclusion by regaling the world year after year with illusions. The incident we have mentioned threatens to endanger his plans; he faces it, and so soon as he has set it aside he will return to his original views with a perseverance strengthened by success.

Hence, the well-known differences existing at the before-mentioned period, and even at present, between the Courts of Vienna and London, are nothing more than a dispute about the best way of injuring and deceiving us. It is my opinion that they still fundamentally agree, as they always have agreed, in both these attempts.

Yet, notwithstanding this connivance, they will discover their embarrassments directly the sword is drawn. Prince Metternich is reported to have said here, that he can always let loose England against us if we take up arms; but England will also require the Court of Vienna to come to a decision, and then Austria would be reduced to the necessity of encountering the greatest dangers, and of submitting to the greatest sacrifices.

Great Britain, without allies, though still powerful, becomes less formidable. If she ventures to compromise Austria, I am of opinion that she will become less formidable, because she will expose one part of her system to destruction. Accordingly, our true policy enjoins us to appear before the latter Power in a terrible form, and to persuade her, by our preparations, that if she dares to take steps against us, one of the most fearful tempests that she has ever experienced will burst upon her head.

The Turks are bad allies for those who seek to shield

them. Nothing would be easier, in an emergency, than to drop them, in order to face the army that advanced to protect them. Nor can the Austrian Cabinet be blind to these considerations, which are so obvious and evident.

It is my candid opinion, that Prince Metternich, far from plunging into this abyss of uncertainty, will combine with a system that he is incapable of defeating by his dexterity. It is probable that he will either declare to the Turks that they must listen to the propositions of arrangements presented to them, and that he will represent our entrance into the two Principalities as a resolution occasioned by their own imprudence, or he will seize upon such other provinces of the Ottoman Empire as shall suit him. In the former case, we should be already in harmony; in the second, we should become so. Therefore, the only accident we should have to fear, would be an open declaration against us. I have already observed that the probability of this occurring will diminish in proportion to the warlike attitude that we shall assume, and to the conviction that will be forced on the Court of Vienna respecting our intentions. The Court and State Chancellor is perpetually informing every one, including France—as I shall have the honour to show in another despatch—that he will make himself answerable for our resolutions. If he discovers his mistake by subsequent experience, he will either have to change language and conduct, or he will expose the monarchy to shocks that it will scarcely be enabled to sustain.

The character of this despatch does not permit me to enter on an enumeration of the comparative resources of the two empires, or their relative situation, or on their mutual ability of inflicting injury on each other, if this misfortune became unavoidable; but a simple inspection of the military and moral map of the two countries will suffice to show the

eventual fate of both, if they measure their strength against each other.

Prince Metternich cannot shut his eyes to these facts. If he adopts a prudent course, he will avoid war; if he becomes violent, he will be punished. With a ministry circumstanced like his, such a cabinet as that of Russia will find a thousand means of putting an end to the estrangement existing between us.

France had adopted a wise and reasonable course at the beginning of the troubles in the East. Whilst hoping that we should avoid extreme measures, and continually associated with us in our propositions for an adjustment, she was, nevertheless, decided to follow and side with us, if circumstances obliged the Imperial Cabinet to adopt different resolutions.

When M. de Villèle was placed at the head of the government, he found these maxims established. M. de Montmorency and M. de Chateaubriand were guided by them during their administration.

Baron de Damas shared the same views and sentiments, but with more vacillation and less firmness, because the President of the Council would not suffer him to act up to his views.

M. de Villèle never showed much partiality for Russia. The influence exercised by the Emperor, relating to the war in Spain, was virtually in the teeth of the Alliance, though the King of France owes his present security, and M. de Villèle the preservation of his authority, mainly to the conclusion of the war in Spain, and the extinction of the revolution in the Peninsula.

The liberals, having guessed the inclination of the Premier, called upon him, by the numberless channels through which they can manifest their opinion, to shake off (as they term it) foreign influence, and he has had both the weakness and the wickedness to yield to their insinuations.

He had ventured on unpopular, or at all events hazardous, financial operations, and he thought that he ought to make certain concessions to the liberal party, to counteract the effect of his errors, and of his improvidence. Accordingly, he was led to abandon those strict and unyielding principles which were then professed by the continental Allies, and on which the restoration of the Bourbons in France had been founded.

M. de Villèle, in thus deserting the colours of the Alliance, was fully conscious that his conduct would appear more reprehensible to the Emperor of Russia, than to all the other Sovereigns; accordingly, he assumed an attitude of stubborn resistance against his judge, because he felt that he had broken, if I may so express it, the association of monarchs.

Advancing in the career on which he had entered, this Minister proceeded to acknowledge the independence of the negroes of St. Domingo, and does not disguise his intentions concerning Spanish America. In following out this course, he has met with the approbation of England, and with the consent of the greater part of France, because the greater part of the nation, brought up under a government the creature of circumstances, wants this principle to be recognized, even by the Bourbons, who reign by hereditary right. The concession is dangerous, but M. de Villèle thinks it necessary, to keep in office, and secure the success of his financial system.

This digression, which does not seem to have any immediate connection with the affairs of Turkey, will not appear misplaced, because it indicates the motives which more or less cause the alienation of the French Cabinet from that of Russia. It describes the false position in which M. de Villèle is detained by the consciousness of his transgressions, and by a kind of approval that he obtains from the liberals, or from



the national vanity, whenever he gives out that he wishes to emancipate himself from foreign influence.

The Austrian Cabinet, far from appearing surprised at the defection of the French ministry from the general doctrines of the alliance of which they have shown themselves such strenuous supporters, has exhibited the completest indifference, which under the circumstances is equivalent to an approbation.

By pursuing this policy, Prince Metternich flattered M. de Villèle, and approximated to the views of England: two preliminaries well adapted to forward his plan, which is to sacrifice all to the success of his views respecting the direction, and the conclusion that he wishes to give to Eastern affairs.

M. de Villèle long hesitated, and still hesitates, in my opinion, respecting the path he ought to follow in so thorny a question. The fear that he felt, and still feels, of a war between Russia and Turkey, has led him, and would still lead him, in my opinion, to consent to all that might be proposed by the Imperial Cabinet, in order to force the Porte to a treaty. But Prince Metternich is incessantly persuading him, that all condescension on this point will only make the question more complicated, being convinced that the best way to gain time and to prolong the chances of ending the quarrel in favour of Turkey, is to resist our propositions. These tactics being fundamentally identical with the chief views of the English, provided they met with eventual success, and having hitherto been crowned with the desired success, have been adopted by M. de Villèle, because he has not such safe data on which to build if he follows another course.

The correspondence from Vienna contributes in keeping him in the dark. The reports of Count de Caraman are dictated by the Court and State Chancellor. All the intelligence that arrives from St. Petersburg, and all the conferences

with M. de Tatichtcheff, are communicated in Paris, explained and with comments, according to the sense that it pleases Prince Metternich to inculcate, as I shall show in a subsequent despatch. It is true that an entire reliance is not placed in these reports; but in doubtful circumstances, it produces the intended effect for the moment, which is that of keeping France in suspense and of raising difficulties.

This state of things will last until we adopt steps that will bring on a crisis. Then, as it will be necessary for the surrounding Powers to declare themselves, we shall see what they will say, and how they will act, under the real and positive circumstances that will result from our decision, whatever it may be.

France is far from fostering any ill will, and still less any enmity, against Russia. The Ministry that governs her may tell a falsehood or form an intrigue, but if it dared to utter a word about war or rupture with us, both the Ministry proposing such a course, and the King listening to it, would be exposed to an almost inevitable ruin at the expiration of six months.

To act against us they would be forced to side too openly with England and Austria; this servile dereliction would call forth a disaffection that would more than outweigh the jealousy occasioned by our enterprises. Besides, what compensation could be offered by the Courts of London and Vienna for the dangers and sacrifices to which a war would expose her? They would not suffer her to take a village or a rock. She would therefore be treated like a gladiator, led into the arena to give the spectators the pleasure of witnessing his death. Moreover, where could they find a field for action? England would derive no accession of strength from French fleets, and if French armies manage to come into contact with ours, which appears to me impossible, they know the fate that awaits them.

M. de Villèle sacrifices the general principles of the Alliance to his personal views as Minister of France, and to the necessity of the plans which he has hatched; and consequently to remaining in office. If he were to take part in a remote, expensive, and unprofitable war, his measures of interior administration would go to the ground, and the very existence of the present dynasty would be compromised. A circumstance, that should moreover add weight to these considerations, is the fact, that being placed between England and Austria, he can trust neither, and that having justly offended us, he must expect to be excluded from all future arrangement, which would not fail to be the natural conclusion of the crisis, whatever it may be, even if it were produced by the war that we wish to avoid.

My opinion is, that France will abstain from declaring against us; and if her evil genius should decide her to a contrary course, she would not be able to maintain it, because her geographical, political, and moral position does not admit of her taking part in a league against Russia.

Prussia being less jealous, and consequently more impartial, has shown constantly in her opinions that she had a just idea of the nature, and of the importance, of the affairs in the East, and if the Court of Vienna had shared her views, and her good intentions, the plan of the Imperial Cabinet would without any doubt have been accomplished.

Suppose then that Russia undertakes alone to put in practice the same coercive measures which Prince Metternich would not accede to, all tends to the supposition that Berlin will offer no opposition, and on the contrary, her unbiassed and friendly attitude will be a great restraint to the others, and contribute to make them desire a conclusion which, without being injurious to them, suits the interests and the dignity of Russia. These considerations sufficiently indicate the ne-

cessity of placing confidence to a certain extent in the Prussian Cabinet, and convince it that the part we destine for it will contribute to maintain relations between the two Courts, and the two Sovereigns, conducive to their mutual honour, and to the happy friendship which already exists between them.

Before making up my mind to the opinion I now submit to the Imperial Cabinet, I sought carefully to find some other way of proceeding in the affair which now occupies us, and which, though of a more pacific tendency, and less exposed to a chance of war, would be equally fitted to bring about an honourable result; but, I own, notwithstanding my wish for this, nothing presented itself to my reflections likely to effect it.

Our august Master sees already in his wisdom that the continuation of the conference of St. Petersburg, without a change of conduct on the part of the other intervening Powers, can only serve to encourage them in the system of duplicity and of deception, which more or less has guided them in the prolonged course of this negotiation.

The basis once fixed, the choice of two alternatives alone remains to us: either to abandon everything, and sacrifice the dignity, the rights, and the interests of Russia, or otherwise to form the resolution to decide as your Excellency commanded me, upon the means the most likely to secure the *dignity, the interests, and the rights* which are now compromised—justice, policy and honour, have decided the question.

In making a choice of measures, I have kept as near as possible to such as are not incompatible with the preservation of peace. Russia presented a plan which she desired to put into execution, in the name of the Alliance and with its consent. The sovereigns who have had it communicated to them, have not rejected it, but have only sought to neutralize its effect,

in order to gain time, and to give the Turks the opportunity for another campaign. This experiment has been made, and only renders the question more complicated, both as regards the Turks and Greeks, through the attempt, on the part of the latter, or of some amongst them, to place themselves under the protectorate of England.

On the other side, the state of things in the Principalities can no longer be tolerated; neither can the position of the Servians—driven to the necessity of revolting or of losing their privileges, that is to say, the security of their existence, and of their life—be allowed to become habitual.

In this situation, Russia decides to take those measures alone, which she desired to do with the general consent of her Allies. She declares to the other Sovereigns, that she has changed neither her views nor her dispositions, and invites them to press upon the Turks the considerations proposed in the former communication, that is to say, to agree to a suspension of arms, and to join in a congress in order to resolve on a proper arrangement of affairs.

If the Allies, or, to speak more correctly, if Prince Metternich, for everything depends on him, prefers peace to war, he will strive to do all that good sense and reason dictate, to maintain the one, and ward off the chances of the other. In the other case, Russia can have no motive to recede before dangers which he himself would brave.

It would doubtless be presumptuous to predict the course of conduct which the Court of Vienna would pursue in the previous hypothesis. It is, however, difficult to help feeling a certain presentiment, that it will not like to adopt extreme measures. War is a calamity for all. For Austria it would, in my idea, be ruinous. When Prince Metternich sees he can no longer rely on the success of his favourite scheme, which is, to reduce Russia to a cipher, and to enable the

Turks to continue the war without fear of interference, he will enter into the views of our Cabinet, because he will feel convinced that this will be the best means of avoiding the consequences of an open rupture.

It is probable that the Austrian Minister, far from exciting England to war, will try to induce her to accept the system of negotiations. He knows that if party feeling becomes embittered, and things are carried to extremes, that the Turks will be driven from Europe without regard to the quarrels which may result from the division of the spoil. This event would be the least desirable conclusion for the Court of Vienna. Even the increase of territory would insufficiently compensate for the disappointment she would feel at the new position we should occupy.

In proposing these considerations, I do not consider them as certainties: they are simply reasons, as a further aid to justify a plan formed on the basis of necessity, and as a condition, without which it would be impossible to secure the rights, the interests, and the dignity of Russia.

The commotion which our resolution will cause throughout Europe, will be proportioned to the way in which France and Prussia, and particularly Austria, will view it. If they accept our explanations, and join in our system, everything will remain *in statu quo*; if the contrary, those who raised the storm will thus imagine to shield themselves from the consequences of their own conduct. It would be carrying their pretensions to an absurd length, to expect from us the endurance of their deceptive procedures, and of their refusal to join in so just and so necessary an affair, merely because, if we oppose each other, disturbances will ensue. There is something extremely insulting in this, not indeed to ourselves—as it cannot touch us—but to reason and common sense.

When tracing this plan, I sought to keep my mind free from any influence, either favourable or the contrary, which might, in any degree, bias my judgment; I examined the present and past conduct of our Allies; I reasoned, without any kind of prejudice, on that which they may hold, according to the theory of probabilities; and I weighed all with respect to its effects on Russia; at the same time being on my guard not to overlook the opposite side of the question, or that which might happen to our Allies.

The good and the evil which they may experience in this affair, is in their own hands; we are not, on this account, obliged to fetter ours.

There is one point which I have no right to enter upon—namely, the actual means we have at our command to establish our rights, and to defend them in the different hypotheses I have supposed. I trust they are adequate to our position; and that our resolution, once formed, we shall adhere to it resolutely. Without this conviction, I could not venture to have made the least conjecture on the subject.

Before I bring this to a conclusion, I shall take the liberty to remind your Excellency, that, in deducing the motives and the aim of our commencement of action, and, consequently, of the entry of the Imperial troops into the two Principalities, I abstained from all declarations containing general promises of our disinterestedness, except those mentioned, and which imply the preservation of the pacific system, and of the co-operation of our Allies, in the measures proposed in order to maintain it. If it happen otherwise, either on the part of our Allies, or on that of the Turks, we must hold ourselves free to adapt our conduct to circumstances, and without anticipating renunciations likely to prove prejudicial, which are lightly estimated at the beginning of a struggle, and are very hurtful at its conclusion, because the cabinet which made

them diminishes thereby its means to negotiate, and deprives itself of the advantages which it might derive from these sacrifices, if, when ultimately it decides to incur them, it were in a position to demand a just compensation, or to obtain a full return for its generosity, from those who would be obliged to throw themselves upon it at the decisive moment.

Such, your Excellency, are the reflections which have presented themselves to my mind respecting the important question now pending. The orders of the Imperial Cabinet could have been more successfully obeyed, but not with greater zeal and submission.

I have the honour, etc., etc.



A SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH OF  
PRINCE LIEVEN.

DATED FROM LONDON, 18TH (30TH) OCTOBER, 1825.

Count Lieven, Russian Ambassador at London, being called upon, like General Pozzo di Borgo, to give his opinion on the political situation of Europe, after having drawn an exposition analogous to that of his colleague in Paris, finishes his despatch in these terms:—"If next spring finds Russia in the same position in which she is at present, war can alone bring her out of her difficulties, and this war should be prompt, in order to take Europe unawares."

IN the communication of the private despatch, addressed the 6th of August, to the Representatives of his Imperial Majesty at the Courts of Paris, of Vienna, and of Berlin, your Excellency desires me, in the name of the Emperor, to submit to his Cabinet, as well as to others, my opinion:—

Upon the nature of the union formed apparently between our Allies to paralyze our views with regard to the affairs in the East.

Upon the degree of force which the opposition we meet may acquire.

Upon the part England may take in it.

Upon the best measures to defeat this system.

And, lastly, upon the measures requisite, in case either of a rising in Servia, or of a definite refusal of our demands respecting the two Principalities, to secure our rights, our interests, and our dignity, without endangering the peace of Europe.

I shall commence by offering to your Excellency a concise

account of the actual position of Russia, in the question of the Levant, and will then examine the attitude which this imposes on us, and the consequences which may ensue. I shall strive to fulfil, as well as I am able, the honourable task which the confidence of the Emperor confers upon me, and the difficulty of which is lightened by the latitude his Imperial Majesty deigns to afford me, in the permission to express to him my opinions in a straightforward manner.

As far back as the origin of the rising in Greece, the Emperor publicly expressed his disapprobation of this enterprise. The results of this struggle between the Greeks and the Porte, disarrange and compromise our relations with this Power, which oversteps, in respect to us, all the stipulations of the treaties. The Emperor, careful to avoid consequences only too probable from a direct discussion with the Ottoman Government, abstained from claiming his rights, and left the settlement of the question to his Allies.

The Allies' openly acknowledge the justice of the cause, and undertake to smooth the difficulties; but after four years of tedious negotiations with the least important of all the Powers, the intervention of the four mediating Courts has had no effect. Notwithstanding, Russia has not ceased, during this time, to exhaust, with regard to Turkey, every expedient within the bounds of prudence; she has even carried to an extreme, a patience, a forbearance, and a disinterestedness, of which history scarcely affords another such example; and, as the reward of such generous treatment, she finds herself successively abandoned by all; and the Porte refuses to keep her most solemn engagements. Thus, Russia is obliged, at the present moment, to contend with a twofold difficulty—namely, to vindicate her unrecognised rights, and to put an end to the union in the Levant, which is incompatible with

It was worthy the power of the Emperor, and, above all, of a character which places him above mere glory, and which has acquired a far greater lustre, after this proof of his patience and self-denial, to sacrifice his nearest interests to the preservation of a general peace. But he has now reached the extreme limits of this forbearance, and strong in the justice of his rights, as well as in the constant uprightness of his intentions; strong, also, in the experience he has unfortunately made, that all the means of negotiation have been exhausted, —it becomes his dignity, as also the interests of his empire, to seek, henceforth, his rights, by other and more effective means.

Three questions require to be examined and solved, before we form so important a resolution.

Is Russia prepared for the exigencies of a war, the success of which should be speedy and brilliant?

In undertaking it, has she more to fear than the enemy she will have to encounter?

And what would be the best means to obviate this danger?

I assume the first of these questions solved in the affirmative.

The second presents us with the chances of either a single or a combined aggression. The general peace might also be compromised by some revolutionary movement.

In the present state of Europe, when the great Powers are free from all direct occupation, it would be impossible for any one Power to take arms, and profit by our embarrassment, without the consent of one or more of the great Cabinets. Such an attempt would therefore enter into the category of a combined plan.

Can this combination, alone formidable to Russia, be formed?

Up to the present moment, it does not exist. At least,

England is not of it; and a league, in which she does not take part, is not to be feared; as nothing very threatening need be dreaded, unless she joins it, and throws in the weight of her opposition.

It is not improbable, however, that the mere likelihood of a war between Russia and the Porte might lead to a union, and perhaps a general one; for what is the feeling towards Russia? The whole of Europe looks upon this colossus, whose gigantic strength only requires a sign to be directed against her, with dread. Thus, her interest is to support the Ottoman power, as the natural enemy of our empire.

Yet, though there exist a certain degree of conformity upon this point between the Cabinets of Europe, it is scarcely probable that such varied elements as enter into their policy would admit of unanimous action. But it is prudent to allow the possibility of such an occurrence.

In another point of view, the agitators in all countries would receive with delight an event, which, by engaging the resources of Russia, would call off her dreaded attention from themselves, and perhaps incite them to attempt fresh disorders. Although, in usual policy, this might be considered as favourable to our enterprise, the first wish of the Emperor is to preserve Europe from fresh troubles, and, therefore, this hypothesis ranks amongst the dangers to be avoided.

This danger, however, seems to be of less importance than others, as people are tired of so many fruitless attempts. They may even begin to comprehend that a chimerical felicity is too dearly purchased at the price of so much real misery; the governments, also, on their side, taught by experience, are more on their guard against the recurrence of such attempts.

Against all these probabilities, we must oppose an efficient remedy—which is, to assume a cautious attitude until the

moment arrives to avenge the wrongs of Russia, and ensure success by the rapidity of our blows.

We have six months before the proper season for the commencement of operations. In the meanwhile, our position is excellent, it might even be qualified as adroit, were not such a term beneath anything high and noble. With every right on his side, the Emperor has uttered no reproach, wounded no self-love, nor made use of menaces. He has kept a silence suited to his dignity. This silence has had an impressive effect, and may lead people to suppose it a precursor of energetic measures; the first effect of this fear will be to induce them to seek us in order to prevent consequences.

At this conjuncture it will be important to impose upon our Allies, in rejecting none of their overtures; whilst we, at the same time, promise them nothing which will not lead directly to the aim we have in view. In a word, we must prevent their acquiring any certain knowledge of our resolution, and mislead, if possible, their suspicions regarding it; but we must not, for an instant, leave the strong position, in which the impolicy of our Allies, added to the firm and straightforward conduct of the Emperor, has placed his Cabinet.

Our cause is so legitimate, the policy of the Emperor has been so just and magnanimous, and the sacrifice so great which he has made for the maintenance of peace, that when the moment for a declaration shall arrive, it is impossible that the simple exposition of our rights, and of our conduct, should not carry conviction with it, and consequently render it difficult for the other governments, whatever their individual interests may be, to lead their people against the most just of causes. And, further, amongst the governments from whose hostility we have most to dread, there are two, who are too much under the control of public opinion to engage lightly in a struggle without its sanction.

If, added to these considerations, the Emperor were to declare the aim of his policy in the war in question; if he were to show that this has undergone no change, and that the tendency of his actions has been unvarying: what cabinet, apart from individual interests, would not place implicit faith in the loyalty of his intentions?

These events will develop themselves before the moment of action; incidental circumstances may favour us, and prevent our recourse to extreme measures. England already seems inclined to court us; such a combination offers itself to us as human foresight cannot calculate upon. The Emperor's prudence and sagacity will see how to take advantage of it; but I venture to affirm that if next spring Russia is in her present position, war alone will relieve her from her difficulties. *And this war should take Europe unawares; it should be prompt*, in order to profit by the moral restraints which would retard a good understanding between the Courts, and also to make it physically impossible for them to parry the blow that we should strike.

I have the honour, etc.

## PRIVATE DESPATCH OF M. DE TATICHTCHEFF.

DATED FROM VIENNA, 3RD (15TH) APRIL, 1826.

Prince Metternich acknowledges our Right to redress our Grievances by force of Arms—His dilatory Policy—His fears of the Liberals in case of War—Probability of drawing over Austria—If our Army pass the Balkan, Austria certain to secure a portion of the Spoil—War once begun, it would be prudent to occupy Crajova and the whole of Little Wallachia—In no case to fear Austria will offer us any decided Opposition.

I OUGHT to add to my principal despatch of to-day, some reflections upon the conduct that Austria will follow in either one or the other of the following hypotheses—viz., that the Porte would accept our proposition, or, by a refusal, force us into a war.

Your Excellency will probably have seen from the reports I sent from Milan, as well as from my private letters of that period, that Prince Metternich does not contest our right to use coercive measures in order to redress our injuries; but he disapproves of such means to enforce the pacification of Greece. He desires, no doubt, a prolongation of this state of indecision, and cloaks this desire in the fear he expresses that the commencement of hostilities may give an occasion to the liberals for the formation of fresh revolutionary schemes. But I believe if Russia thinks it necessary to drag Austria along with itself into the war, that it will not be impossible. Prince Metternich is now using sincere efforts to induce the Porte to satisfy our demands. If the negotiation is carried

on near our frontiers, it will be easy, as well as advantageous, to prevent Austria from impeding it; if, on the contrary, war is declared, and we confine ourselves to the occupation of the two Principalities, Austria will probably remain passive; but if the operations carry us to the right bank of the Danube, and across the Balkan, then the very existence of the Ottoman Empire is endangered, and I am convinced Austria will hasten to secure a share of the spoil. This appears to me so probable, that if, after our troops are in possession of the Principalities, the Turks do not submit to the conditions offered them, and if the war were to be prolonged without being carried to the other side of the Danube, I do not hesitate to express the opinion that, in this case, the occupation of Crajova and the whole of Little Wallachia must not be neglected; for if these parts remain unoccupied, events might bring the Austrians there, but in no case need we fear much opposition on the part of Austria.

Receive, etc.



DESPATCH OF COUNT NESSELRODE, TO HIS IMPERIAL  
HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE.

[The preceding despatches of Prince Lieven, and of General Pozzo di Borgo, give a clear insight into the plans of Russia in 1825. These she put into execution with a steadiness, a calculation, and an energy, worthy of admiration, and such was her success that the ephemeral diplomacy of the great Powers of Europe, though 'on their guard and irritated against the secular designs of Russia, ended by involuntarily aiding in their accomplishment. The following despatch proclaims the triumph of Russia, *superbiam quæsitam meritis*. The abstract is as follows:]

The Treaty of Adrianople crowns the most glorious of wars with success, notwithstanding the active hostility of Austria, and the secret opposition of England—Europe renders justice to the Emperor's moderation—Our Power predominant in the Levant—The Greek question settled to our advantage—The Emperor's motives for not refusing his vote to Prince Leopold, or to Frederic of the Netherlands in fault of the other—The Turkish Empire in the power of our army, but it suits better the Russian interests to reduce her to dependence on us, and to complete conformity to our wishes in the future—The States formed out of the wreck of the Ottoman Empire, would soon become our rivals—The Russians not yet in a situation to organize them to their advantage—The opening of the Bosphorus to our flag, strikes the other Powers with astonishment—Four hundred thousand ducats of indemnity—Unaccustomed reception given by the Sultan to Count Orloff—Revenge taken on Sir R. Gordon's imprudent bravado—The occupation of the Principalities secures the indemnities—The conquest of them, worthless—Generosity—Halil Pasha—We impress Turkey with the certainty of her ruin if she attempts to brave us again—We are satisfied with the footing on which we stand with the other Powers.

St. Petersburg, February 12th, 1830.

MONSIEUR,—By my despatches of September the 18th, and of October the 16th, I had the honour to communicate to your Imperial Highness the treaty of peace, which has

crowned with success the most glorious and the most legitimate of wars Russia has ever had to sustain against the Porte.

This war, accepted by the Emperor only when unavoidable, and brought to a happy termination notwithstanding the active hostility of Austria, and the secret opposition of Great Britain, has left Russia in so imposing and so exalted a position, as to render it unnecessary to develop its advantages.

On the one hand, Europe with one accord has done justice to the moderation of the Emperor, whilst the conditions of the Treaty of Adrianople have consolidated the preponderance of Russia in the Levant. Her frontiers are strengthened, her rights established, her interests secured, and her commerce is unimpeded.

In my former despatches to your Imperial Highness, I did not venture to dwell upon the probable results of this transaction before the testimony of facts had confirmed the hopes to which it gave rise.

Besides, the Treaty of Adrianople reserved two questions for subsequent negotiations. And as long as the issue of these negotiations remained uncertain, it was impossible for me to fulfil the office to which I attach the most honour and value, and I could only communicate to your Imperial Highness vague conjectures.\*

The two questions to which I refer, relate, one to the fate of Greece, and the other to the execution and mode of securing the pecuniary engagements of Turkey to his Imperial Majesty.

The first did not depend entirely upon Russia. The

\* Count Nesselrode had been ordered by the Emperor Nicholas to send periodically to the Grand Duke Constantine at Warsaw, the result of the labours of the Russian ministers.—ED.

Porte, it is true, had agreed to the protocol of the 22nd of March, and we have only enforced its adhesion to this act, because it was the first and only one which could in any degree determine the future destiny of Greece, and because without this as a basis, we should have had none in our ulterior discussions either with the Porte or with our Allies. And in fact it was not until after the signature of the article X. in the Treaty of Adrianople, that we found any sincere intention on the part of the Cabinet of St. James' to terminate this difficult affair upon grounds likely to secure peace in the East, and to institute in Greece a state of things capable of developing the resources of that country without compromising the tranquillity of the others by the nature and form of its institutions. The Conference at London then took into serious consideration, the defects and omissions of the protocol of the 22nd of March. England and France recognised, as we did, that this protocol and the supremacy, which it established, could only lead to perpetual differences, not alone between the Greeks and the Turks, between the Porte and the three Courts, but also between these Courts themselves; that the general peace would be endangered; and that as these Courts had determined to make Greece really independent, they ought to be on their guard not to put this in opposition with right, or to confound words with things, and above all, that they should be careful not to involve Europe by imprudence in discussions which may sow the fatal seeds of discord, and bring about the greatest of misfortunes, universal war,—a result only too probable. These motives, the gravity of which no one can contest, determined the Conference of London to adopt a combination less complicated than those that had preceded, and which the Emperor considers infinitely preferable. Your Imperial Highness will find this explained in the protocol annexed to this, and which I could

not communicate earlier to your Highness, because it reached me only two days ago by a courier from London, and because this Convention, happily a final one, has given rise, since October, to debates which have continually altered either the substance or the form of the document, until the day of its signature.

The protocol of the 3rd of February, 1830, imposes undoubtedly great sacrifices on the part of Greece, but it opens a future of peace and prosperity, and in securing her commercial relations, it secures also one of the essential interests of Russia, and satisfies the want of the southern provinces, where the commerce of Greece had formed relations of a useful and increasing activity, until the epoch of the deplorable revolution of 1821; *and in this respect no other State can successfully dispute with Russia either the advantages which the nature of things has created, or the preponderating influence of Russia, which will be their necessary result.*

When the courier left London, the choice of the prince to govern Greece was not entirely fixed. The suffrages of the three Powers had been in favour of *Prince Leopold* of Saxe-Coburg, but he had not finally accepted their offers. Many considerations have determined the Emperor *not to refuse him his vote*; the conviction he has, that Prince Leopold will bring to the administration of Greece only sound principles, essentially monarchical, and opposed to revolutionary doctrines; the certainty that *far from having contracted an affection for England*, the Prince desires to forsake her, because his connections with the King, the Ministry, and the people, are disagreeable and false; the inclination he shows to *embrace the religion of his new country*; the formal declaration made in the protocol of the Cabinet of St. James', that his fortune is independent, and that he shall continue to enjoy this property, which has been secured to him as a national

gift, in the shape of a private fortune for life, without restraint either on his place of residence, politics, the circumstances arising from them, or upon his future relations with Great Britain; and lastly, the consideration that the force of circumstances will of necessity lead him to identify himself with the country whose destiny will be committed to him, and give up to this his former policy,—a truth that the history even of this century attests upon the evidence of examples, which occur at the present time in which I write.

Finally, Prince Leopold took upon himself to confirm our anticipations on this subject, when the sovereignty of Greece was offered him, *for he asked to have Candia annexed to Greece*, and made this a condition of his adhesion to the wishes of the three Courts. Candia is the one of all the islands inhabited by the Greeks, which England has always most peremptorily excluded from the delimitation of Greece, and whose emancipation the Cabinet of London considers as injurious to the commercial interests and merchant navy in the Mediterranean. We ourselves, even at this present time, could scarcely demand of the Grand Seignior the sacrifice of so important a possession, and of which he has preserved the greater part.

Prince Leopold will, therefore, probably be obliged to renounce his first stipulation, which we can neither maintain nor accept, but which, on the other hand, shows intentions on his part very desirable for us.

If this fail, overtures will be made to Prince Frederic of the Netherlands, and your Imperial Highness too well knows the merits which distinguish him, as also the sentiments of esteem with which the Emperor honours him, to doubt the readiness of his Majesty to give him his suffrage. The choice, either of this Prince or of Prince Leopold, once settled, the protocol, of which I have the honour to transmit a copy to your

Imperial Highness, will be notified to the parties interested by the three Courts, who will admit of no refusal, and who will determine, by this arrangement, an affair they cannot longer allow to remain undecided.

The second question which at present occupies the solicitude of the Emperor, includes other articles of the Treaty of Adrianople, and the whole of our relations with Turkey.

The aim of these relations is the same as that we proposed by the Treaty of Adrianople itself, and by the re-establishment of peace with the Grand Seignior. *We had it in our power to march on Constantinople, and to overturn the Turkish Empire. No other Power would have opposed it.* No immediate danger would have menaced us if we had put an end to the Ottoman dynasty in Europe. But in the opinion of the Emperor, this dynasty, reduced to an existence entirely dependent on the protection of Russia, and to a strict obedience to her wishes, was more desirable for political and commercial interests than any new combination which would force us either to the extension of our dominions by conquest, or to substitute other states for the Ottoman Empire, which would not fail very soon to rival us in power, civilisation, industry, and riches. It is upon this principle that his Imperial Majesty regulates his relations with the Porte, and, therefore, as we do not desire the ruin of the Turkish Government, we seek means to sustain her in her present state; and as this Government can only be useful to us by a complete deference towards us, we constrain her to adhere to a religious observance of her engagements, and a prompt compliance in all our views.

In this twofold point of view, the relations which we have now established with the Porte, through the medium of Aide-camp General Count Orloff, and of the actual Counsellor of State, Bouteneff, afford us several satisfactory indications.

The essential articles of the Treaty of Adrianople are being put in execution. The important subject of the special regulations on which depends the free passage of the Bosphorus to our flag, is terminated in a way which cannot but cause great astonishment to the other Powers, and even to England, whose flag is far from being treated with the same respect as ours in the Channel of Constantinople. In all relating to Servia, and the restitution of the districts which ought to be given back to her, the Porte has obeyed with as much docility as readiness.

It appears probable that the 400,000 ducats as a commercial indemnity which ought to be paid us in April, are already lying in the coffers of the Grand Seignior.

Your Imperial Highness has been able to judge by the details published in the newspapers, of the unaccustomed reception given by the Sultan to Count Orloff, and of the manner in which this Monarch expressed himself.

Sir R. Gordon, humiliated at the part he had played at Constantinople, imprudently endeavoured to give a proof of his credit, by obtaining permission for the English frigate, *La Blonde*, to enter the Black Sea. This injudicious act drew upon him a severe reprimand from the British Government, whose regrets for this useless bravado are enhanced by the way in which we have taken advantage of it, by forcing the Porte to allow one of our ships of war to pass the Bosphorus, and to anchor beneath the walls of the Seraglio, where it has been joined by a frigate and a brig, on board of which were M. de Ribeaupierre and his suite. These two vessels passed the Dardanelles without concealing their guns, and even received a salute from the forts, which had never before been accorded to any Ambassador or Minister on a similar occasion.

These marks of respect are certainly not sufficient to prove that the political views of the Grand Seignior are

such as they ought now to be towards Russia, but with the Orientals themselves they are of importance.

Your Imperial Highness will obtain a more circumstantial idea of the events I have here only rapidly stated, as well as of the true state of our relations with the Porte, in the subjoined extracts from the reports of Count Orloff, which I consider it my duty to submit to your Highness.

There remains one important negociation to terminate, either here with the Turkish Envoy, Halil Pasha, or with the Government of the Grand Seignior at Constantinople.

The object of this negociation is the way in which the indemnities of the war stipulated for by an additional convention of the treaty of the 2nd (14th) of September, 1829, shall be acquitted. The occupation of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia during a period of ten consecutive years, was originally intended as a security for the payment of these indemnities; but the Emperor thought this occupation would expose us to many disadvantages, to considerable expense, and would be looked upon as equivalent to the taking possession of these Provinces, the conquest of which has always appeared to his Majesty as useless, because without the expense of maintaining troops there, they are at our disposal both in times of peace and of war. Besides, it would be a deviation from our declarations, and draw upon us the just protestations of the other Powers of Europe, to annex them to the southern provinces of our Empire. These motives, as well as the appeal which the Convention of the 2nd (14th) of September made on the part of the Grand Seignior, to the generosity of the Emperor, impose on us other stipulations to guarantee the payment of the sums due to us. The Emperor will deign to remit the Porte a portion of them, and in order to form any idea about the payment of the rest, or upon the compensation we could accept in lieu of money, the



want of which is greatly felt in Turkey, we await a memorandum from Halil Pasha, which will make known to us with greater precision the terms upon which the Porte appeals to the magnanimity of the Emperor, the wishes of this Power, her proposals, and to what extent the Envoy is empowered to act. His Majesty will then come to a determination; he will not overburden the Ottoman Empire so as to ruin it, but will retain in our hands the *keys of the country*, which will enable us to keep it in check, and give weight to the existence of this debt, so as to make Turkey feel, for many long years, her true position as regards Russia, and *the certainty of her ruin if she venture again to brave us*. As the additional convention of the 2nd (14th) of September established as a principle that the Emperor should definitely decide upon the mode of paying off the indemnities of war, the final result of this negotiation will depend solely and always upon his Imperial Majesty.

*Our relations with the great European Powers are in every way satisfactory.* They are still cool, and cannot fail to be so, with Austria, after all the opposition which she excited during our last war, but they are devoid of discussion or bitterness. *With England*, they are again placed on *the most satisfactory footing*; the Greek question, which could alone compromise or change them, is at length settled. With Prussia, their useful intimacy continues and increases. *With France*, they are strengthened by identity of interest, *which has always united us to that country*; her internal state is unfortunately far otherwise than we could desire, but I will not attempt myself to develop to your Imperial Highness the real motives or the probable effects of the crisis with which it is menaced. I will leave this to his Majesty's Ambassador,\* and I hasten

\* Despatch of General Pozzo di Borgo, dated from Paris, the 9th (21st) of March, 1830. We shall give, in the sequel of our collection, the documents annexed to the present despatch of Count Nesselrode.

to communicate to your Highness all the information I have on the subject, by placing before you his last despatch.

I am, with profound respect, Monseigneur, your Imperial Highness' very humble, very obedient, and very devoted servant,

NESSELRODE.\*

\* This despatch of Count Nesselrode is printed after the original, and the others after copies derived from the diplomatic archives of the Grand Duke Constantine, at Warsaw.

## DECLARATION OF CATHERINE THE SECOND.

SENT TO THE DIET OF THE KINGDOM OF POLAND THE 20TH OF APRIL, 1766, IN FAVOUR OF THE NON-UNITED GREEKS, AND OF THE DISSENTERS, BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRINCE REPNIN, AMBASSADOR OF RUSSIA AT THE COURT OF WARSAW.\*

Religion and humanity determine the Empress to protect the Ruthenian Greeks in Poland, who, if refused satisfaction, would have the right to ally themselves with the neighbouring States, in order to claim their due.—Foreign Powers, in treating with the Republic, include all members of the Community.—The Empress cannot limit her protection without compromising her dignity.—Benefits conferred on Poland by the Empress.—The Empress demands the Restitution of the Churches taken from the Ruthenian Greeks.—The right to build new ones.—The diminution of imposts on the Greek Churches.—Entire liberty for the Greek Seminary of Mohylew.—The preservation of the Greek bishopric of Mohylew *in perpetuity*.—Freedom of the popes from all Catholic ecclesiastical jurisdiction.—Liberty of Mixed Marriages.—Equality of Temporal Rights.

UNITY of religion, and the glory of contributing to human happiness,† are not the only motives which induce her Imperial Majesty to renew at this present time, in the most pressing manner, her intervention in favour of the Greek Church, and of the other Dissenting bodies, subjects of Poland, in order to put an end to the oppression under which they groan, and to re-establish them in their rights. With the view to ex-

\* Theisner, *Viciissitudes of the Catholic Church*, i., II., p. 51.

† See the article entitled, "Nekrassovian Cossacks," at a future page.

pose the reasons which call forth this present declaration, the undersigned will bring forward a fact attested in the collection of the laws of the Polish nation, namely : that the Greeks and the Dissenters have always been considered as entitled to the rights they now claim, and which they in consequence enjoyed in the most prosperous times of the Republic,—they received then, peaceably and without restriction, all the advantages and privileges ensured to them in common with the other inhabitants of the country. These rights were solemnly acknowledged and guaranteed by all that constitutes the bond of nations, and by the most sacred agreements, thus establishing a public right between them and their compatriots, of which they could at all times claim the fulfilment; an inalienable right, not to be annulled by the civil constitutions of only one party in the State.

It would be to deny evidence, not to acknowledge as an invariable principle, *that a constant refusal to do justice to the claims of the Dissenters would necessarily lead them to throw off all obligations towards a community whose advantages they could not share ; that a prolonged refusal would make of the Dissenters a body of men perfectly free ; would give them the right to choose umpires amongst their neighbours to judge betwixt them and their equals, and to ally themselves to these if unable otherwise to avoid persecution, and no law either human or divine could condemn them.* In times past, the Republic had been in danger of this, but had happily succeeded in preventing it by the sanction which the treaties formed with foreign Powers gave to the home-policy of Poland. Henceforth the maintenance of order and the tranquillity of the Republic ceased to belong exclusively to the inhabitants of the land, for this became the imperative duty of the Powers, who, in treating with the Republic, contracted also engagements with all its divers members.

It is thus that Russia, in virtue of the treaty of 1686, and the other Powers in concert with her, in virtue of the treaty of Oliva, with one accord consider it their duty to watch over the security of each party of the State, to prevent all discord between them, to procure for them a strict distribution of justice, and the enjoyment for each and all of that which constitutes reciprocal and general rights. *It is, therefore, to be faithful to the treaties, that the Empress desires to regain for the Greek subjects and the other Dissenters all their rights; and to secure to them their continuation.* Other motives no less powerful, arise out of the peculiar position of Russia, with respect to the Republic; and it is evident that she cannot place any limits to the protection she grants to the Dissenters, *without compromising the glory and the dignity of her crown, and the confidence of her friends.*

*It is not to elicit fresh thanks from the Republic, that we again retrace what her Imperial Majesty has done for it; it is only to place the motives which determine her Majesty to interfere in a strong light, and to show the necessity of giving her aid in the cause in which she is interested, and at the same time to prove the impossibility of refusing this protection in the position in which the Republic has placed itself with regard to her Majesty.*

It is from sincere friendship, and from the desire to fulfil the duties of good fellowship, that the Empress has taken, and still continues to take, interest in the welfare of the Republic. *She has rejoiced to see the Polish nation confederated, the re-establishment of her tranquillity, the consolidation of her liberties, and the freedom of electing her King from amongst her ancient nobility.* Every one must acknowledge the generosity and affection with which her Majesty granted their demands for help; and, to secure the happiness of all the members of the Republic, entered so warmly into the affairs of

her neighbour. The free election of a Polish King was one of the motives, and perhaps the most important, of those which induced an appeal to the intervention of her Majesty. This election took place with a tranquillity, and a unanimity of feeling, of which the Republic could hardly cite another example. But although in this case her Imperial Majesty succeeded beyond her hopes, she would consider her work incomplete if any portion of the nation were to be denied the happy effects of her Majesty's friendly intervention; she would feel her intentions only half accomplished, and the solicitations addressed to her only in part fulfilled, so long as this disunion respecting the Dissenters should last. On this account, her Majesty believes it incumbent on her to justify in all respects the confidence which the Republic has placed in her affection, and to continue her aid without interruption, and without regard to risks, until the final decision of a question which involves the happiness of a portion of the people.

Her Majesty now renews her application to the present Diet, to put a stop to this source of unending discord, and thus restore tranquillity to the Republic. Her Imperial Majesty begs the King and the nation to grant this subject all the consideration which it demands, from its importance to the general welfare. Her Majesty looks upon it in two ways, viz., in a spiritual, as well as in a temporal point of view. As to the first, the Republic, without having annulled the rights of the Greeks and Dissenters, has notwithstanding multiplied abuses to such a degree, that liberty of conscience is reduced to a dead letter, or nearly so. In consequence, the undersigned demands in the name of the Empress, his sovereign, "that these abuses cease, and that in future everything may be done to prevent the renewing of such abuses, or others similar to them, which cannot happen if the following articles are decreed by the present Diet."

Article I.—Churches belonging to the Dissenters, and unduly taken from them, to be given back. No obstacle to be made to the renovation or reconstruction of such as time or fire should have injured. No opposition to be made to baptisms, marriages, services for the dead, preaching the word of God in churches or to the sick. The ecclesiastics, both of the Greek church and of other Dissenters, to have permission to accomplish the above-mentioned acts, and to employ all means requisite to support the dignity and respect due to Divine worship; the ringing of bells, the use of a proper costume, to have cemeteries,—in a word, to fulfil without opposition all that the administration of the sacraments and the Divine services of every religion require; a union of these details constituting religious liberty.

Article II.—To fix this liberty of religious worship in the kingdom in a definite and complete manner, the present Diet will declare that in all the villages and towns where the Greeks and Dissenters have neither chapels nor churches, it will be permitted to the members of these different confessions who wish to settle in them, to establish churches, cemeteries, priests, and pastors, and that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction will not in any manner restrain these priests and pastors in the accomplishment of their duty, and in the administration of the sacraments.

Article III.—Liberty of conscience is a divine right, and this fact concerns every one. It is, then, the duty of every well-regulated state to allow all its subjects this privilege, and to grant full liberty in this respect to each. This principle once admitted, it is evident that the tribute exacted by the Catholic clergy from the Dissenters for burials and baptisms, is an abuse; the variations as to its proportion in the different provinces would suffice to show it has no legal title. Abuses of so pernicious a nature, cannot be

made lawful by any individual constitution, if those interested have not established this constitution by their free votes. It appears, therefore, most just to reform this abuse, yet if the different orders of a free state stipulate for some distinction in favour of the predominant religion, it would be proper to fix, once for all, a slight contribution, to be considered rather as a mark of deference than as a tribute.

Article IV.—The Greek seminary of Mohylew not to be disturbed in any way, and to continue the education of the youths of the Greek persuasion without any hinderance whatever.

Article V.—The seminary and bishopric of White Russia as well as all its dependencies, to be reserved in perpetuity to the Greek religion. The Greek churches, and those belonging to the Dissenters, will continue to belong to their respective confessions.

Article VI.—No Greek priest or Dissenting minister to be cited under any pretext before an ecclesiastical tribunal; they depend entirely on secular jurisdiction.

Article VII.—Marriages between persons of different communions not to be forbidden, and the children to follow, according to sex, the religion of their respective parents. In a word, the Greeks and the Dissenters in Poland to enjoy perfect freedom in their religion, and that paternal protection which equity and reason owe to every citizen, and which, on this account alone, is no more than a strict right.

Justice also demands the re-establishment of the Greeks and Dissenters in their temporal rights, which her Imperial Majesty insists upon, impelled by the friendship she feels as a neighbouring Power, as well as by the duties of her position, to secure the felicity of Poland, and to maintain good order, which alone can promote it.

The equality of the nobility is no doubt the basis of



Polish liberty, and the most sure guarantee of her constitution. All, therefore, who have aimed, at different periods, to deprive of their rights and prerogatives the Greek and other nobility not of the established religion, become the unfortunate source of dissensions and anarchy; one portion of the nation, with reckless want of foresight, thinking to reap great advantages by raising themselves at the expense of another portion of the nation, thus destroying by egotism, and for a transient good, the real and only tie which cements a national union.

In a time of peace and general harmony, in which everything conspires to the establishment of a complete and lasting happiness, when the laws regain their former force by the zeal and unanimity of patriots, and promise to render the Republic more flourishing than ever, all members of the State ought to comprehend that no durable prosperity and happiness can be anticipated if they are not perfectly united, and that to maintain one party of the nation in the exclusive possession of charges and dignities against the ancient laws of the Republic, which grants to every sect an equal right in the government of the State, would be to sacrifice the national greatness to a particular interest. This point of the public law of Poland, almost demolished by a succession of civil enactments made by one party alone of the State in times of trouble and discord, is precisely that on which her Imperial Majesty founds her request for a negotiation, including those subjects of the Republic who do not follow the established religion, in order to determine their share in the administration of the State and their connection also with the crown. Until a perfect understanding on this point is established, and the solicitations of divers orders in the Republic satisfied, her Majesty will feel her obligations to be unfulfilled. *The aid which she accorded*

*to the whole nation for its common good*, she owes likewise, and cannot refuse, to a portion of the nation so considerable as the Greek and Nonconformist communities. . . The heart of the Empress could not be satisfied if she had only procured an apparent tranquillity for the Republic, if she had preserved it from the violence which had menaced its laws, its liberty, and its institutions, only to abandon one party of the nation to the persecutions of the other; if she had contributed to put in execution certain laws only to augment and perpetuate the power of abuses; lastly, she could not rest satisfied, even if one portion of the nation had received her assistance gladly and with benefit, whilst another portion, even more considerable, with equal claim to her solicitude, and having also invoked her support and contributed to render it efficacious, still continued to groan under persecution.

Religion, the duties of friendship and of the social intercourse which should exist between two neighbouring nations, the obligations imposed by treaties, the honour attached to their accomplishment, the desire to answer the hopes of a whole nation, enjoin on her Majesty the absolute necessity to continue these efforts, in order to bring about the re-establishment of the Greeks and Nonconformists in the enjoyment of the rights, as well spiritual as temporal, which are their due as members of a free state. The Empress is convinced that the good offices of a friendly and neighbouring Power will suffice to render general the feelings which the most sensible and patriotic of the nation now entertain, and as those who still oppose these sentiments ought to be looked upon only as enemies to themselves and to their country, no private consideration will deter her Imperial Majesty from the end she has in view. She considers it her duty to employ against them every means likely to effect the restoration of general tranquillity, and

believes she could not employ them more worthily. This is the declaration which the undersigned has been ordered by his Sovereign to make to his Majesty the King, and to the Republic of Poland, convinced that demands so just will be fully accorded by a government actuated essentially by principles of liberty and equality, and which consequently cannot fail to receive favourably any request made in the name of humanity.

NICOLAS PRINCE REPNIN.

## PRECIS OF THE REPORT

RESPECTING THE SEDITIOUS MOVEMENTS WHICH OCCURRED IN  
POLAND IN THE SPRING OF THE YEAR 1789, PRESENTED IN  
1790 TO THE CONSTITUENT DIET, BY THE SPECIAL DEPU-  
TATION CHARGED WITH THE INQUIRY INTO THIS AFFAIR.

[Literal reprint of the impression published at the time, under the title, "Extract from the Discourse," etc. The official report was published in Polish, at Warsaw, by Zawadzki, in 1790, in 2 vols., 8vo.]

Origin of the Insurrection of Cossacks in Poland—The great majority of the inhabitants of the Greek religion, united in 1595 to the Roman Catholic religion—Revolt of Chmielnicki in 1648, supported by the irruption of Muskovy into Poland—The communication with Constantinople being interdicted to the Polish schismatics in 1676, because of their connivance with the Turks, they begin to consider Kiiow as their metropolis—The Czar keeps possession of this town after the peace, and in violation of the Treaty of Andruszow—Influence of the new Metropolitan See in Poland—Negligence of the Polish government—Koninski, a Polish subject, the schismatic bishop of Mohylew, becomes the agent of Russia—The ignorance of the Popes—The Russian Popes instal themselves in Poland—The Russian Propaganda advances—Revolt in 1765 smothered by Prince Augustus Czartoryski—Treaty of 1768 imposed by Russia—Its stipulations in favour of the Dissenters strike a mortal blow at the independence of Poland—Catholic confederation of Bar in 1768, inspired by patriotism, reduced to despair—Schismatic butchery at Human, fomented and paid by Russia—Sadkowski, almoner of the Russian Embassy at Warsaw, becomes the chief of the schismatic plots—Treaty of Partition in 1772—The Polish Catholics and Schismatics are distinctly classed in it as the respective subjects of Poland and Russia—The Schismatic Cures in Poland are filled by Russian Popes, in contempt of collateral rights—Synod of St. Petersburg—There is only one

office of administration—Its decrees are published in Poland in the shape of Ukases—The Russian Catechism, with its dogma of blind obedience to the Czar, introduced into Poland—Public Prayers for the Empress in Poland—Establishment of the Bishopric of Pereaslav, without any participation of the Polish Government—Sadkowski sent to Kiiow in 1787, on the passage of the Empress through the town—He helps in drawing up the new form of consecration oath for the Popes—Detailed account of the Ecclesiastical Reports to be forwarded to the Synod—The Confessionals converted into centres of conspiracy—All devotional books forbidden, save those issued from the Synodal printing office—Measures against the united Greeks—The Greco-Russian Churches, through the exertions of Sadkowski, increase from ninety-four to three hundred in number—In 1788, Public Prayers were offered up in Poland, even for the success of the Russian arms—Sadkowski has the control over considerable funds—Clandestine introduction of arms by means of Russian traders—Symptoms of revolt in the Ukraine, in 1789—Measures of the Polish Government—Russia, in the affair of the Dissenters, obtains the co-operation of the other European Cabinets, and pursues its own object unknown to them.

THE usual causes of insurrection may be traced in the excessive severity of governments, in the irritable character of the people, and the corrupt or barbarous state of a nation's morals. These causes, which are found in all nations, had also occasionally begotten serious discord in Poland; but as they were occasioned by the collision of interests or by domestic vices, they were only accidents to which every body corporate is exposed.

The Republic is threatened at the present time with new dangers, peculiarly serious and formidable, inasmuch as the same evil which is only transient elsewhere, becomes a permanent disease in Poland, whose poison perpetually infecting its system, may at any moment give birth to new irruptions. Nor is this state of things the result of a combination of internal causes, but it proceeds from a permanent system adopted by a foreign Power.

All the revolts which formerly broke forth in Poland, originated in the fierce and unruly character of the inhabitants of the southern parts of Poland, known by the name of Cossacks. Those of the present day are produced by the deep-laid schemes of a dangerous neighbour. The report presented to the States by the committee appointed to examine the accomplices in the plots that exploded in the spring of 1789, has completely exposed this scheme, and shown the period, the means, and the precautions employed to enlist favourable accidents as instruments of foreign intrigue, and to transform domestic riots into a political conspiracy. It is our purpose to give here an abridgment of the origin and progress of this plan. In the narrative to which we have alluded, strength of reasoning is found united with an abundance of details founded on the most authentic documents.

The nature of this work forbids our giving the whole history in all its details, and we shall only dwell on the most capital points. But though our limits prevent the introduction of minutiae, it shall be our care to prevent the insertion of any feature that cannot stand the test of the severest criticism.

The Cossacks, a vagabond people, without morals or police, steeped in ignorance, and restive under all authority, were the first who made the Polish nation acquainted with

insurrection. Though a faint gleam of spiritual light afterwards visited the houses of these men plunged in barbarism and debauchery, the uniformity of the Greek church which prevailed throughout their country, prevented the divisions and fanatical discussions resulting from a difference in religious opinions. It was not till the year 1595, that Separatism entered into its bosom, when the Metropolitan of Kiiovia, the Archbishop of Polock, and the Bishops of Vlodimir, Luceoria, and Helm, carried to the Holy See the offer of their adhesion to the church of Rome. Prince Constantine Ostrogski, offended at the step which was taken without his concurrence, strenuously opposed the union of the two confessions, and being supported by a powerful party, he laid the first foundation of a schism that was to become the fertile source of subsequent troubles.

But though numerous discussions took place shortly after this separation, they had no connection at first with the rival pretensions of the two churches. The public archives and legislative acts emanating from these disturbances, establish this in a satisfactory manner. The only effect produced by a difference of religion, for some time, was an opposition in the religious opinions of the citizens. Religious dissensions had no share in the disastrous revolutions, whereof the annals of the kingdom have transmitted a faithful narrative, and which have left deep and painful traces in the vast steppes of the Ukraine, watered with the noblest blood of Poland.

The year 1648 marks the epoch of new calamities. Vladislaus IV. was no more. Poland was still lamenting the death of this beloved king, when the daring of one man, notorious for the calamities that he inflicted on his country, plunged her into the horrors of a civil and religious war. Chmielnicki (for such was his name), disappointed in being deprived by the government of Czechryn, of a favour that

had been presented to him by General Koniecpolski, harboured the project of creating an insurrection among the Cossacks. He inspired them with his wrath, by representing the injury that he maintained he had suffered, either as an outrage offered to their faith, or an encroachment on their liberties. Thus religious fanaticism mixing up with political turbulence, entered for the first time as an element in the robbery, bloodshed, and devastation that laid Poland waste.

Endeavouring to strengthen his cause by support from abroad, Chmielnicki first admitted the Tartars as associates in his plot; but these barbarians, being stimulated rather by the attraction of plunder, than interested in the motives that had led him to resort to arms, became, ere long, rather troublesome allies. He found a more congenial sympathy in a Power whose fanatical spirit, identical faith, and ambitious encroachments at the cost of Poland, were guarantees of the favour with which it would regard the success of his designs.

The stubborn and murderous war that followed this alliance with the Muscovites, justified but too well the  
anticipations of Chmielnicki.



policy attached a special importance to the possession of a city known to contain tombs held in high veneration, sanctuaries of great celebrity in the Greek church, offering a constant stimulus to the devotion of its votaries.

These spots, endeared to, and deeply revered by, the non-united Greeks, offered a powerful attraction to those Poles who professed the same creed.

At the time of the insurrection of Chmielnicki, the Greek church in Poland acknowledged the Patriarch of Constantinople as its head. Subsequent events interrupted this relation with the ancient rival of Rome. Doroszensko, who inherited the daring and sanguinary projects of Chmielnicki, roused the seditious spirit of the Cossacks, and, seconded by the Tartars, he kindled a bloody and obstinate civil war. The disasters of this war were partly the product of the intrigues and treachery of the non-united Greeks, who, under pretext of providing for the necessities of their worship, passed over the Turkish frontier, and plotted the ruin of the state, in concert with its enemies. This double-dyed perfidy occasioned the law of 1676, forbidding the non-united Poles to hold any relations with the See of Constantinople.

This decree, which was called forth by the pressure of circumstances, led ultimately to more serious evils than those which it was intended to check.

Withdrawn from the control of a distant authority, the non-united Greeks of Poland came gradually to look upon the town of Kiiow in the light of a metropolitan see, which, being retained in the hands of Russia, in consequence of the treaty confirming that of Andruszow, became a link between the non-united of both churches.

The reign of Augustus II., the faithful ally of Peter I., was the period when the influence of Russia over Poland was consolidated on the new basis of a power that overaws the

conscience. The northern Cæsar having curbed the unruly character of his numerous and various vassals, thought the authority of his crown insecure so long as it should be separated from, and limited by, the spiritual power. He united them both in his own person, and by announcing himself as the head of the Greek church, his authority obtained all the energy and influence of ancient theocracies. Henceforth the decisions of the Synod became the absolute decrees of the Sovereign, and political subjection was confounded with religious submission.

This new order of things added considerably to the dangers springing from the relations subsisting between the non-united Greeks of Poland and of Russia, and they were rendered still more formidable by an event that occurred soon after the death of Augustus II. The faction of Stanislaus Leszczynski sought to obtain the support of the Cossacks, living at that time under the protection of the Porte. This inconstant people, armed in defence of a party formed by the Ottoman Porte, ended by submitting to the Empress Anna Ivanovna, and added to the power of a dangerous neighbour of Poland.

It is true that the states of the Republic, under the reign of Augustus III., seemed emancipated from the troubles of civil war, and appeared to enjoy permanent tranquillity; nevertheless, their frontiers in the Ukraine, always exposed to the invasions of the Russian Cossacks, became now a very unsafe residence; and the fertile lands of that province resembled a desert. Sietz and Zaporozze became the favourite resort of the youth of the Ukraine, as Kiiow had become the sanctuary of the sacred mysteries of their religion to the united clergy.

The consequences of these *liaisons* were calculated to rouse the animadversion of a vigilant government; but, at this period, the general relaxation of all the branches of the in-

ternal administration, the absolute impotence of the supreme power, owing to the perpetual dissolution and convocation of new diets ; the national indifference, fostered by the soothing influence of a long peace, and the indulgencies of wealth and luxury, had prevented the Government from keeping a steady eye on future contingencies. This negligence of the Polish Government seconded the aim of its neighbour's policy admirably. Russia endeavoured to foster the inclination of the non-united Greeks of Poland to its government, by the exhibition of an artful gentleness, calculated to alienate them from their lawful governors.

From henceforth, the Polish insurrections, which were no longer the transient result of accidental circumstances, escaped the superficial vigilance of the Government.

After the town of Kiiow had passed from under the sway of Poland, and that the non-united Greeks of that Republic were withdrawn from the authority of the See of Constantinople, Russia became a second home and country to them. Their education, the institution of their priests, their dependence on the new metropolitan see, were so many ties which bound them to Russia from their very infancy. Though locally subjects of the Republic, they were connected with a foreign Power by moral ties more binding than those of policy. The surface of the country where they dwelt, might be regarded as one of the dioceses of Russia.

Poland still reckoned at that time among its possessions, Polock, Mohylew, and those portions of the Republic which were detached by the last dismemberment from the chief mass of its territory. Koninski, bishop of Mohylew, was a subject of the Republic ; but his dependence on the Synod of Petersburg, soon converted him into the most devoted and active agent of the policy of that Cabinet. Being a zealous advocate of the doctrine of the non-united Greeks, which

attaches the idea of sovereign authority to that of religious supremacy, he successfully forwarded the influence of Russia in Poland, by disseminating there fanatical principles, calculated to secure as warm partisans of Russia all the individuals in the Republic who professed the same communion. A plan of this nature required coadjutors; and Koninski found a very clever and devoted accomplice in Sadkowski, who, trained in his school since 1758, showed himself his worthy disciple. His docility, aptitude, and zeal, soon obtained for him the confidence of his teacher, the Abbé de Sluck, and he was shortly invested with the bishopric of Pereaslav.

To obtain a just idea of the principles of Koninski, the reader need only cast his eyes over the two discourses that he delivered at Petersburg in 1765, before the Empress and the Heir-apparent.

These documents are especially remarkable for opinions highly prejudicial to Poland, and favourable to Russia; for a subtlety of thought commensurate with the nature of his projects, and for the fanaticism of his language. Though a citizen and subject of the Republic, he pronounces the dominant religion in Poland a ravenous wolf. He thanks the Empress for having favoured the measures suggested by his zeal to secure the effectual protection of the flock confided to his care. He places the homage of an absolute subjection at the feet of that sovereign, promising to inspire his flock with the same sentiments.

Installed in the bishopric of Mohylew, his first care was to draw up a detailed description of the condition of the non-united Greek churches in Poland. He endeavoured to give a pathetic representation of the state of gross ignorance in which the clergy of that confession was plunged; nor was church discipline the chief object he had in view in this publication. A want of intelligence, the forgetfulness or igno-

rance of the character of their vocation, were no longer the only deficiencies chargeable against Greek ecclesiastics. The doctrine of a blind submission to the Synod of Petersburg, had already begun to prevail. Every man was regarded as ignorant of his duties, who did not profess an entire submission to this synod, to the exclusion of every other authority, or whosoever separated the dogma of this submission from his articles of faith.

Koninski, in order to propagate these doctrines in Poland as fast as possible, was careful to fill the vacant livings with monks and priests coming from Russia, who were pre-eminently noted for their fanaticism, and whose duplicity appeared to him most calculated to carry out his wily policy.

Accordingly, the progress of these doctrines was soon exemplified in a conspiracy hatched in 1765, though happily abortive in its issue. The vigilance of Prince Czartoryski, palatine of Russia, and at that time general of the troops of the crown, detected the scheme in time to prevent it. Harko, a Cossack officer, the author of the insurrection, was seized and executed, and the peasants of the Ukraine, already in a state of revolt, returned to their allegiance.

Nevertheless, the preponderating influence of a neighbouring Power progressed daily. Bribery and corruption had gathered the Nonconformists of the different confessions at Sluck; the same principles presided over the act, which, by admitting Russia in the imposing character of mediator between the dominant religion and the Dissenters, furnished her with a safe and plausible pretext for cementing her influence in Poland. She thus added to the ascendant that she had already acquired over the minds of the non-united Greeks, the authority of a public and open protection which she assumed towards them in comprehending them under the appellation of Dissenters. Intrigues, cabals, and intimidations, were the

preliminaries of the diet of 1768, which followed the Conference of Sluck; this unhappy era was signalised by unheard-of and multiplied outrages inflicted on the national dignity, and the treaty put a finishing hand to the dependence of Poland, which was its offspring.

A careful analysis of this treaty presents more than one proof of the systematic spirit of supremacy which coloured its clauses; but, as this discussion would exceed the limits prescribed for this work, we shall confine ourselves to some remarks on the special act respecting the Dissenters, as having a more immediate connection with the matter with which we are engaged.

#### ARTICLE I.

§ 1. The Roman Catholic religion is acknowledged by this act as the dominant religion in Poland. In the copy printed in Russia, and found in the archives of the Archimandrite Sadkowski, the words, *perpetually dominant*, are suppressed. Nevertheless, this treaty was to regulate the conduct of the Archimandrite, and had been forwarded to him to this end by the Synod of Petersburg.

§ 3. The punishment of exile is decreed against all apostates from the Romish church. This stipulation, though apparently favourable to the established religion, was, in reality, only calculated to advance the interests of Russia. The crime and the punishment were equally advantageous to her. By punishing apostasy, according to the terms of the treaty, Poland enriched the Russian Empire with its own losses. By leaving the crime unpunished, the number of partisans of Russia in the heart of Poland would be increased.

§§ 5, 6, 7. The Court of Petersburg stipulates in this act the establishment of a synod and consistories for Dissenters, and withdraws them from all other dependence. In

removing, in like manner, the non-united Greeks from their proper jurisdictions, it abstains from providing any other for them—an omission whose object it is very easy to see through.

§ 8. The bishopric of White Russia, declared lower down as dependent on the Metropolitan of Kiiow, places the dis-united clergy of Poland in dependence on that of Russia, by the natural results of such an arrangement.

§ 12. Schools and the branches of study are withdrawn from the national inspection, and intrusted to the direction of the bishops, already subject, by the preceding article, to the metropolitan see of Russia.

§ 14. The right of patronage, reserved to proprietors in all religions, is restricted in the case of the Catholics, who are required to defer to the recommendation of the bishops. This prerogative, which was already so limited in theory, soon became a cypher in practice.

Without multiplying our extracts from the articles imposed on the nation by this treaty, the reader will clearly see the decided plan of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, which was to consolidate its authority over the non-united Greeks in Poland, by means of artfully-combined stipulations; the general tenor of the treaty having already placed the whole nation in a state of dependence on it.

To give a diplomatic colouring to these arbitrary proceedings, Russia was careful to support her intervention by the approval of the Courts of London, Berlin, Stockholm, and Copenhagen, but none of these Courts acceded to its wishes by sanctioning its proceedings with a signature or ratification; and Frederick William, whose lofty views command the suffrage and admiration of Europe, has plainly manifested his opinion on the subject, by his open and active co-operation with the

nation in its courageous attempts to shake off the disgraceful trammels of a foreign protectorate.

Though the national pride was humiliated by the preponderance of a great Power, favoured by circumstances, the feeling of honour was awakened in the breasts of the patriots stung with the disgrace of dependence; they sought a remedy for the degradation of the State in their own high spirit. This magnanimous example was soon followed by a general revolution. The whole kingdom was on fire. We shall draw a veil over the distressing picture of this revolution, in which bravery, deprived of warlike resources, without any other support than the love of freedom, had to encounter all the resources of a strongly-constituted empire. We shall simply recall the memorable calamity which aggravated the disparity of this unequal struggle, and of which the recital has a direct bearing on the object with which we are engaged. We allude to the explosion of the insurrection of the Ukraine, which added the horrors of a civil war to the misfortune of a foreign aggression. Zelezniak, Tymenko, and Bondarenko, the principal chiefs of the Zaporovians, were the authors of this sedition. Having entered Poland successively, and congregated together at the monastery of Montryn, they directed all the preparations for a bloody conspiracy. The pompous announcement of a protection of which they boasted openly, the co-operation of the non-united priesthood, whose fanaticism lent the sanction of religion to a criminal enterprise, and all kinds of seductions, were employed to stimulate an unruly people. Thirty thousand peasants shortly raised the standard of revolt, murder and rapine accompanying their steps. Human, Lisianka, and some other towns of the Ukraine, became the scene of enormities exceeding in atrocity the most barbarous recorded in history.

These revolting scenes were about to be repeated in Vol-



hynia and Podolia, when the wise and vigorous measures of the Grand-general Branicki, at that time Master-general of the Ordnance, succeeded fortunately in suppressing the insurrection. Gonta, Szydlo, Ukraine chiefs, and some of their accomplices who were captured, underwent the punishment incurred by their crimes. But the author of so many horrors, with his comrades, evaded the sword of justice; being seized by Russian troops, they were carried off into Russia, under pretext of their being subjects of that Empire, and Poland was not avenged by the news of their execution.\*

The smouldering embers of insurrection burst forth anew into flames the following year. Fed with the same fuel, it was about to produce the same ravages. Tymenko, an accomplice in the first sedition, Paczenko, and Zurba, other Zaporovian chiefs, penetrated into Poland, divided into three bands. The secret of their being easily dispersed by the General Stepkowski, and of this incipient revolution leading to no fatal results, must be traced in the same policy which rejoiced in the effects of the first revolt.

Russia, seeing that its object was accomplished,—*i. e.*, the crippling of a neighbouring state armed to defend its independence—did not think it expedient to countenance the entire devastation of a province respecting which it already entertained more ulterior views, as we shall soon see, and which was of essential use at that moment, from the supplies that it furnished to the Russian armies, which were then implicated in an obstinate war with the Crescent.

The interval that elapsed from the year 1768 (an epoch as brilliant for Russia as it was odious to Poland) to the

\* Melchisedech Iaworski, a non-united monk, known as having fomented and encouraged this famous sedition, lives in Russia, and is promoted to a high dignity. Zelezniak himself has been seen there recently, living in luxury. When facts speak, reflections are superfluous.

events of 1775, which were the results of the former, was turned to account to mature the plan of enslaving the Republic in silence, by creating dissensions in opinion. The fanatical tendency of the non-united Greeks in favour of the supremacy of a Power which had declared itself the protector of their civil and religious rights, was carefully fostered. All kinds of cautious measures, a habitual gentleness, and seductive prospects,—everything was done to extinguish the last remains of attachment to the national government, in hearts captivated by so many attractions.

Sadkowski, the docile pupil of the Bishop of Mohylew, who obtained, by the treaty of 1768, the title of Bishop of White Russia, was the principal agent in these muffled and subtle intrigues. His talents, sharpened in the school of fanaticism, had received a more extensive development in the new career that had been opened to him. He was appointed almoner to the Russian legation at Warsaw, and under the cloak of this appointment was enabled to follow up with increased activity the plan of a system, whose relations he could effectually promote in that position; and thus the minister of a chapel became a pillar of political intrigues.

The treaty of 1775, which filled up the measure of Poland's misfortunes, by enriching Russia with a part of the spoil of that kingdom, added a new weight to its influence over the non-united Greeks, by stripping Poland of the centres of their spiritual jurisdiction. Accordingly the Court of Petersburg, which had hitherto confined itself to exerting a tacit dominion over that class of the subjects of the Republic, assumes in this treaty a language that only accrues to a direct sovereignty. The ninth article of the second *special act*, which establishes a commission to take cognizance of the discussions arising between the united and non-united Greeks, ends with these remarkable words: "Meanwhile, to remove

every pretext for similar complaints, the two high contracting parties will give stringent orders to their *respective subjects*, to await, in perfect quietness, the arrangements of the fore-mentioned commission, and the troops will be forbidden to interfere or use violence with any one in the affairs alluded to." The meaning of this passage cannot be equivocal, as soon as we remember that the contracting parties in the treaty are Russia and Poland, and that those who are called "their respective subjects" in the treaty, are united and non-united Greeks.

By tracing the combined course of policy, which presided over the drawing up of this treaty, its spirit and aim is discovered at every step. By a calculated show of condescension, it gradually restricts the prerogatives granted in 1768 to the Dissenters, whose protection was only a blind to that which had been given to the non-united, whilst all that regards the latter, and all that cements their dependence on Russia, is carefully recorded and confirmed. The partial modifications that are made in their franchises also betray the forethought of an enduring policy, which provides the means of exciting at option useful fermentations, by suffering a germ of discontent to remain in certain slight privations, which can be turned to account when required, as so many proofs in the eyes of the non-united Greeks, of an unjust and partial government in their legitimate rulers.

Later ages will disclose but too well these politic calculations. Thousands of writings, which have appeared in succession, and which it would be as superfluous to mention, considering their notoriety, as to analyse in the limits of this work, unveil clearly enough the nature of the ministry exercised by Sadkowski, under the title of a modest almoner; what care he bestowed in keeping constantly before the eyes of the non-united Poles, the effects of the benevolent pro-

tectorate of Russia with regard to them ; with what attention he fostered and promoted amongst them, a secret repugnance for the national authority. The faithful register of his extensive correspondence testifies to his activity.

Fanaticism has been at all times the powerful instrument which policy has ever profitably used ; accordingly it proved essentially serviceable in Poland.

So long as the appointment to the vacant livings was inherently vested in the presentation of the patrons, the elections did not always turn out to the satisfaction of this policy. This inconvenient obstruction was speedily removed ; almost all the cures were gradually filled, without any regard for the rights of the patrons, by ecclesiastics sent from Russia, whose fanatical docility was a guarantee for their being suitable instruments. Their zeal responded to these expectations, by the attachment of all those whose consciences they controlled.

The care bestowed by the Cabinet of Petersburg in multiplying the delicate threads that attached the non-united Greeks of Poland to its interests, was carried to apparently trifling lengths. Names, which add so little to the substance of things, are sometimes a substitute for realities with vulgar minds. Russia did not omit to try this mode of attraction with the non-united. At the time when they acknowledged the supremacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, their confession was styled Greco-Oriental in Poland ; since their separation from that original see, Russia sometimes designated them by the generic name of Greco-Russians, and this affected designation was employed of late with the most studied attention, in order that everything, even including names, might incessantly remind the subjects of the Republic professing the non-united faith of their dependence on the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

The period soon arrived when the pretensions of this Cabinet were manifested by more decided measures. Of this nature is the Ukase of the Synod of Petersburg, issued the 24th of February, 1780, and transmitted by the Consistory of Pereaslaw in Poland, which enjoined the monk Orlow to remove his residence to the monastery of Bohuslaw in Poland.

The name of ukase, and the system which it signalises, are alike new to the Polish nation living under a free government, and must doubtless surprise the reader.

But we approach a period when those absolute orders multiplied in Poland, in proportion as foreign supremacy became more firmly seated there.

Speaking of a ukase of the Synod of Petersburg, it will not be out of place here to give an idea of what a synod is, not according to the general acceptation of the term, but according to that which is particularly attached to it in Russia.

The Synod of Petersburg is not an ecclesiastical assembly, whose jurisdiction is limited to rites, discipline, and morals; it is one composed of members subject to the head of the church, who is the political sovereign; it is dependent on the Russian Cabinet; it is one of its offices for the purpose of transmitting and promulgating decisions through the imposing organ of fanaticism, which the Russian clergy believe themselves obliged to excite as a state duty. The orders of the sovereign are sacred commands to the synod; they promulgate nothing which is not sanctioned by the sovereign. Through this, religion becomes a constituent part of the sovereignty, a safeguard for the passive obedience of the subjects, under the vigilant inspection of the clergy. It is this irresponsible supervision which the superior Synod practises in Russia, and which it has endeavoured to extend into Poland. The development of this system dates from

the year 1783, an epoch marked by an event favourable to its execution, which was the death of the Lord Wolczanski, the archimandrite of Sluck. This ecclesiastic had not been educated in the fanatical school; he had lived and grown old in the principles of attachment and respect for the national government; he had learnt from infancy to distinguish the limit of the respective rights of states, as well as that of their 'possessions. He recognised in the See of Constantinople, the primitive supremacy of his religion. Thus absorbed in the modest functions of his office, he seemed to be little suited to serve the hidden views of policy; accordingly he was not initiated into its secrets. His death, by clearing away all difficulties, created a new order of things. The influence of the Synod of Petersburg soon manifested itself with the same character of authority in Poland as in Russia.

Its most minute as well as most important regulations, such as the promotions to the first dignities of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, were published in the states of the Republic, by ukases. One of these ukases announced there the nomination of Koninski to the archbishopric of Polock, and his introduction to the Synod. The simple publication of foreign decisions in a state, is of itself an act derogatory to the independent sovereignty of that state. But it was only the prelude to graver attempts about to be aimed at the Republic. Without the participation of the government, Sadkowski was inducted into some of the first dignities of the non-united clergy of Poland. The order conveying this promotion, instead of being supported by the presentation of the lord of the place, was accompanied by a novel expedient instead of this essential formality—the announcement of the Russian Embassy at Warsaw.\* Having entered upon the

\* See under the letter C, the Ukase installing Sadkowski in the

exercise of his office without the preliminary consent of the patron (obtained very long after), the new Archimandrite of Sluck hastened to justify the motives of his choice.

A book, entitled the *Abridged Catechism*, had been secretly introduced into Poland, during the life of the Archimandrite Wolczanski. Sadkowski took care to disseminate it freely amongst the non-united Greeks. This publication, the moral title of which seems to announce the development of principles derived from the worship due to the Divine Being, and from love to our neighbour, is only a tissue of principles destined to inspire the most entire devotedness to the interests of Russia. It is from this book, in which blind obedience to the sovereign is placed amongst the articles of faith, that the formula of the oath required for admission to priestly orders is extracted. That formula, prescribed as early as the year 1768, by a ukase of the Synod of Petersburg, was not at first used, excepting in the case of priests ordained in Russia; Sadkowski employed all his zeal to make it commonly adopted amongst those even who were ordained in Poland. If we reflect ever so little on the text of this oath, we cannot but be greatly surprised at seeing throughout, the sovereign placed almost above the Godhead, and devotedness to his interests placed before the most sacred duties. In seeking to discover what may be the nature of the objects which require the inviolable seal of secrecy on the part of an ecclesiastic, when we reflect that the Synod and the Cabinet of Petersburg are identified, the imagination places no longer any limits to a power disposing of such strong springs of action.\* When the voluminous archives of Sadkowski were subsequently ransacked, very numerous proofs were furnished of the prevalence of this influence in Poland, and

\* See appendix, under the letter D.

the secret designs of an extensive system of policy were disclosed.

The collection presents a series of ukases, which succeeded each other, and were perpetually renewed in Poland. The celebration of fêtes and events, glorious to the Empire of Russia, public prayers for the Empress and the Imperial

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ancient bishoprics at Leopold and Kiiow, he advises that the episcopal see be fixed at Sluck, and to make it dependent on the archbishopric of Kiiow, with the twofold object of conferring on the former see, together with its new title, the character of a superior authority, and to secure, by its dependence on a Russian metropolitan see, the subordination of the whole Greek clergy of Poland to the Synod of Petersburg. He proceeds to develop his views respecting the administration of Greek churches and the increase of their number. Sadkowski is there presented as a candidate for the projected post, as the most fit by his zeal, his tried talents, and local connections, to suit the political motives of that establishment. In another paper addressed to the Synod, he indicates the means by which to obtain for his protégé, the license of the King of Poland, if not under the title of Bishop, at least under that of Suffragan of the metropolitan of Kiiovia.

The Synod of Petersburg, in adopting without reserve all the views of Koninski, put them at once into full execution. Sadkowski was very soon consecrated as bishop of Pereaslaw.

Raised to that dignity, which in the system of the Cabinet of Petersburg becomes a post of confidence, he binds himself, by a form of oath more rigid than the usual oath, to inviolable secrecy, and to the faithful execution of all measures confided to his care. He there declares in the face of Heaven, that no power in the universe, any more than the multitude of the people (an expression which, in the original language, designated a republic), should be able to alter his blind obedience to Russia.\*

The great object of these engagements, the secret of this

\* See appendix, under the letter E.

imposing system, which captivated the visionary fanaticism of Sadkowski, are clearly disclosed in confessions and proofs in his own handwriting. The aim disclosed in these papers, was nothing less than the fusion of the eastern and western Greek churches, into a single vast system. Thus the southern provinces of Poland were intended to become a bridge leading to new conquests, which would ultimately extend the limits of the Empire.\*

The occurrences at that period present evident symptoms of the existence of such a system. They erect a bishopric in Poland without the participation of the national government; a pension is attached to it, the more effectually to secure its dependence; the new bishop is bound by an oath, which, from its nature, destroys or prevents all other engagements; he enters into the full execution of the functions of his office, he exerts all the authority of his station, and it is only after the accomplishment of all that is essentially characteristic of the exercise of an office, that a skilful policy suggests the propriety of soliciting a license from the King of Poland, in order to disarm, by this empty formality, the vigilance of the national administration upon the dangerous consequences of so many encroachments on its authority. Foreign influence was then predominant in Poland, denying the King the freedom of refusing, and scarcely leaving him the resources of delay. The granting of the license was deferred till the new bishop had taken the oath of fidelity to the King and Republic. He actually went to Warsaw, but not without having first obtained permission and a sort of dispensation from the Synod of Petersburg. Presented at court by the Russian Ambassador, as soon as they had informed him that the taking the oath was the essential pre-

\* See appendix, under the letter F.

liminary which he had to fulfil, he disappeared, and the license was delivered later, at the pressing and obstinate solicitations of the Ambassador.

Nevertheless, the delay of the grant did not delay the activity of Sadkowski in the abuse of his functions, or his correspondence with the Synod of Petersburg. The messages of the one, the reports of the other, continued:—the regulations of all kinds were executed without any obstacle. When afterwards, armed with a license from the King, granted through importunity, he saw himself legally possessed of an eminent office in the State, many months passed away without his having given to the government the necessary guarantee of the fidelity of his administration; and the oath which he took since, was obliged to be previously communicated to Russia.

The year 1787, was the period of the Empress' journey to Cherson, and of that memorable interview whose effects produced a general commotion in all Europe, and hastened the moment destined for the regeneration of Poland.

Sadkowski was ordered to Kiiow at the time of the Empress of Russia's sojourn in that city. The form of the oath which he must tender to the Republic, was there analysed, discussed, and settled. The subtle theologian weighed all the terms with attention; he caused them to resemble the text of the former engagement, in order carefully to set aside all that might detract from their strength, or diminish their scope. A skilful introduction of retrenchments and of modifications rendered the wording of it actually open to interpretations in keeping with the nature of the first engagement.

It would be superfluous here to mention in detail, all the differences which were perceptible between the form of the oath, such as it had been proposed to Sadkowski, and that

which he pronounced at Tulczyn. We will only pause at two remarkable omissions.

The first formula makes express mention of the national laws of Poland, and of the dominant Roman Catholic religion. In the formula drawn up at Kiiow, the last words, *Roman Catholic*, and at the end of the previous passage where it is said, *National laws*, the qualification of *Poland*, are suppressed. Moreover, a general approximation of the tenor of the oath taken by Sadkowski to the Republic, to the text of the oath by which he was engaged to Russia, is sufficient fully to convince every attentive reader, that this previous engagement had lost nothing of its power by the subsequent yielding of a homage, whose form rendered its obligations vague and illusory. Accordingly, the entire devotedness of Sadkowski to the interests of Russia was not less apparent after that period. New personal benefits, new favours granted to monasteries confided to his direction, a successive increase of the funds intended for the expenses of the administration, are sure proofs both of the well-placed confidence in the persevering zeal of Sadkowski, and of his steady promotion of the system adopted by the Cabinet of Petersburg.

Amongst many other regulations which are disclosed by the development of this system, we find one worthy of particular attention. It is that which prescribes an exact report, according to a given pattern, of the state of the dioceses, of their receipts, their expenses, and the number of parishioners. The age, sex, the condition of single and married people, all, even to the number of communicants at the sacrament of confession, are there classified. It is easy to guess the motives of this searching inquiry. The confessor is the depositary of secrets inaccessible to any other authority; and by a grievous abuse, the sacred veil of penitence has frequently covered criminal plots. Poland has just learnt this from sad ex-

perience. Fanaticism had recourse to this method to propagate seduction, to follow it out, and to prepare the way for its progress. And this is not a charge ventured without authentic proofs. The depositions during the trial of the persons implicated in the last revolt, prove the reality of this charge. The confessionals were become the *foci* of sanguinary plots. Treacherous oaths were received there, and lists of proscriptions were drawn up in them.

Another edict, not less remarkable, directly opposed to the tenor of Article IX. of the treaty of 1768, but eminently adapted to secure the reign of fanaticism, is that which forbids the printing of books of devotion and science, excepting in the press of the Synod, and which only suffers the circulation of those bearing the seal of the Censorship, and the approbation of the Synod.

Nor must we pass over in silence the article of a report of Sadkowski, from which it appears that during the short period since his induction, the number of non-united churches, which, at that date, did not amount to more than ninety-four, had increased to three hundred.

We approach at last the period when measures, long since planned, were to be crowned with success. The year 1788 would probably have put the finishing stroke to the subjugation of Poland, unless Providence had destined it to become the epoch of her resuscitation. Still the unjust enterprises of foreign authority were manifested this year. The kingdom was inundated with ukases of all kinds. The suppression of the dioceses, the sub-division into bishoprics, the publication of pardons for deserters, a number of other regulations absolutely foreign to the nation, succeeded each other rapidly.

A war kindled at both extremities of the Russian Empire, called forth a manifesto. It was published in Poland with

the same formulæ as in Russia, together with public prayers, if this name may be applied to imprecations and anathemas, directed not only against the Powers at war, but against all religions differing from the non-united Greek churches. The conquest of Oczakow occasioned publications of the same kind, destined equally to excite fanaticism in favour of Russia, and to manifest the ascendancy of that Empire, by the pompous display of her triumphs—another means of advancing the system of a foreign authority which already weighed but too heavily on the nation. The fortune of war seemed soon about to establish it, when the face of things in Poland suddenly changed.

The Diet had been assembled at Warsaw for three months. United by a tie, formerly the work of intrigue or constraint, now the happy cement of virtue binding together the wills of a nation determined to be independent, this Assembly advanced vigorously in its labours. Its rallying word was the union of the King with the nation; the annihilation of the yoke, the guarantee of an independent existence, were the expected aim and prize of their united efforts.

Russia appeared to see with indifference this first outbreak of national spirit. A confident policy inspired by a long and tranquil ascendancy, made her regard the energy of the legislative body as the result of a passing effervescence.

Nevertheless, the unanimity and the perseverance of the Assembly, the methodical character of its deliberations, a fraternal spirit which was manifested more and more in it, all announced that a revolution had taken place in the national ideas and dispositions; public opinion applauded the efforts which broke successively the shackles imposed on the constitution. The national character was developed with the progress of these labours, which presented the flattering prospect

of continual advance towards a new order of things, corresponding to the dignity of an independent nation.

This steady activity roused the Cabinet of St. Petersburg from the indifference in which till then it seemed to have been absorbed; and, far from renouncing the system of domination which Poland resisted with firmness, its policy only redoubled its efforts to retain in shackles a country which threatened to escape them for ever; but these efforts were covered with a veil which the state of things required. The frequent messages addressed to Sadkowski, his numerous reports, a considerable fund of money which he received the same year—all proved a redoubled activity on the part of Russia, but all was enveloped in the shadow of secrecy.

Very soon various intelligence came successively from different parts of the kingdom, announcing indications of a general disposition to revolt amongst the peasants of the united and non-united Greek confessions.

These first rumours were soon changed into certainty; the imminent danger required prompt and vigorous measures; Sadkowski was watched; the Russian Cabinet was not ignorant of the movement taking place in Poland; the efficacious precautions of the Government to lay the storm were known to it; besides, it could not but be aware of the interest which other Cabinets took in the fate of the Republic. All these considerations forced it to observe a circumspect conduct; it descended to contrivances, the object of which it was easy to appreciate; a long-delayed order forbade the publication in Poland of manifestoes, which, as we have seen above, had already been made quite public. This order, accompanied by a despatch from Sadkowski, arrived in Poland when the person and the papers of the latter were already sequestered. Such a message was admirably calculated to calm all suspicion and anxiety, to disarm the vigilance of the Administra-

tion, and to slacken the activity of the researches destined to unravel all the threads of a dark plot. They flattered themselves that, by gaining time, the explosion of the plot would anticipate the discovery of the manœuvres which were preparing its way.

The termination of the project did not answer the expectations of its authors; but can we doubt the source from which it sprung?

The prodigious influx of *vivandieres*, suttlers, camp-followers, and other Russian subjects, who spread almost simultaneously all over Poland and Lithuania, the frequent importation of knives and other arms, introduced into the kingdom under the pretence of their being merchandise, the uniform attestation of the imprisoned conspirators, all confessing that murders, directed by fanaticism, were to be committed on the same day in all places, from the centre of Lithuania to the extremity of the Ukraine, and that the confessional concealed with its veil the measures agreed upon for their execution; all this weight of proofs, of witnesses, and sentence of death pronounced and executed upon some guilty persons, inspires a conviction which leaves no doubt respecting the premeditated origin and consequences of a plot ready to explode.

The firm measures of the Government happily anticipated its ravages, but the element of danger is not extinguished. This hidden principle of disasters still exists, the source of future evil.

The active spring of fanaticism has lost nothing of its



of religion, through the possession of Kiiow, Pereaslaw, Mohylew, Orsza, Polock, chief seat of the spiritual jurisdiction.

Seeking to support so much authority by respectable names, Russia availed herself of the co-operation of her Allies to draw up treaties, whose secret object was concealed by plausible motives.

The fine-sounding name of tolerance served as a cloak to the projects which were intended to enslave the nation, under the imposing pretext of protection stipulated in favour of the Dissenters. But now that the secret of this clever policy is brought to light, that these Sovereigns see with surprise the ravages of oppression, of fanaticism, and interested calculations, where they believed they saw only the beneficent effects of protection, of tolerance, and disinterestedness, — Poland cannot have to fear that they will sanction with their approval or with their silence the future proceedings of an oppressive Power, whose efforts might speedily extend beyond the limits of this kingdom.

She rather anticipates, with confidence, that the enlightened policy of these Sovereigns will henceforth attach to the independent existence of the Republic, the conviction of a necessary weight in the balance of general interests. Already the august Monarch who, to the brilliant qualities of a war-like hero, knows how to unite all the virtues dear to humanity, highly applauds and co-operates with the constant efforts of the nation to shake off the yoke of dependence, to surround itself with barriers impenetrable to foreign influence, and this magnanimous example guarantees beforehand to Poland the united suffrages of all Europe.

## APPENDIX TO THE PRECIS.

## A.

DISCOURSE ADDRESSED TO THE EMPRESS OF RUSSIA, BY THE  
VERY REVEREND GEORGE KONINSKI, BISHOP OF MOHYLEW,  
IN THE MONTH OF JANUARY, 1765.

I HAVE to thank your Imperial Majesty for the care you take of our suffering church, as well as for the measures you have sanctioned in her defence. But how can my thanks equal so great a benefit? how shall so great goodness be rewarded? Let those whom you protect, gracious Sovereign, return you their thanks; those who, shut up in darkness, will again see the light; those who, formerly tormented, will begin to breathe freely; those who, dispersed, may return to their homes. Let mothers thank you when they embrace once more their children; the flocks when they regain their pastors; when the sanctuaries of the Lord, until now shut, shall be opened; when the influence exercised over the consciences of the servants of the Lord shall cease, and when the happiness of receiving the redemption of Israel shall no longer be denied to the dying who are at the gates of eternity. It is then, that all these will learn how to thank and to know the value of such goodness. Future generations, who shall receive the true faith as an inheritance from their fathers, and shall imbibe it at their mothers' breasts, will also thank you. As they do not forget the Apostle Constantine, neither will they forget Catherine; and when they bless the

memory of the defender of the Christians persecuted in Persia, they will twofold glorify the protectress of their Christian parents suffering in Poland. At the present time, we render homage to that apostolic spirit and paternal zeal for individuals of a like belief which is found in the letters written by Constantine to the King of Persia, fourteen centuries ago; let as many more pass by, and those who shall read your letters, in which protection is secured on a similar occasion to suffering Christians, will not fail to render the homage due to your apostolic spirit, and to bless your maternal interest towards those professing the same religion. Finally, you will be also recompensed by Jesus Christ Himself, the head of the church when it suffers as when it flourishes. He is persecuted when His people are persecuted. Seated on His throne of glory, He says: "Saul, why persecutest thou Me?" and if He defend those who defend His, and if He says from the height of His glory, "Catherine, since you defend Me, I promise to recompense you in a special manner, for every glass of water given to any one of My disciples," will He then leave without a recompense your cup of redemption, that supporting and refreshing cup presented to so many millions of His disciples? Truly you will not lose your reward; He will give it you, good measure, running over, and showered upon you in a dew of blessings. Pursue, with other glorious actions, the defence of the faithful, and do not permit the destruction of those who suffer so wrongfully, but procure, upon earth, the immortal glory of Constantine. Preserve this apostolic crown which is prepared in heaven for you alone. Defend Israel, and the Lord will neither slumber nor sleep, but will keep watch over the preservation of your Imperial Majesty, and the splendour of your reign to the remotest period.

## B.

DISCOURSE ADDRESSED BY THE SAME BISHOP TO THE GRAND  
DUKE OF RUSSIA.

RETURNING to my flock in Poland, dispersed for so many centuries, I recommend to the benevolence of your Imperial Highness, with sentiments of profound submission, this flock, which the predecessors of your Imperial Highness have always defended as being of their own faith. I have never doubted the zeal of your Imperial Majesty for the uniformists, because it is inherent in the blood of your Majesty, and because it is attached to the name of apostle, which is also yours. It is in the confidence which this hope inspires that we often implore the mercy of the Lord to preserve in strength and for a long course of years, this precious treasure and the vessel of gold which contains it: I mean the rare virtues of your Imperial Highness, and of your person. Just as your ancestor has been accounted equal in apostolic pre-eminence to the first apostle Peter, so also the name and glorious actions of your Imperial Highness, the great Paul, will be associated with those of your grandsire, Peter the Great.

## C.

ORDER OF HER MAJESTY THE EMPRESS OF ALL THE RUSSIAS,  
ADDRESSED BY THE ECCLESIASTICAL CONSISTORY OF KIIOVIA,  
TO THE IHUMEN (OFFICIAL) VICTOR SADKOWSKI, CHAPLAIN  
TO THE EMBASSY AT WARSAW.

SAMUEL, by order of her Imperial Majesty, member of the holy directorial Metropolitan Synod of Kiiovia and of Halisz,

in execution of the order of her Majesty, despatched by the holy directorial Synod, the 30th of October, 1783, by which his Reverence was commanded to raise you to the archbishopric of Sluck, situated in Poland, but dependent on the diocese of this place; after the manner in which you fulfil your duties, and the justice due to your character, as well as from respect to the recommendation of the Bishop of Mohylew, member of the Synod, and that of M. de Stackelberg, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and of the Baron d'Asch, Resident and Aulic Counsellor, it is hereby notified to you that the holy Synod has decided that his Reverence should recommend another chaplain for the mission of Warsaw, with the consent of M. de Stackelberg, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and you are enjoined to repair without delay to Kiiovia, at the expense of this said monastery of Sluck, to be promoted to the dignity of archimandrite of this monastery; and in order that no interruption may occur in the duties you fulfil at the Embassy, you will nominate, if such be the desire of the Count of Stackelberg, and with reference also to the opinion of Spiridion Ihumen, a good and intelligent Jeremonach, whom you will choose from the orthodox monastery of Brzesc in Poland, and he will remain until the arrival of the chaplain nominated to the office. Such is the order which you must expedite, and which is at the same time sent to Spiridion Ihumen of Brzesc, this 7th of December, 1783.

(Signed)

TARASIUSZ, Archimandite of Kiiovia, Ihumen  
of the Cathedral church of Zloto Michal-  
owka, First Grand Vicar.

ANDREW JARKOWIEW, Chancellor.

JOHN LEWICKI, Sub-Chancellor.

And below: "Received, and the receipt notified the 11th of January, 1784;" and on the other side, the certificate of

the doctor and the major in command, who bear witness to this document having passed the Russian outposts.

D.

OATH TAKEN BY A PRIEST AT THE TIME OF HIS CONSECRATION,  
COPIED FROM A BOOK ENTITLED, "ABRIDGED CATECHISM."

I, the undersigned, promise and swear before Almighty God, and upon His Holy Bible, to be as I ought in all things, obedient and submissive, to serve loyally and faithfully to the last drop of my blood, and without regard of my life, Catherine Alexiowna, Empress of all the Russias, my gracious sovereign, as well as my very gracious master, Paul Petrowicz, her dear son, Grand Duke, and legitimate heir of the throne of all the Russias. To watch over and defend all the rights and prerogatives attached to the sovereignty, to the power and authority of her Imperial Majesty, as much those already established, as those to be established hereafter, in all the extent and force of their literal wording, in each case to use them as far as lies in my power in the service of her Majesty, and to the advantage of her country. To give, not only timely notice as soon as informed of anything likely to be prejudicial to her interests, or to menace its integrity, but also to employ every means to anticipate and prevent them; to keep the secrets confided to me; to fulfil the functions of my charge determined by this public oath, and by another separate one; to fulfil conscientiously and fitly all the rules, instructions, and ordinances which may be successively given by my superiors in the name of her Imperial Majesty; to allow nothing whatever to turn me from my duties and my oath, either private interest, the ties of blood, of hatred or of friendship, but on the contrary act in all things as a good

and faithful subject of her Majesty. And thus may God bless my soul and body according as I shall answer for my actions before His terrible judgment-seat. I swear besides to fulfil, as I ought, all my duties as a priest, with a perfect purity of life; to instruct with zeal and charity the souls committed to me in the knowledge of the Divine laws; to study, carefully and attentively, the language, the meaning, the power, and the mysteries of the sacred writings; not to get drunk, not to cause scandal, to live respectably, to keep a proper reserve and decency, as well in my language as in my dress; to be careful also of the respect due to my character, and to train my flock in the true religion, by good example and a blameless life; to employ the word of God, the writings of the fathers, the spirit of mildness, and all possible means, to convert by conviction, and lead back to the bosom of the Greek church, all schismatics in my parish; to impeach those who persist in their errors, and above all those who pervert others by their discourses and their writings, and not to connive at their heresy, to leave out their names in the books of confession with the confessing faithful. I swear further that I give no other mental signification to the promises that I make, than those intended by these expressions that my lips utter, and that I understand them in all their force, and in the meaning which those who read or listen to them also give. May God, who reads the depths of the heart, be witness to the sincerity of these promises, and may His vengeance fall upon me if I lie or swear against my conscience; and as guarantee of their accomplishment I kiss the words of my Saviour. Amen.

## E.

## EXTRACT FROM A BISHOP'S OATH.

VICTOR, the very dear elect in God, confirmed archimandrite, is presented to be consecrated bishop of the holy cities Perejeslaw and Borispole. The bishop-elect then said :

“ Upon which I promise to obey and to be in everything submissive to the holy directorial Synod of all Russia, as to a legitimate superior established by Peter the Great, of glorious and immortal memory, and confirmed by her Majesty the Empress, our gracious sovereign who gloriously reigns.

“ I acknowledge also to have received the episcopal dignity only with the consent of her Majesty Catherine Alexiowna, my very gracious sovereign, Empress of all the Russias, and then by the choice made of my person by the holy directorial Synod of all Russia.

“ I promise not to allege any excuse when any bishop shall require of me to repair with my coadjutors, the other bishops, to the assembly of the sacred directorial Synod of all the Russias, even if any power or body of people should wish to deter me, being bound by my oath to complete submission to the orders of the sacred Synod. I promise and vow by this oath to hold to this obligation, and to use all my efforts to serve faithfully and loyally her Imperial Majesty our gracious sovereign, and the Grand Duke Paul Petrowicz, her dear son, and legitimate heir of the throne of all the Russias ; to be obedient to them in all things ; not to regard my own life, and to shed the last drop of my blood to defend and maintain their acknowledged rights and prerogatives, and to recognise as inherent in the sovereignty their power and authority ; to contribute in all cases and according to circumstances, everything likely to be of service or advantage to their country ; and



if any information should reach me in any respect contrary to the interests of her Majesty, or likely to injure or to be prejudicial to them, not only to hasten to give timely notice, but to do all in my own power to impede and prevent it; also, never to violate either the secrets of the church or any others committed to my keeping.

“I declare further to observe all things prescribed by the sacred directorial Synod; to conform in the administration of my church entirely according to the tenor of the diploma which will be given by this said Synod; to execute with punctuality and submission, all the decrees and ordinances which may in future be made under the good pleasure of her Majesty the Empress, without swerving in the least from truth and sincerity.

“If ever I infringe that which I here promise, if I contravene the very holy canons, if I fail in submission towards the sacred directorial Synod of Russia, or if I cause a schism and seek to lead in any way my diocese from submission to the sacred Synod, I consent to be deprived of my authority and dignity without a murmur, or ability to justify myself, and to consider myself unworthy of the spiritual gifts conferred upon me by the imposition of hands at the time of my consecration.

“I swear further before God, who sees all things, that I give to these promises no other sense than that implied in the words I have pronounced, and that I understand them in the sense they present to whoever reads or hears them.

“In entering into an engagement to fulfil that which I have promised here in words, I oblige myself likewise to perform it to the last instant of my life, in order to obtain, through this means, eternal salvation, and this I confirm by oath. May God, who sees the inmost depths of the heart, be witness of my promises.”

## F.

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY VICTOR, BISHOP OF  
PEREJASLAW, TO THE EMPRESS OF RUSSIA.

MOST SERENE SOVEREIGN, ABSOLUTE AND VERY GRACIOUS PRINCESS,—It is from a compassionate respect towards the church of Jesus Christ, founded for many centuries in a neighbouring state, that your Imperial Majesty has been pleased to turn your eyes upon me, your Majesty's very humble servant, and to confer a singular favour on your faithful servant, in confiding to him the new house of God, which is raised and sustained by the succour of your powerful arm, in order to shelter the scattered flock under the shadow of your pro-

church will fall down, and that in future these two will form but one.

Of your Imperial Majesty, my very gracious Sovereign, the most humble and the most obliged amongst your subjects who pray to God for you,

VICTOR,

Bishop of Perejaslaw, Coadjutor to the Mother Church of Kiiovia.

Kiiow, this 7th of July, 1785.

G.

UKASE TO EXTERMINATE IN POLAND THE NOBLES, THE PRIESTS,  
AND THE JEWS.\*

As we clearly see with what contempt and shame we, as well as our religion, are treated by the Poles and the Jews—the defenders of our Greek religion being persecuted, oppressed, and punished with death; for these reasons, being no longer able to permit such outrages, such infamies, and this persecution, *solely for the sake of the contempt shown to our holy religion*, we order and enjoin Maximilian Zelezniaak, of Tymoszew, Colonel and Commander in our territory of Lower Zaporogia, to enter upon Polish ground, accompanied by some regiments of our Russian army, and of Don Cossacks, to exterminate and strike down, by the aid of God, all the Poles and Jews, blasphemers of our holy religion. By this means we shall put an end to all the complaints brought to our throne against these merciless assassins—these perjurers

\* *We do not think* this received the seal of the Empire, or was signed by the hand of Catherine the Great, but it was circulated by the popes, and then carried into execution. It will be found in the *Considérations sur la Confédération de Bar*, by M. Vielhorski, Paris, 1770, in 8vo; and in the *Memorial of Chodzko*, Paris, 1846, in 8vo.

—these violators of the law—*these Poles who, in protecting the false belief of the impious Jews*, blaspheme and despise our religion, and oppress a faithful and innocent people. We order, therefore, that in the passage of the troops through Poland, they exterminate the name of these heretics, and destroy them and their memory from posterity for ever. But, in order that treaties and friendship may be observed towards a neighbouring people, we forbid, under heavy punishment, to molest or annoy either Turkish, Greek, Armenian, or our own Russian merchants and traders, who require to pass through Poland with the object of commerce; we desire they may have a free passage, and such help as they may require. We confirm this order and this permission, given at St. Petersburg, sealed with our arms, and signed by our own hand, the 20th of June, 1768.

CATHERINE.

A true copy.

The attaman koszowy, PETER KALNYSCHIEFFSKOI.

With Witnesses.

## NEKRASSOVIAN COSSACKS.

[To give an example, amongst others, of the practical application of the community of religion, and of the desire to contribute to human happiness, invoked on every occasion by the Russian Government, we give what follows:—]

FOR more than a century, the fugitive Cossacks, who, after the revolt of the Ukraine, were driven from their homes in Poland, had established themselves in Turkey, under the name of Nekrassovian Cossacks. The Turkish Government had assigned them lands on the right bank of the Danube, near its mouth; since when, their numbers had increased to many thousands. Before the campaign of 1828, the Russians had managed to effect an understanding, and to gain over some amongst the ancient Nekrassovians; so that, relying on their promises, and perhaps on the community of religion, more than half the Russian army passed the Danube, whilst they remained in their villages; others, less unsuspicious, fled into the interior of Turkey. Soon after the breaking-out of hostilities, all the villages of the Nekrassovians were surrounded in the night by strong detachments of Russian troops; they carried off men, women, and children, by main force, with all their goods, embarked them on board Russian vessels, and transported them to the other side of the Black Sea, where they were stationed in the steppes in the neighbourhood of Anapa.

## THE CATHOLIC RELIGION IN RUSSIA.

LLOCUTION OF HIS HOLINESS OUR LORD THE POPE GREGORY XVI. TO THE SACRED COLLEGE IN THE SECRET CONSISTORY OF THE 22ND OF JULY 1842; FOLLOWED BY AN EXPOSITION, CORROBORATED BY DOCUMENTS, OF THE CONSTANT CARE OF HIS HOLINESS TO REMEDY THE SERIOUS EVILS WHICH AFFLICT THE CATHOLIC RELIGION IN THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL STATES OF RUSSIA AND POLAND.

n 1831, Poland having fallen, the Russian Government exacted from Rome a public reprimand of the patriotism displayed by the Catholic clergy during the struggle. His Holiness Pope Gregory XVI. at first refused; but, led into error by the Russian Ambassador, and possessing at that time, with the other Cabinets of Europe, very little exact information about Poland, threatened, besides, in case of refusal, with the transportation of the Bishops and the *élite* of the clergy into Siberia, he at length acceded. He consented to publish, in July, 1832, his celebrated Bull, addressed to the Bishops of Poland. The grief which this caused to the Catholics most attached to the Holy See is well known. This grief was soon shared, and avowed with tears and with a saintly humility, by the Pope himself, who allowed that his religion had been mistaken in this concession. Russia, on her part, did all to convince him that the Church, far from benefiting from this, suffered, on the contrary, an increasing and systematic persecution. In 1842, his Holiness Pope Gregory XVI. published to the world the perfidy and violence against which he had vainly, though so perseveringly, struggled. He pronounced an address, July the 22nd, before the Sacred College, of which we give here the text and its translation. It was printed at Rome, followed by an "Exposition, corroborated by Ninety Documents, of the unremitting care and anxiety of his Holiness to remedy the serious evils with which the Catholic Religion is afflicted in the Imperial States of Russia and of Poland." No reply was made by Russia to

this denunciation of her hereditary fraud ("Avita fraus"). Some years after only, it was known that the Emperor Nicholas, when at Rome, had kissed the hand of this same Gregory XVI., and had promised him "to render justice, if required, to his Catholic subjects." The way in which he kept his promise is no secret.

VENERABILES FRATRES,—Hærentem diu animo nostro dolorem ob miserrimam Catholicæ Ecclesiæ in Russiaco Imperio conditionem, alias, Venerabiles Fratres, vobiscum ex hoc ipso loco communicavimus. Testis quidem Ille est, cujus, immerentes utique, vicaria potestate fungimur in terris. Nos statim ab inito supremi Pontificatus munere nullam sollicitudinis studiique partem prætermisisse, ut tot tantisque quotidie ingravescens malis, quoad fieri posset, mederemur. Quis autem impensis hujusmodi curis responderit fructus, facta etiam recentissima satis superque demonstrant. Quantum inde assiduus Noster dolor excreverit, magis Vos cogitatione præcipitis, quam Nobis liceat verbis explicare. Est vero quod intimæ amaritudini summum veluti cumulum addit, quodque Nos, pro Apostolici ministerii sanctitate, præter modum anxios ac sollicitos habet. Cum enim quæ ad incolumitatem Catholicæ Ecclesiæ intra Russiæ dominationis fines tuendam indesinentur præstitimus, in iis maxime regionibus palam non innotuerint, illud sane molestissimum accidit, ut apud degentes inibi permagno numero fideles, avita Santæ hujus Sedis inimicorum fraude, rumor invaluerit, Nos sacratissimi officii immemores tantam illorum calamitatem silentio dissimulasse, atque adeo Catholicæ Religionis causam pene deseruisse. Itaque eo jam adducta res est, ut lapis offensio- nis ac petra scandali propemodum evaserimus amplissimæ parti dominici gregis, cui regendo divinitus positi sumus; immo vero universæ Ecclesiæ super Eum tanquam super firmam petram fundatæ, cujus ad Nos, utpote successores, veneranda dignitas promanavit. Hæc porro cum sint, id Dei,

Religionis, et Nostra etiam ratio omnino postulat, ut vel ipsam tam injuriosæ culpæ suspicionem longissime a Nobis propulsemus. Atque hæc causa est, cur omnem seriem curarum, quas pro Catholica Ecclesia in memorata Imperio suscepimus, peculiari expositione ad unumquemque Vestrum mittenda, patefieri jusserimus; quo nimirum universo fideli Orbi elucescat, nos proprio Apostolatus muneri nullatenus defuisse. Ceterum non concidamus animo, Venerabiles Fratres, futurum sperantes ut potentissimus Russiarum Imperator et Poloniæ Rex illustris, pro sua æquitate et excelso quo præstat animo diuturnis Nostris ac subditæ sibi Catholicæ gentis votis benevole obsecundet. Hac spe fulti non desistamus interim oculos ac manus in montem, unde veniet auxilium nobis, fidenti cum prece levare, omnipotentem ac pientissimum Deum una simul enixe obsecrantes, ut laboranti jamdudum Ecclesiæ suæ expectatissimam opem quantocius largiatur.

VENERABLE BROTHERS,—Already in this place we have poured forth with you, Venerable Brothers, the grief which now, for so long a period, has taken deep root in our soul, at the miserable condition of the Catholic church in the bosom of the Russian Empire. He for whom we are, though unworthy, vicar upon earth, is a witness, that from the moment which invested us with the charge of the Sovereign Pontificate, we have neglected nothing that solicitude or zeal command in order to remedy, as much as possible, so many and daily-increasing evils. But what has been the result of so much care? Facts, and very recent ones, speak but too plainly. You can comprehend how impossible it is for us to put this into words. There is also something which increases to the utmost this inward bitterness; something which, because of the holiness of the apostolic ministry, plunges us beyond measure in anxiety and affliction. What we have



done without intermission to protect and defend, in all the regions under Russian dominion, the unvarying rights of the Catholic church, has not been made public: it has not been known, above all, in those regions; and it is another cause of grief, that amongst the numerous faithful who inhabit these regions, the enemies of the Holy See have, with the hereditary fraud which characterises them, spread abroad amongst them a rumour, that, forgetful of our sacred ministry, we suffer in silence the great and heavy evils with which they are overwhelmed, and that we have thus almost abandoned the cause of our suffering religion. This has been carried to such a height, that we are become as a stumbling-block to a large number of the Lord's flock, whom we have a divine right to govern, and even for the universal church, founded, as upon a rock, upon him whose venerable dignity has been transmitted to us his successor. Such being the state of things, we owe it to God and our religion, as well as ourselves, to repel even the suspicion of so injurious a fault; and this is the reason of our order for bringing to light the successive efforts made in favour of the Catholic church in the Russian Empire, in an explanation addressed to each of you, in order that it may be manifest to all the faithful we have in no way failed in the duties imposed by our apostolic charge. Further, we will not allow our soul to be cast down, Venerable Brothers. We hope the very powerful Emperor of all the Russias and King of Poland will listen to the justice and high-mindedness which distinguish him, and give ear unto our pressing requests and to those of the Catholic population subject to him. Sustained by this hope, we, however, cease not to raise in supplication the eyes and the hands towards that Power from whence all succour comes, and to ask personally of God the Almighty and All-merciful to grant His church, so long plunged in sorrow, the assistance she needs.

PETITION OF THE NOBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF WITEPSK.

ADDRESSED IN 1834 TO THE EMPEROR, TO COMPLAIN OF THE  
VIOLENCE USED AGAINST THE UNITED GREEKS, IN ORDER  
TO FORCE THEM OVER TO THE ESTABLISHED RELIGION.\*

Violences and Deceptions—The Churches of the united Greeks are closed  
—Their Doors sealed, their Clergy driven away—Consciences alarmed  
—Change of Religion presents itself as a lucrative speculation.

THE very clement Emperor now happily exercising his sovereign authority in the constant and general government of his people, desiring also in particular cases to give to his faithful subjects the opportunity of offering their humble requests, has enacted in his decree touching the order of the assemblies, that the nobility united in session could examine into their wants, and make known to him, through the president of the assembly, whatever might appear to them useful or expedient. The nobility of the province of Witepsk, resting upon this foundation, full of sentiments of gratitude and animated by filial confidence, take the liberty to lay the following facts before his Imperial Majesty.

For some time, but particularly in the present year, 1834, no stone is left unturned to lead over the united Greeks to the established religion. These doings would make no im-

\* See Theiner, *Vicissitudes of the Catholic Church of the two Formule in Poland and Russia*, Debécourt, 1843, in 2 vols., vol. 2nd, p. 301.

pression upon the minds of men in this province, if they were permitted to act in this union according to the voice of conscience and from a strong conviction. But the means employed fill the mind with terror. In many places a small number of parishioners are called together, unknown to the others, and obliged, not by free choice, but by violence against which they are unable to struggle, to embrace the established religion; and although this pretended adhesion to it is the act of the few, it is announced to all the other inhabitants of the village or parish who have remained in their houses, that they ought to profess the established religion. Sometimes, notwithstanding their protestations against it in the public assemblies, the whole of the parishioners were placed amongst the number of those who profess the dominant religion. In every case their own minister was driven away, and the church used for the Greek service, contrary to all prescribed rules in this matter. The union being thus established by violence and in spite of the inhabitants, if these resorted to ecclesiastical or civil authority, protesting their wish to keep inviolate the religion of their ancestors, and endeavoured to defend their cause in a legal manner, this proceeding would be held in the light of an act of desertion from the established religion, voluntarily received by them, and they are punished accordingly in various ways. In some parishes, in which a part of the people remained faithful to the religion of their ancestors, the parish church was, notwithstanding, devoted to the Greek services; the smaller churches even were closed and their doors sealed up. It is thus that some, without previous warning, and by the mere order of the magistrates, were forced into the established church; others, from fear of atrocious persecutions, of which they saw many examples; others, again, entered it in the hope to obtain some particular favour, or to be delivered from some public charge or from slavery. And

whilst professing it, they remained faithful in their hearts to the religion followed by their ancestors and by themselves for so long a period. They even avowed to those who had forced them into the established religion, that though they obeyed the orders given them, and frequented the churches, and received their sacraments, yet inwardly they remained steadfastly attached to their former religion. Finally, those who persevered in maintaining their faith, saw themselves deprived of their churches and their clergy, and found the greatest difficulty in procuring Christian instruction and other spiritual aids.

The result of all this is, that the people begin generally to believe religion may change according to circumstances, and that it is not necessary to feel persuaded of its truth, or to have inward faith in it; and that, with a view to procure any particular advantages, it may be abandoned. From this it arises that religious maxims do not make the impression they ought; they cease to be the foundation of every civil duty and virtue. The citizens and subjects are a prey to constant doubts and extreme anxiety. At one moment, on account of the rumours that the change of religion is enforced; again, on account of the denunciations to which they are constantly exposed, under the pretence that they impede the propagation of the established religion.

The nobility of Witepsk, impelled by these motives, though persuaded that liberty of conscience is sufficiently guaranteed by the laws of the Empire, and by the supreme desire of the Emperor (happily the head of all), and that the established religion enforces, like all other confessions of faith, the obligation to fulfil our duties, by inserting in its ethics the principles of civil and religious virtues; terrified, however, by the means used to propagate it, and the results this cannot fail to bring about, the nobility of

Witepsk have desired the president of the session to collect all the facts concerning this affair, to make them known to him who has the power of redress, and to present a petition to his Majesty.

PETITION ADDRESSED IN 1835 BY THE FAITHFUL  
UNITED GREEKS OF THE PROVINCE OF USZACZ.\*

Apostolate of the Russian Commission—Blows on the head—Tearing out hair—Prison—Transportation—Clergy of the United Greeks forbidden to administer the Holy Sacraments—Heroic firmness of the Martyrs.

without priests, and confess each other, but we will not embrace your faith; rather let us choose the fate of the beatified Jehoshaphat: it is what we desire. But the Commission left us, mocking at our tears and our prayers. And we have remained like stray sheep without a shelter.

We sign, etc.

LETTER OF CATHERINE TO STACKELBERG. 1780.

The Pope supposes that the King of Poland undertakes to mediate in the affair of the Jesuits in Russia—We tolerate the Catholic religion in our dominions—We allow also the Priests to remain, but under the condition that they obey our sovereign authority without reservation of any kind—No third person can question anything which may be done in this respect in Russia—If the Court of the Bourbons, or any other, or whoever it may be, insists on this, the Pope risks the slight authority I allow him to have in my States.

*Saint Petersburg, February the 14th, 1780.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,—Having answered, by the letter of Count Panin, written by our order the 22nd of October, of last year, your despatch containing the account of the Apostolic Nuncio residing in Warsaw, respecting the Jesuits having schools in our governments of White Russia, we thought the directions which were given therein sufficient to answer all questions required upon the subject. But seeing by your late reports that the Pope concluded, from the representations of the Minister of the Court of Poland, the Marquis Antici, that the mediation in this affair would be undertaken by the King of Poland, we think it necessary to enter into a fresh explanation with you, and for your better information to communicate to you our ideas respecting this.

We have permitted the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion throughout our Empire, comprehending the governments of White Russia, only on condition that un-  
 der obedience to our sovereign authority should be  
 " the new ordinances and



institutions of the spiritual government of Rome, are only received by our Roman Catholic subjects after we have recognised them as not contrary *to our pleasure*, and have permitted their publication, so that even the Bull of Pope Gregory the XIV., respecting the Jesuits, was not published in our Empire, as is well known, and the Society of this order has been kept intact, as useful, and better fitted to educate youth in these provinces, for which it is unequalled. There was no intention either to abolish or to change this order in any way in our Empire. The whole affair consisted in this, that after the union of these provinces to our dominions, we established there a special hierarchy for the Romish churches, and a series of spiritual orders or degrees, independent of those of Poland. It was also necessary to take measures for the preservation of this order, to give it a domestic and not a foreign tendency, and to keep up the number by means of its noviciate. It is in consequence of this, that our bishop of White Russia, of the Romish church, Stanislaus Cestrgencewitz, in virtue of his episcopal authority confirmed by us, and having besides the benediction of the Pope, by an edict in which he confided to him the reform and the government of all the clergy, without excepting any of the religious orders, proceeded to the opening of the school of noviciates for the order of the Jesuits.

From this slight sketch, you will see that *this said bishop has only executed our pleasure as absolute Sovereign, towards whom his submission as subject admits of no exception.*

Presiding in the diocese which is confided to him by our authority, he was further persuaded to the act by the utility of this order to the Romish Church, which contributes more than any other to spread enlightenment.

These considerations lead us to protect a society so advantageous to these provinces, and far more useful than all

the other monkish institutions of the Roman church, which only foster idleness and aversion to the duties of a citizen. We have no other idea of the Jesuits than this, and their conservation in this part of our Empire can assuredly injure no one, if, according to our institutions, the clergy attend only to the duties of their calling, and in other things are subject, with all other ranks, without exception, to the laws of the country. *We believe no third party would question the actions of our subjects, if in accordance with our wishes; as we observe, on our side, a similar discretion with all the other Powers independent of us.* We require our Minister to answer all the questions which may be made by the Bourbon Court, or any other, by these motives. More detailed explanations appear superfluous, and we definitely order you to reply to all the questions put to you on this matter, in your place of residence, by a verbal opposition drawn from the preceding letter of Count Panin, and from our present rescript; *you will break off all negociation on this affair, as of one purely domestic, in which foreign intervention is incompatible with our dignity.* Further, when an occasion offers, you will give to understand, that the herein-mentioned Bishop, who has only acted in accordance to our will, and has shown, on many occasions, his fidelity to us, and his zeal for the welfare of his diocese, continues to enjoy our favour and our imperial regard, and that we shall defend him to our utmost, and will not suffer the slightest attack either on his authority or his honour. Such insinuations will have great weight with the Court of Rome, for if the fixity of our purpose in this respect is seen, even the efforts of the Bourbons will prove less powerful than the fear of losing the small degree of authority we allow the Pope in our dominions.

(Signed)

CATHERINE.

LETTER OF COUNT JOSEPH DE MAISTRE TO HIS  
EMINENCE THE CARDINAL.\*

Justice requires that the Catholic religion in Russia should not be considered a tolerated religion, but as a religion of the state; whereas, in reality, it is not tolerated at all—The blasphemies of the Jews and Mohammedans against the established religion professed by the Emperor, are tolerated, but the dogmas of the Catholics are not tolerated—Siestvzencewicz, at one time Protestant and officer of the hussars, then Catholic Archbishop of Mohylew, considers the Emperor as his Pope—Eleven millions of Catholics in Russia;† they are under the direction of the schismatic Minister of Public Worship.

St. Petersburg, 1816.

MY LORD CARDINAL,—From a sentence in the last letter of your Eminence, I perceive that you are by no means aware of the real state of the Catholic religion in this vast Empire; and as it is a matter of the highest importance, you will not, I am sure, feel offended at my endeavour to explain this to you.

Your Eminence will have read in the different official documents published at the time of the expulsion of the Jesuits, that Russia has been always distinguished by her spirit of toleration. This sounds very well, and I am fully persuaded that his Imperial Majesty firmly believes it, for no Prince in the world has a higher respect for liberty of conscience; but, as a fact, this is *nil*. Thus, to speak with exactitude, it cannot be said that the Catholic religion is tolerated.

\* *Unpublished Letters and Fragments of Count Joseph de Maistre*. Paris, Paton, 1851. Two Vols. See Vol. II., p. 395.

† This cipher has much diminished since the unfortunate struggle in Poland, in 1831.

Your Eminence will observe, therefore, that if we speak with the accuracy requisite in such matters, the Catholic religion should not be considered a religion merely of tolerance, but of the state—a privilege belonging to her as well as to the Protestant faith, though neither the one nor the other is the predominant religion, which is very different. A tolerated religion is one introduced into a country by force or by finesse, and which afterwards the Government is constrained to acknowledge. This was the case with the Protestants in France, and is that of the Rascolniks in Russia. But when a Prince acquires new countries, either by concession or by conquest, he evidently acquires them with their religion; thus, it is not a matter of tolerance, but of justice. I have communicated this observation to several clear heads in this country—all were struck by it; and I remember having made it known, three years ago, to Prince Alexander Galitzin, Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, to whom we owe so many obligations at this time, and he honestly said:—"Indeed, this is true; I had not regarded it in this light before."

Suppose I admit as a hypothesis, that the Catholic religion is nominally, and in the usual sense, tolerated. I maintain, however, as a fact, that this so-termed tolerated religion is not in the least tolerated.

A religion is not tolerated when not allowed to be followed according to its spirit, its dogmas, and its general principles. His Majesty, my august Sovereign, would not certainly imagine he was tolerating the Jews in his dominions, if he forced them to eat pork, or to work on their sabbath—yet such is the manner in which our religion is tolerated in Russia.

It is permitted to be said in the Synagogue, that Jesus Christ was the son of a soldier, and in the Mosque it is also allowed to be said: "How can God have had a son when He

has had no wife?" Because these blasphemies are found, the first in the Talmud, the second in the Koran, no one troubles his head about it. But if a Catholic preacher asserts, "There is no salvation without the pale of the church," he is cited before the civil authority, and is commanded to communicate his sermon; he is reprimanded, etc. "It is said he is wanting in respect to the religion of the country." As if the want of respect was not far greater in those who dare to look upon our Saviour as an adulterous bastard! If any one fears to hear things offensive to his creed in a tolerated church, let him keep away.

At the time his Imperial Majesty had ordered a funeral oration to be preached in honour of General Moreau, the priest entrusted with this duty, had to appear before the military governor and read it over to him before delivering it. A sermon criticised by a military man, is, according to our notion of things, as extraordinary as a bishop commanding troops at their military exercise; here, no one is surprised, because the rules of one church are transferred, without its being even noticed, into another.

The recognition of the Pope as head of the church, is the principal dogma of Catholicism; deny this as a principle, and there can be, as we believe, no real Christianity. The idea of a universal (catholic) religion, without one sole and supreme head, seems as irrational to us as the Russian Empire without an Emperor. If we are told, "The Synods suffice for you;" we reply, "Why not, then, a Senate for Russia?" We dislike the idea of any change whatever in the unity of government. I do not say we are right; this is not the question which now engages our attention. I merely assert that such is our way of thinking, and therefore that we cannot consider our religion as tolerated wherever this dogma is not tolerated.

The chief of the Catholic church in this country, my lord the Archbishop of Mohylew, had been protestant, and an officer of hussars, before he was a bishop; it is tolerably well known he is hostile to the Pope's supremacy, and desires nothing more earnestly than to oppose his influence. One day, when his Imperial Highness passed him at court, he said to a group of persons standing near: "Behold my Pope!" I had this from a Russian who was present, and who felt greatly scandalised by it. In the time of the Jesuits, he turned their heads about the subject of marriage, in which he introduced, or allowed to be introduced, all the Polish license. Now, God knows what turn affairs may take! For our church it is an important point.

I could inform your Eminence of many curious things, but in a letter it is necessary to keep within the limits of general ideas. If we deduct, from the thirty-eight millions who inhabit this vast Empire, eleven millions of Catholics, two millions and a half of Protestants, the Rascolniks,\* whose numbers we can no longer venture to count, and all the other uncivilised hordes, the dominant religion will be found to exceed numerically but very slightly. This enormous mass of eleven millions of men, can only reach the ear of the Sovereign (I mean in matters of religion) through the medium of a minister of ecclesiastical affairs, a man of the Russo-Greek faith, whom I honour greatly as a gentleman, an honest man, a clever man, a man of the world, and as a good subject of the Emperor; but who knows no more than a child of ten years, what is requisite in order to understand, to judge, and to lead us: besides, after what has passed, he cannot have our confidence.

Thus then, my Lord, whenever your Eminence may hear

\* A Russian sect endeavouring to restore the primitive character of

the tolerance which is enjoyed in Russia, spoken of with a certain degree of ostentation, you will probably call to mind that which I have now the honour to make known to you. Toleration is accorded to Protestantism, Socinianism, Vascanism, Illuminism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, Lamaism, Paganism, and even to Nothingism; but Catholicism, as your Eminence has been shown, does not share a similar privilege. Never can we hope to be tolerated as we ought until we have an organ of our system near the Emperor, and until his Holiness becomes unfettered in his relations with us, and uses freely his authority over the bishops, to keep them in order; this would also be greatly to the advantage of the Empire.

If your Eminence honours me with a request to know what I think of the probability or possibility of a better order of things, I will answer, as it is a religious question, by a scriptural phrase:—"How shall they hear without a preacher." \*

What man here has the right or the desire to lay these considerations before his master? But if God and the future should put into the mind of his Imperial Majesty the good thought to hear us, through the medium of any of those men whom the public voice points out to the Sovereign, I should expect every hope to be realised from such an inspiration. A confidential nuncio would arrange many things, and would be also a great cause of hope. But of this I can know nothing.

Deign to accept, my Lord, etc.,

DE MAISTRE.

(Letters, Vol. i., p. 395, to his Eminence the Cardinal. St. Petersburg, 1816.)

\* Romans x. 14.

MANIFESTO OF WAR OF STEPHEN BATHORY, KING  
OF POLAND, AGAINST IVAN THE TERRIBLE, DUKE  
OF MUSCOVY.

PUBLISHED AT THE CAMP OF SWIR, IN LITHUANIA, THE 12TH  
OF JULY, 1579.

PRELIMINARY NOTE.

[This Document, taken from a remote age, and now reproduced in the English tongue, is well adapted to throw light on the present crisis in the East of Europe.]

THE wise of all countries, whilst severely blaming the encroachments of Russia, repeat unanimously, *Fortiter occupatum!* Still, it is prudent—in fact, it becomes indispensable—to consult history, that sibylline oracle of modern times, in order to judge, since we have to do with an aggressor, whose mode of procedure has long been known, how far we may guarantee the security of the world by a systematic policy, based upon the excessive desire of peace.

Let us then open the briefs of the two antagonistic parties. On one side we see independent states, founded more or less on the principles of liberty, following the impulse of self-government, pre-occupied with political systems, with parties, with the interest of dynasties, with commerce, with industry, philosophy, arts, and letters. They are ambitious, above all, of those moral and industrial conquests, which the freeman pursues, which emancipated society encourages, and from which the whole world derives advantages.

The states of the European system, both great and small, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective interests, the



jealousies and passions of which they may be susceptible, continue their existence without any risk of seeing their independence threatened by reciprocal encroachments. The law of nations prevails amongst them ; and although some of them may occasionally be afflicted by the fever of ambition, it can only be a transient distemper.

On the other hand, a formidable antagonist presents himself, who has been always and essentially the same. Naturally a stranger to the internal obstructions inherent in free states, his only anxiety is to procure occasions for conquests, which he follows according to an innate and traditional plan. By his daring, his cunning, and the exactness of his calculations, he always knows how to blind and divide his adversaries, and gradually to make them instruments to his own ends.

We must never lose sight of the fact, that Russia is an incarnation of that fatal force of masses which has always appeared, in the history of the world, with its mysterious mission, to oppose, to vivify perhaps, possibly also to chastise, those other nobler forces which have been commissioned to awaken and to develop the divine principle of humanity. It is this force of great masses, the offspring of Asia, reared by the side of the cradle of civilisation, which appeared in the ancient annals of the world, coming at first unsuccessfully into collision with the young republics of Greece, and which, by repeated efforts, succeeded in shaking, and ultimately demolishing, the most solid empire of the world. Finally, it is the same force, civilised to a certain extent, which, in modern history, makes continual irruptions into Europe. For it the law of nations does not exist.

During the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, Western Europe knew little of Muscovy, and did not dream of the dangers which were hatching in her bosom, because a solid, noble, chivalrous barrier, analogous to itself

in its mode of existence, separated it from these dangers, and seemed to secure it against them for ever.

At the commencement of the eighteenth century, this bulwark, badly appreciated, badly maintained, and ruined even by the West, gave way, and the inundation began. The Empire of the Jagellons, at the epoch of its prosperity, marched abreast with all the other European States, in extent, in vigour, and influence. Founded and enlarged by the Christian spirit, it soon became a prey to all the temptations of free privileged societies. The fusion of provinces, the debates of the Diets, the conversion of the Pagans, the erection of bishoprics, religious disputes, the perfecting of the laws, the culture of letters, the colonisation of the Steppes, noble and disinterested intervention in the affairs of neighbouring states;—such is the history of the youth of Poland, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This vast country, formerly the high road of the barbarians during the middle ages, by rapidly organising itself according to principles in sympathy with the Western States, became, by its independence, a guarantee for the repose of Europe.

Nevertheless, beyond Poland the Muscovite power reared itself upon totally opposite principles, presenting at first nothing but an accumulation of barbarians, poor, without nationality, without country, and almost without religion; like an inanimate body, it awaited a vivifying breath.

According to the Russian chronicles, Moscow, the capital of the State at first so frail, was built over the body of a man and his confiscated property.\* When the hordes of Genghis-Khan were invading the confines of Europe in the thirteenth

\* Georges, having arrived on the borders of the Moskowa, in the villages of Stephen Koutchko, a rich lord, caused him to be put to death for failing in respect; and being charmed with the beauty of the situation, he there founded a city. *Koussakine* : II. p. 272.

century, and other Slavonic nations were running to oppose them, Muscovy prudently declined to engage in the struggle; but humbly receiving the Mogul yoke, the only honour which it dared to ask was the office of Receiver-general of the Khans, in the principalities of conquered Slavonia.

During this long slavery, this Government, wonderful for its baseness and its serpent-like wisdom, which was its safety, succeeded in inoculating the Russian people, hitherto without soul and without political baptism, with the principle of the Mogul life. This was the true, incontestible, and uncontested origin of the Russian power.

At this present time even, she betrays herself, by facts which are related in the *Moniteur* of the 19th of July of last year (1853), where it is stated, that in China, governed by a race of Tartars, Russia, in order to gain her ends, places herself in the rank of countries tributary to that Government.

*Antiquam exquirite matrem!*

Scarcely was Muscovy freed from the Tartar yoke, when, relying on its newly-acquired energy, it began, with a matchless daring and perseverance, the sad story of its aggrandisement. Whilst pursuing, with unheard-of ferocity, the conquest and extinction of the neighbouring Slavonic Republics, it instinctively cast greedy looks towards distant countries, and a remote future. It began henceforth to study the proper field for the development of its ambitious dreams, and this field embraced all Europe, which it vaguely knew to have been formerly invaded by the hordes that had preceded it. Since Ivan III., "Europe has been no stranger to this new government. The Grand Dukes of Muscovy sought with avidity to become acquainted with the respective relations of the European monarchs, the alliances and hostilities of the various states, the amount of their revenue, the number of their troops, the sources of their intestinal

discords, and the immediate or distant advantages which might present themselves to their invariable and vigilant policy.”\* They succeeded the more easily in their object, because both they and their ambassadors were regarded as ignorant barbarians. It was in this way that diplomacy, which in Western Europe most commonly depends on the intrigues or the circumstances of the day, became in Russia a real element of power, a grave science, steady, hereditary, and always consistent with its vast designs, and whose results, more than the victories of Russia, have brought Europe into the dilemma foretold at the island of St. Helena.

The conquest of the Eastern Empire had always been a pleasant dream of Muscovite ambition.† The clumsiness and mprovidence of the Western Cabinets have chiefly contributed to furnish a serious prospect of realisation to this dream. Even at the beginning of the 16th century, we see Muscovy inspired with hatred against France, on account of her alliance with the Sultans, sending her ambassadors

\* Karamsin.

† The Varangians, who in the 10th century invaded the Slavonic countries, and took the name of Russians, but who must not be confounded with the Muscovites, began to infest the Greek Empire in the following century. At the time of the last incursion which they made there by land and sea, in 1043, an unknown hand clandestinely put on the statue of Bellerophon, at Constantinople, an inscription bearing the prophecy, “That the Russians would one day take possession of the capital of the Eastern Empire.” This inscription was probably the work of Varangian diplomacy, but the time for it was badly chosen. For it is to be observed, that the manifestation of the oracle was followed by a disaster to the Varangians, and very soon by a dissolution of their monarchy. Moreover, the statue of Bellerophon was melted down by the French crusaders, at the taking of Constantinople in the 13th century. In *our* days this circumstance might give occasion to another prophecy.

across Europe to the court of Spain, under the garb of merchants, to offer to the rival of Francis I., fifteen thousand cavalry in the war against Turkey, which was then vaguely projected in Christendom. John Dantiscus, bishop of Culm, ambassador of Sigismund, first King of Poland, who resided at the Court of the young Emperor at Valladolid, announced to his King, in his despatch of the 17th of August, 1527, the arrival of these singular merchants, who presented, on the one hand, propositions of deep policy to Charles V., and on the other, sold to the Spaniards their merchandise, amongst which were the celebrated whips of Muscovy, remarkable as emblems of their power and national industry.\*

The German Emperors soon, although they were secured by Poland against this Russian Protectorate, which in our times weighs with such bad augury on the house of Hapsburg, forgetful of the eminent services which Poland had rendered them in contributing to the annexation of the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia to their crown, ventured, with an astonishing improvidence and levity, to seek doubtful alliances with Muscovy, to their own detriment. The interregnum which happened in 1572, after the death of the last Jagellon, furnished a new impetus to this blind tendency. The Emperor Maximilian II., rivalling with the Duke of Anjou, proposed his son Ernest as candidate for the throne of Poland. To give support to this pretension, he strengthened his relations with Muscovy; and flattered her so far as to take into consideration the propositions of the Czar, respecting the partition of this same Poland, whose crown he coveted for his son. The sound sense of the Polish nation prevailed. Henry III. became King of Poland; his ambassadors ac-

\* Vendebant hic publice merces suas: flagella, etc. . . . , suntque igitur a multis huc derisi, et pro bestiis habiti.—*Dantiscus*.

cepted in his name and that of the very Christian King, the *Pacta Conventa*, one of the articles of which is as follows : “ Offerunt ac spondent iidem oratores, statibus et ordinibus regni, nomine Christianissimi Regis, in usum belli, contra Moschorum principem, quatuor millia Vasconum peditum electissimorum, quibus etiam stipendia in sex menses Christianissimus Rex persolvere debebit. . . . ” Justly irritated at these results, Ivan the Terrible immediately sent an envoy to Maximilian II., in order to stop Henry III. in his journey to Warsaw. It was on this occasion that he thus wrote to his imperial ally :—“ We will unite our efforts in order that Poland and Lithuania may no longer escape us.” And as Russia never failed to proclaim herself the official protectress of humanity, Ivan, the executioner, bathed in the noblest blood of his subjects, failed not to add in his missive to the Emperor : “ You deplore, my brother, the horrible massacre of so many innocents on St. Bartholomew’s day ! All Christian monarchs ought to be distressed on that account ! ” At the end of this intimate correspondence, Cobentzel, the imperial ambassador at Moscow in 1577, stimulating the Muscovite ambition, said to the Czar in a solemn discourse : “ All Europe will unite with you to destroy with one blow, by sea and by land, the proud power of the Ottomans. Let us drive the Turks from Constantinople, and may the ancient Empire of the East fall under your laws, oh great Czar ! Such is the wish entertained by the Emperor.” We add : Behold the secret of the Russian power ! The Nesselrode of that day might have said to his Sovereign : “ Our relations with the great European Powers only offer us subjects of satisfaction.”\* These political trespasses, pernicious in their consequences, passed by degrees from the mysteries of the

\* See the despatch of Nesselrode, at p. 83.

Cabinet, into the domains of public opinion. Publishers, philosophers, literary men, whose pliant hearts turned towards the North, began emulously to flatter their idol Russia, and thus to clear the road for her enterprises. Soon, revolutions, and coalitions which resulted from them, ended by introducing this Trojan horse into the centre of European affairs, and the accidental ally became the imperious and permanent tyrant.

In the present day, the Western States, whilst preserving friendly relations with Russia, and whilst maintaining peace, are not the less fundamentally in a state of muffled and continual hostility with her. In order to be convinced of this, we have only to cast our eyes on those gigantic forces by land and sea, which, to the great detriment of their finances, they are obliged to maintain, without any salutary result, even if they do not occasion fatal evils.

The times change. No one can master the circumstances which create a sincere understanding amongst States, and which impose the obligation of vigorous measures, in order to produce important results. Without a well-devised plan, without an energetic decision, the happy chances presented by Providence, often pass like a beneficent shower over a virgin field, whilst an unfriendly hand may be there to sow dissensions. In this critical position, Western Europe casts, at intervals, anxious looks towards the States bordering on the Russian Empire, nursing the hope of finding in them some guarantee for security. Vain wishes and expectations! The admirable forethought of Russia has succeeded in placing permanent obstacles to all hostile and serious opposition on the part of its immediate neighbours.

Prussia and Austria, no doubt to their regret, are become nothing but outworks to the citadel of the Czars. If you attempt to attack Russia, you find precipices at her frontiers.

If she attacks you in your turn, her neighbours offer no opposition to the passage of her troops.

At the period with which we are now engaged, Europe enjoyed in this respect perfect tranquillity. One barrier—the only one possible, Poland—stood erect between her and Muscovy. The history of the partition of Poland, the most deplorable epoch of the Christian era, sufficiently explains how this ancient bulwark of Christendom became the victim of one of the most atrocious conspiracies which the genius of



perseverance; so that, though never conquered in a fair field, she yet saw her possessions and her influence diminish daily, without being able to avoid it. In 1479, Muscovy wrested from her the sovereignty of great Novgorod; in 1515, the Duchy of Smolensk; in 1563, the Palatinate of Polotsk; in 1576, a part of Livonia.

The Republic of Poland, proud of its liberty, strong in its powerful, enlightened, chivalrous aristocracy; confiding in its extent, its resources, and its relations with civilised nations; despising the barbarism of its enemies,—presents, in many respects, an analogy with the present position of Western Europe. Theoretically, their superiority and their preponderance over their natural enemy cannot be doubted; but practically speaking, Poland lost ground then, as Western Europe does now: Russia advanced then, as she still advances before our eyes. When once we resign ourselves to yield, the declivity seems easy, and the abyss far distant! *Facilis descensus averni!*

What would become of the destinies of nations, if they were not capable of obeying a sentiment of duty—the voice of honour—the aspirations after glory? After the first awakening, which may be painful to them, a noble and grand idea becomes generally diffused, and a man of action becomes the leader of the movement.

Stephen Bathory was elected King of Poland in 1576. He understood the genius of the people who had confided their fortunes to him: he was aware of the power wielded by Russia. With 40,000 troops, who stood forth at his voice as by enchantment, Bathory did not hesitate, in order to reconquer Livonia, and re-establish the preponderance of his crown, to go and attack the innumerable forces of Ivan, which the Russian historians compare to the armies of Xerxes. In open march, at Swir, he published his mani-

festo of war against Muscovy, which we present here to our readers.

A proclamation to an army marching to battle, in order to recover the sacred rights of their country—an army feeble, compared with the immense forces of the enemy—a noble proclamation, of confidence in the Divine justice, published at the commencement of a campaign which was crowned with the most brilliant victories, is undoubtedly a document which universal history ought to preserve and produce with pride and respect.

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STEPHEN, by the grace of God, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Lithuania, of Russia, of Prussia, of Mazovia, of Samogitia, of Livonia, and Prince of Transylvania, to his

enemy ; but that all his enterprises and all his actions, accompanied by injuries against us, have only had this end in view—the conquest and ruin of our fortresses, our cities, the countries subject to our dominion, and our own dishonour.

As soon as we had ascended this throne, we informed the other States of our accession. We sent to the Grand Duke of Muscovy our Internuncios, to apprise him of the increase of our dignity and our power, and to express our earnest desire to re-establish and maintain peace between the two kingdoms. He assured them, by word of mouth, of his good intentions, of his kindly feeling for the Christian name and blood, and gave them a safe conduct for a more considerable embassy. He informed us also, by a special letter, which is at this time in our possession, that he had commanded his subjects to abstain from all injury and wrong with regard to us so long as the negotiations continued, and begging us to act in the same way in our own states.

Although he so imperfectly masked his true feelings that he betrayed them by expressions injurious to our dignity, still we believed that his pride was satisfied with this, and that, subsequently, he would embrace juster views, and would provide for the public peace, and safety of his subjects. We gave credit to these affirmations.

In consequence of this, order was given to our subjects to suspend all hostility with the Muscovites; and we sent an embassy to the Duke of Muscovy himself, composed of the highest dignitaries of our crown: the illustrious Stanislaus Kryski, Palatine of Mazovia, Nicolas Sapieha, Palatine of Minsk, and Théodore Skumin, Treasurer of our Court of Lithuania.

Whilst we were adopting these measures, he was violating his promises. As for us, reckoning on his good faith, we were far from fearing any hostility at the departure of our Ambassadors, and we thought ourselves secure from all



he had brought on our subjects. What has been the result of this? Our Ambassadors were in his presence; the Muscovite had begun to confer with them through the medium of some of his favourites, when suddenly he abandoned himself to all the pride and violence of his character. He would listen to no accommodation on the subject of Livonia, and forbade any mention to be made of that province. He insulted, either by word of mouth or by writing, our person and our dignity, in terms whose violence was unsuited to a king, a Christian prince, or even a simple individual. He laid claim to our Kingdom of Poland, and to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, by I know not how many invalid titles. These rights he claimed as being the fourteenth descendant of one Prussus, of whom no one has ever heard, and who never existed, who was, said he, the brother of Octavius Cæsar, and the founder of his family. It was in the name of this pretended descent that he claimed the entire Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. He made this claim on our crown, when already our Ambassadors, after long and numerous conferences with the Muscovite Counsellors, whom he had appointed for this object, had drawn up the conditions for a new truce, when they had composed the letters in which they recognised that which had been stipulated on both sides,—in short, when the Grand Duke of Moscow had already received them. But very far from giving them back an exact copy of the letters which he possessed, and which contained the real conventions recognised by our Ambassadors and the Muscovite Counsellors, he modified the clauses of the treaty according to his will and pleasure. He did not choose that the truce should affect Livonia; nay more, he exacted that henceforth we should recognise him as the master of that province, comprising the Duchy of Courland, and all the countries subject to our dominion, as

far as the frontiers of Prussia,—that is to say, a part of Lithuania itself. These letters being thus modified, he swore to respect the clauses, and constrained by force our Ambassadors to take them.

Informed of this fact by our Ambassadors before their departure from Muscovy, we sent an Internuncio to the Grand Duke, chosen from amongst our aristocracy, the noble Peter Haraburda, who took him the written assurance that we desired to rest at peace and in harmony with him in the interest of the Christians. We clearly proved to him, that, if he wished that we should each take the same oath, he must include in the same peace both ourselves and our provinces, for it was not consistent either with honesty or reason, that an oath whose end was peace between two Princes, should bring war to the subjects of this or that province.

The most respectable pledge of harmony, ought not to be an occasion of hostility. Christian Princes should never vary, either in words or actions; especially when they have bound themselves by an oath. We must therefore watch, that nothing may ever trouble our connection, that we have acted with probity, and always been faithful to our engagements.

These counsels, which were dictated by the love of justice and benevolence, were far from having any influence on the mind of the Muscovite. For, after having listened to our Internuncio, he insisted on his leaving the court, and kept him, contrary to his wish, in a sort of captivity; then, after having sent us his Ambassadors (and already one embassy was with us in Livonia), he besieged some of our strong places, and especially Venda, which he attacked twice. This injury was soon punished. Our army, which had been reinforced by the succours sent us by Sweden, entirely worsted (with the aid of God) the Muscovite troops. The cannon and the rest of

the battering train fell into our hands. It was in the midst of these circumstances, that we received the Muscovite Ambassadors in our palace at Cracow in the capital of our Empire.

At that time, a considerable crowd of men, belonging to almost all the Christian nations, and the ambassadors of kings, of princes, and of foreign people, was collected there. But neither their presence in our senate, where we received the Muscovites with regal honours, nor the advice of my counsellors, were able to bend their pride, and recall them to the respect due to us. They refused to declare the object of their mission, under pretext that the Grand Duke had forbidden them to speak in our presence, unless we paid them certain honours, to which it was impossible to consent, without lowering our dignity. We refused them; and since we could not prevail on them to renounce their proud pretensions, nor to speak, they left the senate, and also Cracow, simultaneously, without having done anything. Thus no negotiation had been settled, or even entered upon, when we permitted them to return to Muscovy. All these facts clearly show how anxiously we had desired to keep peace and harmony with our enemy—what efforts we had made to spare the blood of Christians, and for their tranquillity. They also showed, by the most conclusive evidence, that the Grand Duke of Muscovy, by his proceedings and by his insults, has devoted his entire thoughts and attention to sow dissensions between us, and wished to make us give up our provinces and the dignity of our name. He afterwards sent us a letter by his Nuncio, in which he asks us to bind ourselves by oath in favour of the truce, whose clauses, as we have already shown, had been drawn up against the wishes of our Ambassadors; he desires that his Ambassadors may be permitted to return to Muscovy; and that we should send

him, if we approve, Ambassadors who would regulate our debates on the subject of Livonia.

But every one must see how contrary it would have been to equity, to our duty, and our dignity, to have recognised by an oath a truce, whereof the clauses not only had not been accepted by us, but which we had never thought of. Could we abandon to his tyranny Livonia, the Duchy of Courland, and the other intermediate countries of our dominion between Livonia and the frontiers of Prussia, which conform to the laws of Lithuania? Have we not solemnly sworn, on ascending the throne, to protect these countries with all the fidelity and all the zeal we are capable of: to guarantee them, even at the peril of our lives, from foreign attacks? This part of our royal functions has always been the most precious to us, and we have never given evidence of a contrary feeling.

Our Ambassadors were never authorised to promise anything, and every thing proves that they never promised anything, that did not agree with our manner of looking on this subject; for the oath by which they had engaged themselves to respect the truce, contained no concessions of this nature. On the other hand, when a peace has to be concluded between princes, or a convention passed amongst private individuals, what reason, what power, what necessity, can possibly constrain one of the two parties to accept it, if, very far from consenting or adhering to it, it has not been even thought of? In order to settle an affair, we must begin by seeing that the intentions of the two parties agree, and afterwards express them by writing, so that not only the thoughts, but the words, shall be conformable to their intentions.

The Duke, our enemy, cannot possibly be ignorant how those affairs are usually treated. It was sufficient for him, I will not say to pay regard to justice and equity, but to call to mind that which our august predecessors, his own an-



cestors, and that which he himself had been accustomed to do formerly, when a truce had to be signed, or a peace to be concluded.

The obligation imposed upon us by the Grand Duke of Muscovy, to take an oath after the formula prescribed in his letters, is not a less iniquitous act than the preceding ones.

If the clauses of the treaty had been written according to our reciprocal wish and agreement—had they been conformable to those agreed to by our Ambassadors—still it would have been proper that each should take his oath according to his separate formula. Far, indeed, was he from having any right to exact from us a formal oath, of the tenor proposed in the letters which he wrote himself according to his humour, contrary to our remotest idea, and contrary to our wishes, or those of our Ambassadors.

It must be quite evident to every one, that in these circumstances, he acted with injustice and bad faith; in fact, nothing proves it better than the conduct of his Ambassadors, who, having arrived at Cracow, refuse to expose and make known that which had been discussed, arranged, and agreed upon between our Envoys and those who had been commissioned by the Grand Duke to confer with them, and that which he himself had decided.

Public insults and open hostilities were added to this duplicity and artifice. Not only did he ravage Livonia with continual incursions, but he erected upon the frontiers of Witepsk—that is to say, in a province independent of our Grand Duchy of Lithuania—a fortress, from whence his officers spread themselves over the whole country, pillaging and massacring our unhappy subjects. He himself was making great levies in his states, and was preparing seriously for war. Complaints reached us from all parts, either through letters or messengers from the illustrious Duke of Courland, from the inhabit-

ants of Riga, and the Commanders of our places in Livonia. All of these implored us for our intervention and help; nothing ever could, or ought, to prevent our commencing war. This is the reason we decided, actuated by just and serious motives, not to receive any letters from the Muscovite, and to refuse our oath to the conditions which he had himself prescribed of his own pleasure.

Our Internuncio returned to the Grand Duke, in Muscovy; and, after having given him our reasons for so doing, declared war—a just and legitimate war, since he had already assembled a considerable army against us under Plescovie.

As to his Ambassadors whom he asked back from us, we let them return to Muscovy without having been able to obtain anything from them, for they persisted in observing a continued silence. We were entitled to consider them rather in the light of spies, than of envoys, for they had not presented to us their letters of credit, and had not uttered a word as to the object of their mission. Nevertheless, as our Ambassadors in Muscovy had apprised us that it was a regular Embassy, we rendered them all the honours due to their title, and gave them the presents which were usual in countries subject to our power. As to the second Embassy which they demanded we should send to Muscovy, after having sworn the truce according to the form prescribed in the Grand Duke's letters, to settle the affairs of Livonia, it appeared to us that it was useless. Of what avail would orators be in our quarrel relating to Livonia, if we engaged by oath (and these are the conditions which he required from us) not only to give up Livonia and Courland to him, but also a part of the countries dependent on Lithuania, which separate Courland from Prussia?

We did not consider it our duty, therefore, to engage ourselves, through this new Embassy, to consent to the loss of our provinces, and to our dishonour.

Thus, soldiers, we hope to have convinced you, by the statement of the preceding facts, that we have always wished to avoid the shedding of Christian blood, that we have always desired peace and tranquillity, and that this desire has induced us to attempt the means of conciliation which have been presented to you. We have forgotten all the outrages which the Grand Duke of Muscovy has caused against our royal majesty; we have sacrificed, with pleasure, our resentments to the peace and tranquillity of our kingdom, to the lives and the fortunes of our Christian subjects. But all the ardour which we have shown for the preservation of peace and a good understanding between our two states, far from having obtained anything just and equitable from him, seems rather to have redoubled his pride and insolence. He has not ceased seeking opportunities of personally wounding us, and of injuring our Kingdom of Poland, and our Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Besides, the analogous conduct which he has always held to our august predecessors, does not permit us to hope that he will ever put a limit or end to excesses of every kind. The injury which he did to our illustrious predecessor, Sigismund Augustus, will teach you how to appreciate him. He covered with humiliations, and treated in the most indignant manner, against the law of nations, Ambassadors of the highest rank, chosen amongst the Senators, whom this Prince had sent him, the Palatine of Inoladislavia, and the Castellan of Samogitia. He ransomed a Polish gentleman, attached to the court of our august predecessor, and haughtily appropriated several precious objects which had been confided to him only in order to be examined. He took a great part of the merchandise from the merchants who accompanied him, and caused their horses to be mutilated, before the very eyes of our Ambassadors. The too sudden death of the King,

Sigismund Augustus, did not allow him to punish this outrage.

We demanded, at that time, reparation for these insults, without his at all troubling himself as to the right of our demand. What shall I say of that written engagement to respect peace, which he gave to our august predecessor, Henry? Did he not, after violating his promises, take possession of Pernavia, and subdue other strong places of Livonia?

against us, when, after having given us the assurance of peace, he suddenly attacked Livonia, although he had endeavoured to prevent us, our Kingdom of Poland, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, from thinking of the defence of this province. Since we can no longer hope to see the Grand Duke of Muscovy restored to good faith and better feelings, and that far from offering us guarantees of certain peace, he adds daily new outrages to the old and the recent ones, that he seeks every means to deceive us, and to make an attempt against the honour of our name or the integrity of our Empire, we believe it our duty to bring it before the judgment of the all-powerful God, who has beheld all with the eye of justice, and to ask for a just revenge, after having in vain employed and exhausted all the means which an honourable and secure peace could give us, and to spare thus the goods and the lives of our Christian subjects. In consequence of this, we have returned his false letters, and have declared a just and legitimate war against Ivan, son of Vasili, Grand Duke of Muscovy. The object of this war is to avenge and repel the double insult which has been shown us, either personally in his discourses and his letters, or by his Ambassadors—the cruel evils which, for so many years, he has brought on our subjects—and all the injuries endured by our Kingdom of Poland. But, in order that all may know how little we desire the ruin and misery of the Christian subjects of the Grand Duke, we declare that no injury shall be done (that is to say, as little as it is in our power to prevent) to any of those who do not fight against us, either in the fortresses or on the field of battle; for we well know that all the motives of this war have been furnished by the Grand Duke alone. He alone attacks us in our honour and our dignity; he alone does not cease to covet our provinces with ambitious audacity. It is in him alone we desire to repress an unbridled audacity,

to stop his cruelties and robberies, so that (if it is possible) we may henceforth give peace and tranquillity to the Christians.

We hope, or rather we firmly believe, that the great and good God will favour us, our armies, and our kingdom, in a war which is undertaken with motives so just and serious, that it is for us a necessity. We think, also, that the Christian Princes, and all men who are informed of these facts, will most certainly believe that we are not impelled by rashness, and that it is not the desire of shedding the blood of the Christians (whom we have always defended, protected, and guaranteed from all danger) which makes us undertake this war, but that we have been forced to it by so many injuries, accompanied, for a long time, by cruelties and barbarities—by the necessity of defending our dignity—by the sad state of our provinces, and of our Grand Duchy of Lithuania—by the duty of watching over the happiness, the fortunes, and the lives of our subjects, for so long a time the victims of the enemy's atrocities—in short, by the counsel and advice of all the orders of our Kingdom, and of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who demand a certain and durable peace, and the re-establishment of tranquillity amongst the Christian people.

Animated in this war by such motives and intentions, we cannot doubt the zeal, the ardour, the courage, and fidelity, of our troops; still we exhort them to show in the campaigns under our orders, a courage above all perils, and to think of the glory and happiness which await them in fighting for so good and just a cause.

Let our subjects prepare to fight with the national courage of our nation—with the intrepidity of our ancestors, to avenge the past, and guarantee themselves for ever from the continual injuries which either their fellow-citizens or themselves have suffered.

that if it is good to fight with valour for the safety of their neighbours, and to expose themselves to danger in their behalf, it is not less important for their own safety, as well as that of their fellow-citizens, to extinguish the fire that is destroying the dwellings of their neighbours.

Let all in general bring to so just a war the earnest desire to gain distinction by their gallantry. Each man will acquire an additional glory and merit, by having to wage a stern and difficult war against the most cruel enemy of the human race.

On our part, we will liberally reward the courage, fidelity, zeal, and the efforts of each one of our soldiers, by our good will, our favours, and our presents, so that no one shall have to repent of his exploits, and all shall see that we love to reward valour and noble actions according to their merits.

Done at Swir, the 12th of July, in the year of our Lord, 1579, and the 4th of our reign.

EXTRACTS TAKEN FROM THE HISTORY OF RUSSIA,  
BY KARAMSIN, RELATING TO THE EXPEDITION  
OF BATHORY.

THE presence of a great man had already rekindled the love of country in the hearts of the Polish magistrates and gentlemen. Bathory spoke the language imperfectly; but he thoroughly understood the history of Poland and Lithuania. He traced an outline of the invasions of Russia; enumerated the portions of territory which that Power had stolen from them; ascribed their misfortunes *to the weakness of their kings*: flattered, with tact, the national self-love; and, putting his hand on his sword, he listened attentively to the discussions of the Diet. . . . .

The Diet unanimously resolved on a war with Russia. Orders were immediately given to assemble a numerous army. The proprietors and citizens submitted without murmuring to taxes till then unheard of.



of the Volga, the Don, the Oka, the Dnieper, and the Dwina. His principal European and Asiatic forces had orders to unite at Novgorod and Pskov. The Russians, the Tcherkessian, Schavkal, Mordvian, Nogai, and Fzarevitch Princes, and the Mourzas of the ancient golden horde, of that of Kazan, and of Astrakhan, advanced by forced marches towards the lakes of Ilmen and Peipus. All the roads were covered with infantry and cavalry. Winter, spring, and a part of the summer, passed in the midst of these arrangements. At length, after having confided the command of Muscovy to the Prince Andrew Kourakin, the Czar, accompanied by all the Boyars, by the Members of the Council, and by a great number of Secretaries of State for civil and military affairs, quitted the capital, in the month of July, and went to Novgorod, where the chiefs of the army awaited his last orders. It was in this last city, that Harpof and Golovin came to apprise him that Bathory, having rejected the truce, was marching against Russia. His army, according to their report, consisted of a force of only about 40,000 men; which was, however, constantly increased by troops from Transylvania and Germany, as well as by numerous Lithuanian volunteers.

Such was the force of the enemy that aspired to crush Russia, whilst the Czar's guard alone amounted to 40,000 gentlemen, young Boyars, Strelitzes, Cossacks, etc. Afterwards, he was surrounded by two principal armies, assembled at Novgorod and Pskov, under the command of Simeon, Prince of Tver, the Princes Mstislavsky, Schonisky, Nogtef, Troubetzkoi, and other generals.

He could, therefore, by a single word, launch all these masses upon Poland. The people, the nobles of the country, opposed to the warlike views of Stephen, severally desired peace with Russia; and a cry of terror resounded from the banks of the Dwina to those of the Bug. . . . .

As soon as the Czar had learned that Lopatinsky, sent by Bathory, was gone to Moscow, he gave the order to stop him at Dorogobouge. That officer then sent Stephen's letter, written from Wilna, the 26th of June: it was extremely prolix, in a dry style, and devoid of all eloquence, but written with spirit. . . . At the time the Czar was reading this letter, he learned that Bathory had already entered the Russian territory.

After having honourably declared war against Russia, Bathory, surrounded by the great and the chiefs of his army, deliberated on the best means and point of attack.

"We must," said he, "conquer Livonia beyond her frontiers. It is true, the city of Polotsk is well fortified, but there will be the more glory in taking it; and the success of this enterprise will intimidate the enemy, as well as stimulate the courage of the Poles."

These words were uttered by a great man: they took effect. The army of Stephen, like that of Hannibal, was composed of men foreign to each other in language, dress, and religion: Germans, Hungarians, Poles, ancient Slavonians from Gallicia, from Volhynia and the banks of the Dnieper, Krivitches, and Lithuanians. Bathory knew well how to inspire this multitude with unanimous feelings and a lively emulation. On leaving Swir, to open the campaign, he published a manifesto.

This invasion, which Ivan did not expect towards the end of the summer, *appeared to him a perfidy*. According to the counsel of his Boyars, he sent a courier to the Emperor, and one to the Pope, to engage them to take his part. In his letter to the former, he tried to show that the Poles made war on Russia on account of her intimate connection with Austria. He then required that Rodolph, faithful to his promise, should send plenipotentiaries to Moscow, to renew

the alliance against their common enemies. In complaining of the bad faith of Bathory, he engaged the Pope to lead back this Prince into a right course of conduct, and to make him give up *an odious alliance with the Turks*. His despatch gave the assurance of the sincere desire which he felt to unite with all the Sovereigns of Europe against the Sultan, and to this effect to form *intimate and enduring* relations with the Court of Rome.

The Polish army advanced across marshes and thick forests, where no troops had penetrated during 150 years. Vitold alone, in 1428, was able to clear a road as far as Novgorod; and some places in this impervious country still bore his name. After the example of this celebrated warrior, Bathory caused roads to be cut through the woods, dykes to be thrown up, bridges to be constructed—struggling with all obstacles, and supporting every privation. He attacked, by the way, Velige and Ousviat, took these two well-supplied fortresses, routed a detachment of Russian cavalry, and at the end of August laid siege to Veliki-Louki. . . . .

Just at this moment, when Russia should have roused herself to crush the audacious Bathory, the Princes of Sitzky and Pirof, plenipotentiaries of Ivan, went to the Polish camp to enter upon humiliating negotiations. Stephen received them in his tent with a haughty air. He remained sitting and covered, when they saluted him in the name of the Czar, and did not deign to address them with one kindly word.

The Envoys first of all required that the King should raise the siege of Veliki-Louki, when they were suddenly interrupted by a salute of Polish artillery: they then exhibited more condescension. They said it was the first time that their master had entered upon negotiations with Poland out of Moscow; but they consented, in his name, to grant the title of

brother to Stephen, if he would surrender Polotsk to Russia. These propositions having been rejected, they went so far as to renounce this city, and to offer to give up Courland, with twenty-four places in Livonia. Stephen demanded, besides all Livonia, that they should give up Veliki-Louki, Smolensk, Pskov, and Novgorod. Sitzky and Pirof then declared that it was impossible for them to make such great sacrifices, and demanded permission to depart, or to write to the Czar. They sent off immediately a courier to Moscow; and the same day, the 5th of September, a tower, which was filled with gunpowder, caught fire, the explosion blew up a part of the fortress, the flames completed the destruction of the walls, and the Russians fell under the swords of the enemy.

This enterprise finished the campaign. Bathory's army was exhausted by fatigue and sickness. He himself was attacked at Polotsk, and the pallor of illness was still on his cheek when he appeared at the Diet of Warsaw to give in an account of his exploits.

"Rejoice," said he to the nobles, "at the triumph of our arms, but let us endeavour to profit by it. Destiny seems to deliver up the whole Muscovite power to us: courage and hope lead to glory. Even if we follow a system of moderation, let us, at all events, conquer Livonia, the chief object of this war: when united permanently to the Kingdom of Poland, it will be a glorious monument of our valour to posterity. Till then we must not think of peace."

The Czar heard of the ruin of Veliki-Louki in his retreat from Alexandrovsky. He immediately sent fresh instructions to his envoys, Sitzky and Pirof, who were following Bathory from place to place, condemned to witness his triumphs.

Arrived at Warsaw, they offered him, to add to their concessions, some districts of Livonia, in exchange for some

Russian cities, which he had acquired; conjuring him to suspend hostilities, and to send his Ambassadors to Moscow to treat of peace. But they received no other satisfaction than an order to return to the Czar with this answer from the King:—"I will not grant either an embassy, peace, or truce, until the Russian army has evacuated Livonia." Ivan, whose condescension increased daily, addressed a friendly letter to Stephen: he called him his brother, lamented seeing Russia disturbed incessantly by the Polish attacks; and entreated him, in short, not to assemble his troops for the following summer.

He caused Pouchkin and Pissensky, Members of the Council, to set out for the King, with instructions which directed them to show *gentleness and humility* in their negotiations; forgetting even all dignity, they were enjoined (unheard-of humiliation!) *not only to bear all insults*, but personal indignities. Thus a Czar of Muscovy drank the cup of disgrace to the dregs!

Notwithstanding his anger, Ivan still consented to yield to Bathory all the Russian fortresses conquered by the Polish arms, only retaining the eastern part of Esthonia and of Livonia, that is to say, Narva, Weissentein, and Dorpat. On these conditions, he proposed a truce for seven years.

The answer to this despatch was a third campaign from Bathory, preceded by a letter filled with the most stinging reproaches. . . . .

"Where are you then," said Stephen to him, "God of the Russian Empire, for such you compel your unhappy slaves to call you? We have never yet beheld your person, nor the banner of the cross of which you speak incessantly—frightening, not your enemies, but only the Russians, with your crucifixes. If it be true, that you have some pity for Christian blood, I challenge you in single combat. Name

yourself the time and place; appear on horseback, and we will fight alone, in order that God may grant victory to the most righteous cause. . . . .”

Far from consenting to allow the Russians one foot of ground in Livonia, Bathory would not listen to their Ambassadors. He drove them from his camp; and in order to beard the Czar, he sent him Latin books, published in Germany, upon the chronology of Russian princes, and upon the reign of Ivan, in order to prove, he said, that the ancient Sovereigns of Muscovy were vassals of the Khans of Taurida, and not the descendants of Cæsar Augustus. . . . .

Ivan still sought for peace, placing his hope in the important mediator who was to interpose between himself and Bathory.

Schévrighin, the Muscovite courier, who had been sent to Vienna and Rome, had returned to Moscow. The weak and careless Rodolph had replied, that he could make no arrangement without the consent of the princes of the Empire; and that the nobles whom he had intended to send to Moscow, in order to conclude there the projected alliance, were either dead or ill. But Gregory XIII.—a Pope celebrated for his zeal for the progress of the Latin religion—expressed the most lively satisfaction on finding, as he thought, an opportunity for uniting Russia to his vast flock. He ordered a celebrated theologian, Anthony Possevin, to set out for Bathory and for Moscow, in order to conciliate the belligerent parties. This is Bathory’s answer to the Jesuit:—“The Czar of Muscovy wishes to impose on the Holy Father: at the sight of the storm which threatens him, he is a man to promise everything—both the union of the two churches and war with the Turks. As for me, *he will not deceive me*. Nevertheless, go and act; I do not oppose it in any way, only I am quite convinced, that in order to *obtain an honourable*

*and advantageous peace, war is indispensable. We shall have this peace—I give my word for it!*"\*

Peace was concluded on the 17th of January, 1582, at Kiverova-Horka. The city of Polotsk, with the neighbouring chateaux, and the rich province of Livonia, were restored to Poland—her rights, her consequence, and her security, were guaranteed. Muscovy even gained by this war; for it is a well-known fact, that the strength and prosperity of Poland have always exerted a salutary influence upon the nationality of Russia. After his defeat, the Czar put an end to the bloody incursions he had previously carried on with impunity. Bathory obtained this honourable peace exclusively by his gallantry in the field.

On the other hand, the Jesuit—who endeavoured to promote, by negociations at Moscow, a vain expectation built upon promises wrung from the Czar at a critical moment—after useless conferences at Moscow, brought back to Rome nothing but the name of *Wolf*, which the Czar, now freed from danger, applied, in his presence, to the shepherd of the Catholic world.

At the time we are writing, the two most civilised and powerful nations of the world, who appeared but yesterday as if arming the one against the other, unite, as though by a command from on high, to send formidable fleets against the secular enemy of Europe. The fresh gales of Malta and Salamis, with the voice of the Christian world, have brought them to the Golden Horn. The interests, the hopes, and the fate of humanity, are confided to wooden walls as in the brightest days of liberty.

For our part, victims of atrocities perpetrated in the light

\* Thus far Karamsin. The remainder of the section is penned by the Polish editor of the French version.

of day, during a whole century, and which are still inflicted on other nations, with our hands crossed upon our breast, which has only its griefs and its faith, roused by the mirage of the desert which surrounds us, we also send to the rendez-vous of humanity, as our present contingent, the memory of a warrior doing his duty as king, and a sigh for the sacred hopes of enslaved generations. We admire the immense strength of justice ;—*animamque herois vocamus !*



EPITOME OF A STATEMENT OF THE DISSENSIONS  
WHICH TOOK PLACE IN 1821, BETWEEN THE  
GOVERNMENT OF HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND  
THE OTTOMAN PORTE.

PRESENTED TO THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS, ON HIS ACCESSION TO  
THE THRONE, BY THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY.

[The statement of negotiations with Turkey which the Russian Ministry submitted to the Emperor Nicholas, on his accession to the throne, is certainly of high historical importance. Nevertheless, the extent of this document exceeding the limits of this work, we regret we can only give an epitome, which is made with scrupulous exactness, so that it gives not only the substance, but the very expressions, of the authentic memorial.]

Turkey not included in the Treaties of Vienna, in 1815—Russia disavows the enterprise of Ipsylanti, in 1821—The Mission of Strogonoff to Constantinople—Turkish Barbarism—The Porte declares Russia an accomplice in the Insurrection of Greece—The Ultimatum of Strogonoff not accepted; he quits Constantinople—The Principalities occupied by the Turks—The commencement of the Negotiations of the principal Cabinets—The Propositions of Russia badly received at London and Vienna—The Answer of the Porte—Russia refuses to give up the Refugees—The Discussion with the Cabinets of London and Vienna upon the Protection of the Greek Religion—The Project of a Protocol not accepted—The Congress of Verona—The Propositions of Russia in the Protocol of the Congress—Lord Strangford at Constantinople—The Arrangement of Commercial Affairs—The Mission of Minciaky to Constantinople—The principal Points: 1st, Commerce; 2nd, The Evacuation of the Principalities; 3rd, In Greece, a *juste milieu* between entire Independence and the Triumph of the Revolution, or Extermination and the Triumph of Barbarism—The Policy of Canning

—The Memorial of the Russian Cabinet, of the 9th of January, 1824, proposes the Establishment of three Greek Principalities, under the Sovereignty of Turkey—The Conferences of St. Petersburg, in 1824—The Hesitation of England—Evacuation of the Principalities—The Mission of Ribeaupierre to Constantinople—Complaints on the subject of the Principalities—The Effect produced in Greece by the Publication of the Russian Memorial of the 9th of January, in the newspapers—Schism between Russia and England—The difference of the views of Russia from those of the other Cabinets with regard to Greece—Metternich opposes the Projects of Russia, detecting in them some underhand designs—Russia demands a categorical Explanation—She decides on defending her Interests and her Rights by herself—Her Regrets and her Trouble caused by the Answer from the Cabinets—The Court of Berlin always faithful—The Porte opposes any Foreign Intervention in the Affairs of Greece—The Influence of Russia in the East compromised, that of the other States increased—The Despatch from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg directs its Ambassadors to maintain silence and reserve; it asks their opinion respecting the disposition of the other Cabinets—The Greeks, oppressed by the Egyptians, ask exclusive Protection from England, and offer her the Sovereignty—The Proposition of Austria rejected—The Answer and Opinion of the Russian Ambassadors—The Opposition of the Cabinets reduced to Impotency; they finish by an Approximation to Russia—The Duke of Wellington at St. Petersburg—The Obstinacy of Turkey.

THE Ottoman Empire not having been either mentioned or included in any of the transactions of 1814 and 1815, Russia, from the year 1816 to 1821, had negotiated alone with the Porte, without the co-operation of its Allies.\* The Cabinet

\* The state of the external negociations in the year 1821, is found in the two annexed documents:—1st, A summary of the conditions on which Baron Strogonoff left our negociations with the Porte; and, A summary of the principal negotiations of Baron Strogonoff at Constantinople, and an analysis of his successive instructions in 1816-1821. We give an extract at the end of this memorial, under the

and the Envoy of Russia, Baron Strogonoff, were preparing for the approaching conclusion of a general arrangement, when Prince Ipsylanti dared to place himself at the head of an insurrection in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Emperor Alexander sent orders from Leybach to Baron Strogonoff, to declare that, far from having instigated or favoured the enterprise of Prince Ipsylanti, Russia had consented to the entrance of the Ottoman troops into the Principalities; that she even called for this measure; but that, in order to prevent disorders, she required that the Ottoman troops should be accompanied by Russian agents. A united declaration of the two Courts was, moreover, to announce, that they employed force of arms solely to repress the insurrection; that, far from wishing to deprive the Principalities of their privileges, they proposed to secure their enjoyment of them; and that as soon as order was re-established there, the Ottoman troops would repass the Danube. Baron Strogonoff, on his part, had condemned the insurrection of Greece by a solemn disapprobation; and had declared to the Turkish Ministers, that Russia would only use its moral power over the Greeks to aid the Divan in extinguishing the fire of revolt.

The Porte rejected our offers, and acts of blind barbarism ensued. Greek, Wallachian, and Moldavian fugitives, sought an asylum in Russia. From that time the Porte declared Russia to be an accomplice in the insurrection.

The Emperor, on his return from Leybach, being informed of the events at Constantinople, gave orders to Baron Strogonoff in July, to deliver a note to the Divan. The injuries which the Porte had just caused to Russia in these last events, by a flagrant violation of all her treaties, were enumerated in this note. In claiming an immediate and complete satisfaction, the Imperial Cabinet demanded an answer

from the Turkish Government after an interval of eight days. Its silence was to be considered as a refusal, and, consequently, as a motive for the rupture of diplomatic relations. The Divan did not reply at the appointed time. Baron Strogonoff left Constantinople immediately, according to instructions.

Here commences a new period of negociations, in which Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia have taken a part.

The Emperor informed these Cabinets of the measures prescribed to Baron Strogonoff, and reminded them, besides, that after having lent them on all occasions the most faithful and zealous assistance, he expected from them, in his turn, the same services; and invited them—*1st*, To support the representations which his Minister was going to address to the Divan; *2nd*, To sustain, by their moral and true co-operation, the measures which Russia would see herself forced to take, if the Porte continued to provoke war; *3rd*, To examine into this hypothesis, and make known the most efficacious means of securing to the countries of which Turkey is composed, *the benefit of a happy and inoffensive political existence.*

There was no doubt of the first of these three propositions meeting with consent; as to the other demands of his Imperial Majesty, Prussia showed herself ready to deliberate on the means of executing them. Austria and Great Britain did not enter into the views of Prussia, and frankly avowed opposite principles. France was more favourable to the views declared by Russia; but it was evident, at the same time, that she feared war, the consequences of war, and the necessity of expressing her fears. The Emperor and Ministry received at once all these answers, and a tardy reply from the Porte to the note of the 6th (18th) of July. The Porte per-

sisted in its old pretensions, and made new ones; it placed new obstructions in the way of Russian commerce; it claimed that part of the Asiatic coast, which it accused Russia with having occupied, contrary to the treaty of Bucharest; it required the extradition of the Greek, Moldavian, and Wallachian refugees who had sought an asylum in the States of his Imperial Majesty. Elsewhere events succeeded one another rapidly. Towards the end of July, there was no longer any insurrection in Wallachia or Moldavia; the public tranquillity was re-established, but the Turkish troops remained there. In Greece the insurrection still reigned.

Notwithstanding the tone in which the reply of the Porte to the note of 6th (18th) July was couched, to facilitate a reconciliation, his Imperial Majesty caused a letter to be written to the Grand Vizier by his Ministry. In this letter, after having recapitulated all his grievances, and apprised the Porte that the fugitives would never be delivered up to it, it was added, that if indisputable facts proved the respect of the Divan for treaties, for the rights of Russia, for the well-being of his fellow-worshippers, and for the Greek religion itself, the Emperor would suspend measures which he was loath to consider indispensable.

The Emperor then proceeded to examine what measures he should have to adopt, supposing this new attempt were to meet with no reply, or make no impression. The occupation of the Principalities was proposed, in order to overcome the resistance of the Turks. But the Emperor resolved, at the same time, to avoid, if possible, the use of coercive measures; and, in the first place, to re-assure at once the Allies, he submitted to the wishes that they had expressed, of again interposing their good offices with the Ottoman Ministry. His Imperial Majesty nevertheless declared that their intervention must be limited to demanding the accomplishment of the

conditions expressed in the letter from his Cabinet to the Grand Vizier, without even seeming to assume the character of a mediation.

It was at this period that the chiefs of the Cabinets of Austria and England had an interview at Hanover. The Imperial Ministry received orders to open new negotiations with them. The affairs of the East were canvassed in an active and continuous correspondence; but there was a difference of opinion on essential points.

The Courts of Vienna and London disputed the interpretation of the treaty of Kainardji, an interpretation which extended to the Greek nation clauses in which *the Greek religion* alone was explicitly mentioned, and gave to Russia an exclusive right of protection. The Imperial Ministry opposed to them custom, the sanction of time, examples drawn from the past, the unity of worship, and the necessity of a protecting power for the Christian subjects of the Porte. In short, according to the opinion of the Imperial Ministry, the Courts of London and Vienna, whilst supporting at Constantinople the remonstrances of Russia relative to the Principalities, did not exact with sufficient sternness an *immediate* satisfaction; they did not announce that they would, all together, have recourse to *coercive means* in case of a refusal; they did not mention the intervention which the Emperor had considered indispensable for the re-establishment of peace in Greece.

It was impossible for the negotiations to advance under such auspices. The Emperor gave orders to the Ministry to communicate to the Allies a project of protocols, which would engage them to demand from the Porte the complete evacuation of the Principalities, the re-establishment of legal order in Wallachia and in Moldavia, and the appointment of Turkish Plenipotentiaries, who should meet, in the States

of his Imperial Majesty, with the Russian and Allied Plenipotentiaries. In this assembly, the arrangements relative to the Principalities would be discussed *exclusively* between Russia and the Porte, and the arrangements which have for their end the pacification of Greece, would be negotiated *collectively* between the Turkish Plenipotentiaries and those of the five Courts, who would guarantee the stipulations that they had determined on, with a common security.

In case of the Divan rejecting the propositions of the Emperor, the Allies were to have the alternative, either of breaking off their diplomatic relations with the Porte, or of declaring that they recognised in Russia the right to have recourse to arms.

The communication of this project of a protocol took place, but Prussia alone signed it without hesitation. France agreed to it conditionally; that is to say, in case all the other Allied Powers acceded to it. England would not enter into any positive engagement. Austria even would not sign the project of a protocol.

Nevertheless, the Allied Courts gave new orders to their Ambassadors at Constantinople, who obtained leave that some troops, arrived from Asia, should quit the Principalities, and that Hospodars should be named. All the Allied Courts appeared also to accept the proposition of an Assembly of Plenipotentiaries, and of a common intervention, which would tend to re-establish peace in the East. The Court of Austria even sent to M. de Tatichtcheff a confidential memorial, which developed some ideas respecting these two last points.

The answers from the Court of Vienna having arrived at St. Petersburg, the Emperor consented that conferences, relative to the pacification of the Levant, should be held at Vienna, between the representatives of the Allied Courts, and authorised M. de Tatichtcheff to take part in them; but he

declared that the Porte, having been invited to appoint Plenipotentiaries, ought to send them to his Imperial Majesty, and that, in that case, the negotiations would take place in his dominions at Kamenetz-Podoleky, and according to the principle which would make the affairs of Moldavia and Wallachia considered as exclusively Russian, and those of Greece as European.

A short time after, the period fixed on for the Congress of Verona arrived. The conditions formerly inserted at the date of November the 9th, 1822, in the protocol of the Congress, embraced the affairs of Greece, the affairs of the Principalities, and the affairs of commerce. Russia demanded that, as to Greece, the pacification of this country, and of the islands of the Archipelago, should be regulated with the intervention of the five Courts under their common guarantee. As to the Principalities, that they should be completely and immediately evacuated, and that the nomination of the new Hospodars should be notified at the Court of Russia according to custom. With regard to commercial affairs, they were to be regulated in common, and the Porte was to accord a free passage of the Bosphorus to the vessels of all nations. These conditions, whose justice the Allied Courts recognised, must be all executed before Russia renewed her diplomatic relations with the Porte. The negotiations which were to be opened to this end were confided to Viscount Strangford. By the care of that Ambassador, in the month of May, 1823, the nomination of the new Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia was notified to the Imperial Ministry by the Reiss-Effendi; but after that, many months passed away without these negotiations offering any hope of success. To facilitate the task for Lord Strangford, the Court of Vienna required that he might be authorised for the moment only to demand of the Porte the complete execution of those of the



conditions in the protocol of Verona, which concerned Moldavia, Wallachia, and commerce: that then Russia, satisfied with these articles, would be able to re-establish her mission at Constantinople, and thus contribute herself to restore peace to the Levant. The Emperor agreed to this proposition. Viscount Strangford was most urgent in his applications respecting commercial affairs: accordingly, the fundamental principles for the arrangement of commerce were subscribed to by the Porte. It was at Tchernowitz, where the Emperor invited the Emperor of Austria to an interview, that the Imperial Ministry found the despatches of Viscount Strangford. The Emperor, in order to show his satisfaction, resolved on sending to Constantinople Minciaky, the Counsellor for the time being, in order to manage commercial affairs.

Since the interview at Tchernowitz, three objects fixed the attention of the Imperial Ministry:—

1st. The complete execution of the arrangements of commerce, agreed on in substance with Lord Strangford; M. Minciaky was to superintend it.

2nd. The complete evacuation of all the Principalities, where all things were to be placed on the same footing of *statu quo*, as before the troubles of 1821.

3rd. The plan to be followed for the pacification of the East, where the struggle still continued. Russia could not admit the indefinite duration of this struggle without wounding her best interests; she could not, any more than the rest of Europe, consent to the triumph of a revolution—the necessary consequence of a complete victory of the Greeks; nor to the extermination of a Christian people—the necessary consequence of a victory of the Turks.

Of these three objects, it was the last which at once gave occasion to negotiations.

The proposition to establish conferences at St. Peters-

burg, in order to restore peace to the Levant, had been planned at Leopold, by the Imperial Ministry with the Austrian Ministry. We all agreed upon inviting the Courts of Paris, London, and Berlin :—1st, To furnish their respective Representatives in Russia with necessary powers and instructions; 2nd, To recommend to their Envoys at Constantinople, to follow the directions which would be addressed to them, from St. Petersburg, by their colleagues; 3rd, That they should give their opinion respecting the measures which would lead, with the most certainty, to the solution of this difficult question. On our part, we announced the speedy communication of some opinion on this subject.

France and Prussia consented to the establishment of the conferences. England did not receive our propositions so favourably. The policy of Mr. Canning differed from that of the Marquis of Londonderry with respect to the Greeks; having acquired, through different means, a great influence in Greece, he was little disposed to divide it with the other States. On the other hand, England had a powerful interest in preventing a definite rupture between Russia and the Porte. Canning, fearing alike to reject our propositions and to forward them, finished by declaring, in the month of December, 1823, that the Ambassador of his Britannic Majesty might assist at the conferences, but with the order to take *ad referendum* all the overtures which would be made there, and all the projects which would be developed.

Nevertheless, the Emperor, having announced to his Allies that he would communicate his views concerning the pacification of Greece, kept his word, and, at the beginning of January, 1824, a memoir upon this subject was drawn up. The Cabinet of Russia conceived the idea of instituting three principalities in Greece, which should enjoy a perfect internal independence, which should be administered according to their peculiar

laws, without the possibility of the Porte being able to meddle in their government; but that they should pay him an annual tribute, and be united to the Ottoman Empire, like the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, by the same political ties. The islands of the Archipelago were to submit to a municipal *régime* equally independent, and to enjoy, as well as the Principalities, unqualified free trade, and to this end they were to have their own flag.

The Russian Cabinet added, that perhaps some fortresses might remain in the power of the Ottoman troops, in the Greek principalities.

This memoir, accompanied by an explanatory despatch, was entirely approved of by the French and Prussian Ministries. The Austrian Ministry likewise gave an indirect approbation, couched in general terms, but it reserved the detailed examination for a later date.

This memoir made a deep impression on the Cabinet of London; after much hesitation, it was not till the 29th of May, 1824, that Canning informed Count Lieven, that Sir Charles Bagot would be authorised to share in the conferences of St. Petersburg, *as soon as Russia should have named her new Minister at Constantinople.*

Such results were undoubtedly far from answering the hopes of his Imperial Majesty; but Sir Charles Bagot having since consented to be present at the conferences, his Imperial Majesty ordered them to be opened on the 5th of June, 1824. The four Plenipotentiaries expressed, in the protocol, an approbation of our memorial; but, at the second conference, it was discovered that none of them were authorised to take ulterior measures. The Emperor was then obliged to suspend the deliberations, and the Russian Ministry addressed to the Allied Courts urgent representations of the necessity for adopting a more decisive course of proceeding. The Cabinet

of London, on its side, had blamed Sir Charles Bagot for having assisted at the conferences held at St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, soon after, Canning informed Count Lieven that Mr. Stratford Canning, appointed English Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte, in lieu of Viscount Strangford, would be sent to St. Petersburg, to take part in the conferences, and would afterwards proceed to Constantinople.

During the interval of these discussions, of which we have just given a sketch, negotiations with the Porte had continued, as much for the expediting of the arrangements for commerce, as for the re-establishment of the legal *statu quo* in Wallachia and Moldavia. The former made no progress, but the negotiations respecting Wallachia and Moldavia seemed to present more satisfactory results. Viscount Strangford announced to the Imperial Ministry that the Porte had just consented to the evacuation of these Provinces, and that the Turkish troops had commenced their retreat. In consequence, the Emperor appointed M. de Ribeaupierre to the post of Envoy Extraordinary to Constantinople, and, in the meantime, M. de Minciaky had orders to act as *Chargé* of the Russian affairs at the Porte.

There had always existed in Wallachia and Moldavia, a small troop of Mussulmans, known under the name of Beschlis, and solely charged with maintaining the police amongst the Turks who came into the Principalities for commercial purposes. M. de Minciaky, conformably with his instructions, complained, without delay, of the presence of the troops and commanders, whom the Porte, as we anticipated, kept in the Principalities under the name of Beschlis and of Basch-Beschlis-Aga. He required in this respect, as in all others, the re-establishment of the *statu quo* anterior to the troubles of 1821.

The Reiss-Effendi replied that the Porte had never

agreed with the English Ambassador to re-establish the *statu quo* anterior to the troubles; that this Ambassador and the Ambassadors of other Allied Courts, had been certainly aware of the measures which the Porte had decided on taking; that all had been satisfied and had completely approved of them; that M. de Minciaky himself had approved of them, since he had handed over his credentials, and that thus all ulterior complaint with regard to this would be useless; that the Court of Russia would never receive any other answer.

Another change, not less sudden, had at the same time deceived the just hopes of the Emperor. A part of the Russian memorial, of the 9th January, 1824, had been published at first by some German papers, and afterwards in all the French and English newspapers. This publication placed the intentions of his Imperial Majesty in the most false light, and had called forth on the part of the Greek authorities of Napoli-di-Romania, a protest addressed to the English Government against all foreign intervention, and a demand for direct succour on the part of England. Building on this protest, the Cabinet of London had declared that it could no longer take part in the conferences at St. Petersburg. Mr. Stratford Canning could only after that present himself before the Emperor to terminate some discussions between the two states relating to the north-west of America.

The Emperor had replied with much energy, and declared that, after such changes, all ulterior deliberation between Russia and Great Britain, upon the affairs of the East, was definitely closed. At the same time, his Imperial Majesty entreated the great Continental Courts to open the conference without England.

The first reception which this proposition met with, seemed to answer everywhere to the legitimate expectation of his Imperial Majesty.

In February, 1825, the deliberations between the Courts of Russia, Austria, France, and Prussia, commenced at St. Petersburg at the very time that Mr. Stratford Canning arrived in that capital.\* The Emperor caused a digest to be communicated to the three Representatives, which showed at once the necessity of acting with promptitude, and the measures adapted for meeting this necessity. His Imperial Majesty invited his Allies to take a common step in connection with the Porte and Greece, and to propose to the two parties an armistice of four months, during which a negotiation would take place with the view of leading to the establishment of a firm peace, the basis of which would be an arrangement which would assign to the Turks the sovereignty over Greece, and to the Greeks, deducting an annual tribute, the peaceful enjoyment of liberty of worship and commercial and political privileges.

The answers we received, deeply affected the Emperor Alexander. Our overtures in fact were rejected. The language of MM. de Laferronaye and de Küster, expressed rather less disapprobation, but on all the fundamental points, their opinions, as well as that of the Austrian Plenipotentiary, did not cease to be the same. All three did not consider the armistice as a *sine qua non* condition; all three

\* The mission of Mr. Stratford Canning occasioned some indirect explanations between Russia and England upon the affairs of Greece. On his return to England, passing through Warsaw in the month of May, 1825, Mr. Stratford Canning insinuated confidentially, that the views of the Cabinet of London might approximate to ours. It was thus that the Count de Lieven was authorised to sound the dispositions of the Government and of the Principal Secretary of State of his Britannic Majesty upon the subject, and to make it understood that the Emperor did not close the openings to an approaching understanding which it

refused to adopt any coercive or threatening measure whatever against the Porte, nor would they consent to sending any diplomatic envoys into Greece, save for the purpose of charging them indirectly to prepare the minds of the Greeks, without authorising them to make any propositions or promises. Instead of an armistice, the Allied Plenipotentiaries had expressed the idea of demanding that the Porte should virtually admit the intervention of the Courts of Russia, of Austria, of France, and of Prussia, in the affairs of Greece. His Imperial Majesty judged it more desirable that they should warn the Porte of the precarious position in which it would stand with regard to Russia, if it rejected the advice which was going to be communicated. Similar instructions were drawn up for M. de Minciaky, and for the other Representatives of the Allied Courts at Constantinople.

It was at Paris that the Chancellor of Austria (having gone there on account of the danger that his wife had recently incurred) received intelligence of these discussions, and of the digest by which we had opened the deliberations of St. Petersburg. The language which he held was not conformable to the expectation of the Emperor. He endeavoured to represent to the French Ministry that our propositions were leading in a direct way to war, and went so far as to say that doubtless we ought to occupy ourselves with the Eastern question, but that there were not sufficient motives to justify the anxiety expressed by the Emperor of Russia.

The negotiations of St. Petersburg, and the language of the Chancellor of Austria at Paris, proved that the Allies were endeavouring to draw us into an endless negotiation, that they hoped by degrees to lead the Emperor to renounce entirely the opinions he had held respecting the affairs of Greece, and to

leave the solution of this problem chiefly to accidents. We had found the Allied Plenipotentiaries unfurnished with the power of adhering to any idea which implied that of a coercive measure. We had seen represented as a mark of ambition, and of subterfuge, as a secret desire for war and conquest, all the propositions of his Imperial Majesty, which, having in view the pacification of the Levant, tended to produce a decisive effect, and to preserve Russia from a total loss of the influence and respect which glorious transactions in these countries had secured to her during the last half century.

Such intentions on the part of our Allies, required a categorical explanation on our part.

The Emperor ordered a despatch to be addressed to his Ambassadors and Ministers at the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin. In this despatch, after having presented a succinct summary of the discussions which had taken place in the conferences at St. Petersburg, it was shown that the continuation of the struggle in the East must certainly lead to consequences most fatal to the repose of the people, and to the honour of their monarchs: that in fact this struggle must necessarily terminate either in the triumph of insurrection, or the total extermination of the Christians, which would be as great a victory for revolutionaries, through the sentiments of indignation and grief which would be so justly excited, and above all, through the false light it would throw upon the policy of the Powers, and their want of consideration, in doing nothing to prevent it; that, besides this, Russia would lose the most useful vehicles of the commerce of her southern provinces; and that, under the auspices of complete success against Greece, any satisfactory connection between Russia and the Turks would be impossible.

Consequently, it was urgent to put an end to this war,



and urgent also to agree that, in order to effect this, the Allies, together, should even use coercive measures, if such measures alone would effect it. Also, that there was an absolute necessity for a truce, as a preliminary condition of all negotiation relative to the pacification of Greece.

The Emperor caused the accusations made against Russia to be refuted. She did not want a pretext for war, for the non-execution of the engagements contracted by the Turks relative to the Principalities, afforded her the most legitimate motives. She did not demand an increasing influence in the East, for she had exercised this influence without a rival, from 1774 to 1821.

At length the Emperor declared, that if, notwithstanding so many decisive considerations, the Allied Courts should persevere in the principles which they had manifested in the conferences at St. Petersburg, he should judge it useless to continue these conferences, and should be obliged henceforth to regard only the rights and interests of his Empire. The Representatives of his Imperial Majesty received the order to communicate this despatch to the Austrian, French, and Prussian Cabinets; and in case of their not producing the desired effect, they were to add a series of propositions, the immediate acceptance of which would alone guarantee a satisfactory issue to the new conferences. These propositions, to the number of seven, related to the mode of intervention; to the frontiers of Greece upon the continent, and also to the islands which were to form a part of it; to Servia;—in short, to restoring the same order of things in Wallachia and Moldavia, as before the troubles of 1821.

The answers to the despatch were placed before his Imperial Majesty in the month of July 1825, but they presented only new motives for regret and trouble.

The Court of Berlin *alone* showed him, for the fourth

time since 1821, the dispositions which he had the right to expect in these negotiations. As to the Austrian Cabinet, it had declared that it considered it necessary to resume the conferences, but without adhering to any of its overtures, without admitting, by any hypothesis, the possibility of employing coercive means, and without disguising the fact that, in new deliberations, neither its language nor its policy would be changed. The answers from the French Cabinet, though less positive in their form, did not differ fundamentally. On the other hand, confidential steps, touching the affairs of Greece, had taken place at Constantinople, and the Porte had uttered a peremptory refusal ever to admit any foreign intervention in this question.

The situation of Russia became daily more serious. The Emperor saw that, with regard to Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, his rights were not acknowledged, and his treaties violated; as to the pacification of Greece, his Allies occupied in the most trifling negotiations, the interests of Russia injured, and the legitimate influence which she had exercised in the East since the treaty of Kainardji, essentially compromised; in fact, ever since the year 1823, all the other great Powers took a more or less active part in the affairs of Greece. We have already signalised the ascendancy which gold, and the agents of England, had acquired there; France, on her part, formed there relations through the channel of her Phil-Hellenic committees; Austria no longer concealed the fact that she had promised succours to the Turks; Russia alone remained a stranger in the strife. The determinations then formed by his Imperial Majesty were consigned to a despatch addressed to the Ambassadors and Ministers at the Courts of Austria, France, and Prussia, the 6th of August, 1825. They were thus expressed:—

“The dignity of Russia, her interests, and, we venture to

say, those of Europe, impose upon us the duty of proving to our Allies that they have incorrectly judged our position, not duly appreciated our actual sacrifices, and aimed at results to which we could not consent." After having expressed this opinion, the Emperor desired his Representatives henceforth to be silent on Oriental affairs. His Majesty ordered, that if the Allied Cabinets demanded the reason of this silence, that they should recapitulate our propositions and their answers, and declare, that "henceforth any further deliberations with them would be fruitless; that in consequence of this, the Emperor could not pursue them, and that in future he could only act in the affairs of the East according to the rights and interests of his Empire." This declaration made, the Representatives of the Emperor were "to assume an attitude of reserve towards the Allied Courts, and avoid all discussion, either on the Oriental question, or respecting the nature, the consequences, or the motives of the determination of which they had been the organs."

Decisive instructions were also forwarded to M. de Minciaky. The Emperor charged him to demand of the Reiss-Effendi a conference for the last time, in which a protocol should be presented, containing an account of all our wrongs; to give him back a formal protest, if the Porte renewed its refusals; to declare that it would then have to weigh all the consequences of such an act; after this to be silent, and to limit his functions to the management of commercial affairs. M. de Minciaky was also to abstain, henceforth, from all discussions upon the Greek question with the Representatives of the Allied Courts at Constantinople.

Such orders required an examination of the system which it would be necessary for Russia to adopt in this new situation of affairs. The Emperor wished to know the judgment of those of his Ambassadors whom he honoured with a just confidence upon this subject. He invited MM. d'Alopeus,

Tatichtcheff, Pozzo di Borgo, and Lieven, to give their opinions frankly upon the nature of the agreement which seemed to have been formed between our Allies, to paralyse our views in the affairs of the East; upon the degree of strength which the opposition might acquire; upon the means of disconcerting this system; and respecting the most eligible measures to secure the rights, the interests, and the dignity of the Empire.

Whilst the Emperor formed the resolutions of which we have given a sketch, some of his presentiments had already been accomplished in the Morea. The victorious Egyptians traversed it almost without obstacle. The Greek chiefs, in the desperate situation in which they were placed, had determined to have recourse to England, to demand her exclusive protection, and even to offer her the sovereignty of Greece and of the islands of the Archipelago which had shaken off the yoke of the Ottoman Porte. But we were speedily informed of what it was easy to have foreseen, that the English Government had rejected the offer of the Greeks.

Nevertheless, their demand, combined with the silence of Russia upon Oriental affairs, excited a great anxiety in the Cabinet of Vienna, which proposed to us to make a fresh collective step with regard to the Porte, inviting it to admit the mediation of the Continental Courts in its dispute with the Greeks. The Emperor sent from Taganrog to the Imperial Ministry to decline this proposition, and to engage M. Tatichtcheff not to depart from his instructions, which had directed him to observe absolute silence on the Oriental question. Shortly after, and at the very moment of the death of the Emperor Alexander, we received despatches, in which the Ambassadors and Ministers of the Emperor expressed the opinions which they had been invited to declare respecting the union which we had believed was formed between the

great Continental Courts to neutralise the intentions of his Imperial Majesty relative to the pacification of the Levant.\*

The Count d'Alopeus transmitted to us positive assurances, which left no doubt respecting the favourable dispositions upon which Russia might reckon on the part of Prussia, whatever might be the ulterior course of events.

These opinions, so unanimous, of the Ambassadors and Ministers of his Imperial Majesty, were justified almost at the moment they were given.

France hastened to send Count Laferronaye to his post, who, since his arrival, thinking he might reckon upon the active co-operation of England and Austria, advanced the idea of a new collective measure at Constantinople, by which the five Allied Courts should announce to the Ottoman Porte that they considered the war between the Greeks and Turks as terminated; that a European intervention in this fatal quarrel was indispensable; and that if the Porte did not agree to it, it would have to dread all the consequences of its position with regard to Russia. It seemed essential not to call forth, by refusing all overture on the part of the Allied Courts, this very union, whose establishment had been feared, and not to expose ourselves to dangerous complications, if circumstances should force the Emperor to give a new character of energy to his determinations. Nevertheless, the Imperial Ministry did not discuss the proposition of the Count Laferronaye, and only yielded, on being pressed, to lay it before the Emperor.

At the same time, the despatches of Count Lieven informed us that the dispositions of the English Ministry tended

\* The despatches of M. Pozzo di Borgo, of M. de Lieven, and of M. de Tatitcheff, being published entire, at pp. 44, 75, and 81, we omit them here.

more and more towards an approximation with Russia. Mr. Canning declared that the first condition that would be required of England, in her negotiations with Russia on the Greek question, would be, that she should negotiate with Russia alone. But he showed, on the other hand, a decided wish to have some conversation with Count Lieven, which might lead to decisive consequences. The last reports of that Ambassador, the confidential statements which Mr. Canning had made to him, the mission of the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg—all unite in testifying the real dispositions of the Cabinet of St. James' on this point. Those of the Cabinet of Vienna are the only ones which, to the present time, have never changed in appearance. Still, as early as the month of September, 1825, the Cabinet of Vienna tried to adjust, by a last effort, the difficulties which subsisted between Russia and the Porte relative to the Principalities, and to remove from his Imperial Majesty the immediate motive for a war, which he had feared from the beginning.

The instructions which he sent to his Internuncio on this subject, arrived at Constantinople about the same time as those which were addressed to M. Minciaky, and of which we have spoken above. According to the communications which have been made to us by Count Lebzeltern, Baron d'Ottensfels received orders to engage the Porte to satisfy Russia in all that might relate to the Danubian provinces; to add that a refusal would be considered by the Court of Vienna as a direct offence, and that it would identify its cause with that of Russia. M. d'Ottensfels then announced, both to the *Chargé d'Affaires* of the Emperor at Constantinople, as well as to Count Lebzeltern at St. Petersburg, that his representations had been crowned with full success, and that the Porte had promised to replace, in Wallachia and Moldavia, the existing Basch-beschlis-agas by officers of an inferior

rank ; and to re-establish generally the *statu quo* which existed previous to the troubles of 1821.

As there was no question, respecting either the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops which remained in the Principalities, under the name of Beschlis, or respecting the authority with which their new chiefs should be invested, M. de Minciaky, wishing to ascertain, himself, the true intentions of the Porte, carried out his instructions, and solicited the conference which he had been charged to demand from the Reiss-Effendi.

It was proved that the Porte denied ever having promised to Baron Ottenfels, anything but to replace the existing Basch-beschlis-agas by officers of a less elevated rank, not having added any engagement relative to the re-establishment of the *statu quo* anterior to the troubles of 1821 ; and not being bound to admit any complaint on this subject.

Vainly did M. Minciaky labour, in this conference, to improve the dispositions of the Porte towards the Servians.

Such blind obstinacy left M. Minciaky no alternative. He was obliged, according to the orders of the Emperor, to give to the Reiss-Effendi a formal declaration, which recapitulated the conduct of Russia towards the Porte, since the year 1821. He enumerated the motives of complaint which the Porte continued to give to his Imperial Majesty. He protested against all the determinations which the Ottoman Government announced with regard to Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia ; and warned it to attribute to itself alone, the necessary results of such a system of policy.

This act is the last of our diplomatic relations with the Divan, since the year 1824.\*

\* See Annexed Notes, B.

## ANNEXED NOTES.

## A.

## EXTRACT FROM TWO ANNEXED NOTES.

THE treaty of peace of Bucharest, concluded under auspices unfavourable to Russia, had embraced in the substance of its public and secret stipulations, all the relations between the Imperial Court and the Ottoman Porte. The collection of compulsory articles contained in that treaty, was intended to form the basis of the state of peace and intercourse between the two Powers.

Nevertheless, the Porte, profiting by passing circumstances, rejected the secret articles, and obtained in this way all the advantages which the sixth article especially secured to it, without acquiescing in the modifications which the separate articles included. It is thus that the Porte had departed from the true sense of the transactions of Bucharest, and was the primary cause of the discussions which subsist to this day. Its refusal to ratify the special clauses, made it impossible for Russia to give up the Asiatic coast of the Black Sea. The grievances of the Imperial Court at the hands of Turkey, were very numerous. They embraced both the safety of his Majesty's subjects, the interests of our commerce, and the rights of Russia to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte. Fortifications had been raised upon the islands of the Danube opposite Ismael. The robberies of the Asiatic populations, and the slave-trade, were tolerated and encouraged by the Turkish commanders ; the stipulations



in favour of Servia remained unaccomplished. The promise to respect the privileges of Moldavia and Wallachia had been openly violated; the free navigation of the Russian flag in the seas of the Levant, and Russian commerce, were hindered; our ships were exposed to the piracies of the natives of Barbary. In short, the Porte had not removed any of those grievances, notwithstanding the tenth article of the treaty. The wars of 1813 and 1815, had prevented the Emperor from devoting his attention to those interests. Returned to his states, he resolved, in 1816, to reconstruct upon solid foundations the system of Russia in the East, and made choice of Baron Strogonoff to carry out his views. The instructions with which this Minister was furnished, were based on the most pacific sentiments towards the Turkish Government. Russia, strong in her right, and adhering strictly to the letter of the treaty of Bucharest, declares, she only wished for that which was founded on justice, and only upholds what was for the mutual interests of both Empires. Baron Strogonoff was commissioned to discuss the complaints of both parties, with the view of effecting a reconciliation, so that the arrangements which might result from them, would carry in themselves the most positive guarantee of their inviolable observance for the future, but would entirely fail, should the Emperor admit a delimitation incompatible with the solidity of the relations they wished to establish, or if he abandoned the fate and the interests of Christians, Ottoman subjects, to the vengeance of Mussulmans, and to European speculations. The objects of the collective negotiations had been thus classified:—The delimitation upon the Danube; the abduction of Russian subjects, and the traffic in slaves (adding to it the complaint of the Porte concerning the coast of Asia); the affairs of Servia; the affairs of the Principalities; hinderances to commerce, and the piracies of the people of Barbary; special

complaints. At the same time Baron Strogonoff was instructed respecting the purport of the arrangements which would ultimately be most conformable to the views of his Majesty. The difficulties which his Majesty's Minister had to encounter were immense; they originated in the nature of many matters under discussion, in the personal character of the Sultan, in the ill-will of the Turkish Government with regard to us,—above all, in the fatal persuasion which his foreign advisers created in the Sultan, that Russia could not make war on him.

Thus, of all the questions which were the subject of the negotiations of Baron Strogonoff, the only one definitely settled was that of delimitation on the Danube. As to the other questions, they remained in suspense up to the year 1821, or were only decided in part and in embryo.

#### B.

#### PROTEST SUBJOINED TO THE PROTOCOL OF THE CONFERENCE OF 1ST (13TH) OF OCTOBER, 1825.

Since the fatal epoch when most deplorable events forced the Imperial Court of Russia to interrupt its friendly connection with the Ottoman Government, it has met the infraction of its treaties, and violation of its rights, with the composure of reason, and a matchless generosity.

Always disposed for a sincere reconciliation, it has given striking proofs of its pacific sentiments, whenever the Porte has manifested similar intentions.

So much moderation and magnanimity ought to have impressed the political proceedings of the Divan with that spirit of reconciliation, and that respect for acquired rights, which Russia had herself made the basis of her policy.

Strong in the justice of her claims, and knowing the embarrassing situation in which the Ottoman Empire was placed, she did not wish for a moment to increase it, by insisting too strongly on reparation of the many grievances of which she had to complain, and profiting by the first progress which the work of reconciliation had made, she limited herself to *exacting the evacuation of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia by the Ottoman troops, and the re-establishment of the old order of things in those provinces, such as it was at the beginning of the year 1821.* She added the positive assurance, that as soon as this condition should be accomplished, she would re-establish her ancient diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. She also gave unlimited proofs of goodwill.

We had anticipated success from this, and also that we should have seen the demand of Russia received with sincerity and good faith. It was just and legitimate, and was prescribed by sacred duties, and positive rights; the Ottoman Government could not withdraw itself from the obligation under which it lay to accept it, and virtually acknowledged this obligation at the conference, which took place on April 27th, 1824, with the Ambassador of his Britannic Majesty; and the formal execution of it was promised for the 29th of June, the same year.

It was on the faith of those engagements, so solemnly contracted, that the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* delivered in his credentials; it was founded on these engagements, and their complete execution was the *sine qua non* condition of the re-establishment of the relations between the two Empires.

We might, therefore, be justified in hoping that the Porte would hasten to fulfil them in all respects, and thus to place its new relations with Russia upon a lasting basis. Nevertheless, we discovered only too soon that these promises, at first

eluded by delays, were revoked and perverted by some material alterations respecting the number of troops. The *Chargé d'Affaires* naturally flattered himself that his procedure, which exhibited the conciliatory policy of his Court, would be appreciated by the Porte, and would ultimately lead to the accomplishment of the engagements officially contracted with the Ambassador of England.

Unhappily, it has not turned out so—the Principalities are still at this time occupied by the Turkish military, and the leaders of the troops exercise there an influence which is incompatible with the privileges of the Moldavians and Wallachians.

Such a state of things, such contempt for all obligations, inevitably gave rise to the most just and earnest complaints. After unexampled delays, our remonstrance had no other result than to lead to the declaration which has just been made, that all is established as formerly, that the troops which are in the Principalities are only *beschlis*, and that they are necessary for the safety of the country,—in short, that the actual military officers in command are replaced by officers of an inferior rank—that is to say, that the same *régime* shall be maintained under another individual and through the influence of the Porte, which will give him the investiture.

A change evidently so illusory, so little in harmony with the stipulations, and which concerns only one part of the claims, could not satisfy the Imperial Court of Russia.

The latter has proved in many ways, that if at all times there has existed in Wallachia and Moldavia a Mussulman guard under the name of *beschlis*, charged with acting as a police force amongst the Turks who went to the Provinces for commercial affairs, this troop was composed only of mercenaries at the choice and in the pay of the Hospodars; that the chiefs, who were nominated by the Princes, only depended on

them, enjoyed no other influence, even no other consideration, were not installed by the firmans of his Highness, were never, consequently, regarded as functionaries of the Porte, did not correspond with it, and did not receive its orders or those of the neighbouring Pashas; that they only executed those of the Princes; that they might be displaced by them at their option; and, in short, that they did not command any Ottoman troops, but only simple *beschlis*:

That at the present time, on the contrary, the *basch-beschlis* are named by the Porte, are instituted by its firmans, and only depend on it; that they command not only Mussulmans, paid by them when authorised by the Princes, but regular Ottoman troops, whose number is out of all proportion with that of the ancient *beschlis*; that very far from being dependent on, and under the orders of the Hospodars, it is these military chiefs who exercise, according to the avowal of the Porte itself, the most pernicious influence over their conduct and administration, and are invested with a power of which there are only too many examples.

The same motives of complaint subsist at this time even, in all their force.

The Ottoman troops occupy the two principalities, Wallachia and Moldavia.

*Their presence is fatal and burdensome; it occasions the ruin of the country.*

*It is a manifest infraction of the privileges of these Provinces, and of the treaties which have secured them.*

It is a violation of the engagements contracted by the Porte, in presence of the English Ambassador, by which the Ottoman Ministers had officially promised that *the troops should be withdrawn, that, in future, there should be simply Beschlis in the Provinces, and that the ancient statu quo should be re-established.*

Thus, when the Imperial Court of Russia requires *that the Principalities be restored, in all respects, in the same condition which they were in before the troubles of 1821; that the mode of nomination, the attributes, and the authority of the Basch-beschlis-agas, as well as the number and functions of the Beschlis, be absolutely such as they were before this period; in a word, that the state of things prescribed by the treaties be entirely restored in these Provinces*,—Russia only makes use of the rights secured to it by treaties, and the recent declarations of the Porte.

Her demands have, therefore, been legitimate, and are so still.

All that it was possible to do to engage the Sublime Porte, by frank and friendly overtures, by the most kind language, to recognise its obligations and the rights of Russia, has been attempted, without reserve, by the Imperial Court of Russia. The negociations have terminated unsuccessfully; but, on the one hand, they have placed in a clear light the magnanimity of his Imperial Majesty, and the purity and uprightness of his generous intentions; on the other hand, they have clearly proved the course that has been pursued to this day by the Porte; that its answers have always been evasive and illusory, and its system a violation of the most positive treaties.

Its conduct during five years offers but too many proofs of this disposition, which is still persevered in.

No such answers, therefore, having been received from the Sublime Porte as the demands of Russia claimed, it only remains to the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* to fulfil a sad and painful duty—that of formally protesting against the consequences which might arise from the conduct of the Porte, by declar-

lachsians and Moldavians, who by a long series of misfortunes have acquired new titles to its solicitude, will never cease from making a demand of the justice of which it is convinced :

That it will adhere to no act or innovation whatever which the Porte may have made, or will make in future, contrary to the prerogatives of the Provinces, and of the treaties which have confirmed them, and in consequence of the events which have compelled Russia to abandon provisionally the exercise of her protection and her tutelary surveillance :

That to this end she is prepared to employ all the means that she shall consider suitable to secure the inviolability of her rights :

That she invites the Porte, for the last time, to make serious reflections upon the consequences of the policy which it has adopted towards Russia.

## DESPATCH OF M. DE MINCIAKY.

DATED CONSTANTINOPLE, 30TH MARCH (12TH APRIL), 1826.

Complaints of Turkey—The Treaties are faithfully observed—The Principalities evacuated—The Servians satisfied—Why does Russia still demand to negotiate?—Being the stronger party, she desires War.

At the moment I was closing my packet, I was informed, *indirectly*, that a person in whom the Reiss-Effendi had placed much confidence, having spoken to that Minister of the note which I had presented to the Porte, the latter replied in the following terms:—

“The Court of Russia attempts things which are inadmissible.

“At the present day, the Grand Seignior accords to the European Powers, whoever they may be, absolutely nothing beyond the established stipulations. *We have, till now, faithfully observed the treaties, but they have no connection with that which Russia demands.* The first point, that which concerns the evacuation of the Principalities, has been definitively arranged in the name of the Court of Russia, by Lord Strangford—*i. e.*, it is agreed that there will be a thousand men in Wallachia, and five hundred in Moldavia. The Princes have nothing more to pay; this is, therefore, settled. In the second place, the Russian Court demands that the Servians should be treated, in some measure, like certain privileged islands of the Archipelago.

“Now, since the conclusion of the peace, *the Servians have been treated as they ought to be*; they only pay a fixed



tribute, and there is only a very small garrison at Belgrade. *What reason, then, has Russia to complain?* In the last place, as regards the mission of the Plenipotentiaries, we cannot conceive upon what point Russia wishes to start a negociation. *We have nothing to negociate about.* If these objects regard the treaties, in this case, we could come to an understanding here; if, on the contrary, they are in opposition to the letter of our stipulations, the Court of Russia has neither the right to exact them, nor the Grand Seignior the intention to accede to them. But, after all, Russia wishes to be at war with us; this will, therefore, be an act of overbearing aggression on her part. Nevertheless, we will reply to its note."

Although it is certain that the Ottoman Minister expressed himself in this way, still it would be premature in us to wish to draw a positive conclusion respecting the nature of the answer which the Porte will give us, seeing that nothing can be yet decided to that effect; nevertheless, I would not allow your Excellency to be ignorant of the language used by the Turkish Minister at so important a moment.

There has been a great council held at the Porte lately, and another will take place soon.

The tranquillity in the capital has never been greater than at this time.

I am, etc., etc.

## DESPATCH OF COUNT DE SUCHTELEN.

DATED FROM STOCKHOLM, THE 13TH (25TH) OF APRIL, 1826.

The Emperor of Russia, to whom the pacific attitude of Sweden at this time was of great moment, communicates to Bernadotte statements concerning Wellington and Turkey—The King of Sweden entirely approves of the Policy of Russia—The reputation of the Russian Diplomacy, and the great talent evinced in the drawing up of its Documents acknowledged.

A SUMMARY, made by the King's order, of all the reports which he had received respecting the Duke of Wellington and our relations with Turkey, had been sent to Baron Palmstjerna, in order to facilitate for him the means of learning more effectively all that was passing on this subject.

Your Excellency sees from this the extreme importance, and will appreciate all the seasonableness, of the communication I have just made, and which has flattered and pleased the King's *amour propre* in the highest degree. The Count of Wetterstedt, being informed by Baron Palmstjerna of what your Excellency's couriers had brought me, was most anxious to receive me. After the reading of the documents, the Count returned thanks for the confidence shown in the Swedish Government. He was pleased to do justice to the great talent with which our diplomatic documents were drawn up; but upon the sum and substance of the communication, he spoke as I had expected—with all the circumspection of a Minister who has not yet received the orders of his Sovereign; or, rather, as one who knows the value which his

Master attaches to an opportunity which is adapted to the development of the eloquence and inspiration of the moment. I did not fail, therefore, to inform the Count, that if the King had the smallest desire to hear the documents in question, I should be extremely happy and flattered in being permitted to read them to his Majesty. M. de Wetterstedt eagerly assured me that he felt persuaded that the King would have great pleasure in receiving me; consequently, the very day of my conference with the Count, the 9th (21st) of April, I received a note from him, stating that the King would expect me the next day, the 10th (22nd), at eight in the evening.

The King received me with open arms, and told me he was curious to hear the documents about which I was come to engage his attention. His Majesty lent the most serious hearing whilst the Count de Wetterstedt and I read them alternately. When we had finished, the King said to me:—"I must get you, General, to write to the Count de Nesselrode that I thank the Emperor for this communication, which is of the highest interest. I am flattered by his Imperial Majesty's confidence in me at this time; I know how to appreciate it; and the Emperor had already quite captivated me by his kindly courtesy towards me ever since the commencement of his reign. The Emperor and myself are placed in a mutually satisfactory position, we have well-defined frontiers, and nothing in the world could interrupt the perfect harmony which exists between us. I desire peace for the Emperor, if it can be maintained, together with the execution of the engagements formally stipulated by the treaties; but if war becomes inevitable, the Emperor's cause is a just one, and my whole heart will be for the success of his arms."

His Majesty then entered on an earnest discussion respect-

ing our complaints against the Turks, whom, according to his expression, you can only bring to reason by cannon shots:—

“I told you this, General, five years ago, when you came to Norway to show me the complications which then existed, and which, ever since, have been only very imperfectly unravelled.”

This was the opportune moment I was expecting to tell the King, that at the time he was just mentioning, he had embraced all that question with his usual clearness; and that, if I were not mistaken, he wrote on that occasion to the Emperor Alexander, to assure him of his wishes for our success in a war which then appeared imminent. I thought I might add that, at this moment, the same assurances renewed to the present Emperor could not fail of producing a good effect.

The King immediately replied: “Yes, I wrote to the Emperor Alexander, as you say; and I ask no better than to do the same thing now; but I have just addressed two letters to the Emperor; I must wait a little; and I promise you that I will seize the first occasion to write to his Majesty in the same spirit as that which I have shown you, and to assure him that he may reckon on me. Your Emperor displays a great and noble character: Europe perceives it, and will find it to its advantage. I feel most grateful for all the kindness shown by the Emperor and all his family to Count de Brahe. I presume that, on his return, he will be the bearer of a letter from your Sovereign, and then an occasion for writing to the Emperor will be found. I shall also have an opportunity when I announce the happy delivery of my daughter-in-law.”

Your Excellency will imagine that I fully entered into the King's ideas. I found them excellent; and I failed not to tell him, that a few lines traced by himself on this subject would be more agreeable and more appreciated than all the

efforts I might make to give an exact relation of all the judicious things and satisfactory assurances which I had just heard.

His Majesty then continued to speak in a strong and positive way of his attachment to the Emperor, and his pacific dispositions with regard to us. He even said: "If you can give my ideas upon this better than I can myself, I authorise you, General, to make use of all the terms which you think most expressive and most proper, in order to represent how friendly my thoughts and intentions are with regard to the Emperor."

Upon this we separated mutually satisfied; and it appeared to me, Monsieur le Comte, that I had great reason to be so. The Minister for Foreign Affairs left the King's cabinet at the same moment with me. He shook hands with me, as if he were entirely satisfied with the language and disposition of his Sovereign. I must not forget to add, that the excellent drawing up of the documents also struck the King. His Majesty told me that the reputation of the Russian diplomacy in this respect had been long established.

The King told me that our war with the Porte would be very popular in Russia. He thinks that the vanguard of our army will suffice for the occupation of the Danubian Principalities. Difficulties, according to him, await us at the Balkhans; but he does not think them insurmountable.

I have every reason to believe that the King will write to the Emperor, as he promised. It will be a means of making himself agreeable, which he probably will not neglect; and through this we shall have, and without any trace of our having influenced it, a suitable and efficient pledge of security.

In acquitting myself of the orders of my august Master, I started with the idea that we must discover as little as possible to the Cabinet of Stockholm that its pacific attitude was

of great moment to us. I was especially justified in following this devious course, because I know the resources of Sweden, viewed separately. I have also the conviction, that at this present time, a war between Russia and the Porte would obtain for us, strange to say, the wishes of the majority of the Swedes; and that the opinion upon it would even be pronounced in our favour by the hope, that this struggle would secure a better future for Greece.

Lord Strangford has written to Lord Blomfield, to inform him that we have sent an ultimatum to Constantinople, and that the Alliance is entirely in harmony with us.

I have the honour, etc.

PRIVATE DESPATCH OF COUNT NESSELRODE TO  
PRINCE LIEVEN.

DATED MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 15TH, 1826.

Joint Measures to be adopted after the Rupture of the Negotiations with Turkey—Necessity of securing the Concessions of Ackermann—Final Settlement of the Affairs of Greece—Means of Paralysing the Intervention of the Pasha of Egypt, by sending the Fleets of the Courts sharing in the Pacification of Greece—England must hinder the exclusive Relations of France with Egypt—Prince Lieven knows how to lead the British Ministry according to the wishes of Russia.

My public despatch of this day points out the reply that your Excellency is required to make to the official paper of Mr. Canning of the 4th of September. This reply contains a complete assent to the propositions of the English Ministry. There still remains one point, however, on which it is desirable that you should have an explanation with the Principal Secretary of State. This point relates to the ulterior measures which may become necessary, if the recall of the Ambassadors, and the threat of acknowledging the independence of Greece, do not produce the desired effect on the Turkish Government. We cannot disguise from ourselves the fact, that England, after having formed *such a decided resolution* as that of *interrupting her diplomatic relations with the Porte*, will be herself interested in preventing this rupture from being quite thrown away, and in avoiding the public mortification of being discomfited by the stubbornness of the Divan; but the position of Russia will be still more critical. The successful negotiations of Ackermann would have restored

to her all her ancient influence at Constantinople ; they would have secured her territorial possessions on the eastern shores of the Black Sea ; they would have guaranteed great advantages to the provinces protected by his Imperial Majesty, in virtue of treaties ; and, lastly, they would have restored all the privileges of Russian trade in the Ottoman Empire in their original vigour. Russia, by interrupting her relations with the Porte, which she had just renewed under the most favourable auspices, would sacrifice all her advantages. The Turks would not fail to declare, in retaliation, that all the concessions which they had made at Ackermann, should be cancelled. Hence new efforts would perhaps be required to replace affairs on the same footing as that which they occupied through our last negociations ; and if, after all these sacrifices, Russia did not obtain the final settlement of the affairs of Greece, in conformity with the protocol of 25th March (4th April), what part would the Imperial Cabinet have played in this conjuncture ? You will, therefore, be good enough to represent to Mr. Canning, in a friendly manner, that under no circumstances would the Emperor consent to expose himself to such a situation ; that if he meddles with the Greek question, it is with a firm resolution of solving it ; and you need not scruple to employ this argument to lead the British Ministry by degrees to acknowledge the necessity of discussing, and of determining with you, the ulterior measures to be adopted, if the withdrawal of the Representatives of the great European Powers, and the fear of Greece forming an independent state, acknowledged by the other Governments of Christendom, do not induce the Turks to accept our propositions.

It might possibly be a difficult matter at the present moment to determine the most appropriate measures, without knowing the ideas of his Britannic Majesty's Government on this point ; but it still appears to us that the most essential



step would be: on the one hand to co-operate, by means of consular agents in Greece, in organising that country according to principles analogous to those sanctioned by the protocol of 23rd of March (4th of April), and to augment the resources and the chances of success in the struggle in which it is engaged, at the same time that we forward the establishment of order, stifle discords, and assist in the formation of a government invested with real power. On the other hand, our main object should be to paralyse the effect of the succours the Pasha of Egypt gives to the Porte, and which alone have changed the aspect of the war. In connection with the last point, it appears to us that we have pointed out in our public despatch a consideration that must have weight with the British Cabinet. *Probably it may never be possible to prove the existence* of a plan whose object is the extermination of the Greeks, or the existence of any compact to this effect between the Pasha of Egypt and the Porte; but it appears to us that we must argue from the fact itself, and consider the inevitable consequence of the conquest of Greece by the Egyptians. Now the fact is, that in all the districts occupied by the army of Ibrahim Pasha, the Christian population is disappearing: some are exterminated because they refuse to submit, and the rest are dragged away into slavery because they have not the power to defend themselves. The inevitable result of the success of the Egyptian expedition is, therefore, the annihilation of the Greeks, or, in other terms, that of the Christian population of the countries which are now endeavouring to recover their independence. Whatever may have been the original intentions of the Porte and of the Pasha of Egypt, this result is certain to occasion all the evils of the plan which England sought to have officially confirmed. Europe will see a Christian people destroyed on the frontiers of Christendom. The old Greek mercantile marine, which is

so useful a vehicle of a very important trade, will be replaced by a Mussulman navy on the model of those of Tunis and Algiers. Piracy will increase, for few shores favour it more than those of the Archipelago, and the commercial relations of our maritime states will lose the security that they require ; in short, the Pasha of Egypt will have obtained a footing in Europe, and a barbarian government will, perhaps, be set up in Europe. But surely, if England has positively declared that it would not suffer such a state of things, it would be the wisest part to assist in preventing it, when facts, which are stronger arguments than words, warn it that its fears may at any moment be changed into a sad reality ? In consequence of these observations, you will endeavour, my dear Prince, to convince Mr. Canning, that the most suitable plan, in case the Divan should not yield on the withdrawal of the Ambassadors, would be that which he himself advanced on a previous occasion, when he proposed to despatch a fleet and keep back the reinforcements sent by the Pasha of Egypt to the Turkish army in Greece, to cut off the army of Ibrahim Pasha, and thus to show to the Porte, without a declaration of war, that unless it is willing to acknowledge the independence of Greece, it will be forced to accede to the pacific advances of Russia and England. *This idea* is, moreover, easily put into practice, and is sure to produce an effect, and it *might be realised by means of a combined movement between the fleets of all the Powers* co-operating in the pacification of Greece.

Besides, we cannot disguise the fact, that we are not quite indifferent to the supplies of ships, men, and stores, furnished to the Pasha of Egypt by France, the care it devotes to the education of the Mussulman youth in Paris, and in special schools where they are initiated into all the arts of civilisation, and in all the sciences that give Christian Europe its supe-

riority, *and we are decided to enter into friendly explanations on this subject with the French Ministry*, so soon as it accedes to the ideas that we are about to communicate to it, conjointly with the Cabinet of London, about the proper course to pursue in order to secure a happy future to Greece. But it is clear that the arguments which we bring to bear against this system must *be doubly cogent with England*. It is evident that she must consider it highly important to prevent the Pasha of Egypt from adding to the advantage he derives from this exclusive alliance, the strength that will inevitably accrue to him if his troops effect the conquest of the country that they are ordered to subdue.

It remains for you, Prince, to make that use of the observations contained in this despatch, which you shall judge most proper. **THE PRESENT LANGUAGE OF THE BRITISH MINISTRY, SUFFICIENTLY PROVES THAT YOU ARE ABLE TO LEAD IT GRADUALLY TO THE END DESIRED BY THE EMPEROR!** and his Majesty invites you to leave no means untried to persuade Mr. Canning, that if the affairs of Greece occasion a rupture of diplomatic relations with the Porte, we must be prepared for circumstances, when this determination would not suffice to secure our object, and consequently when we should be driven, as previously stated, to adopt effective ulterior measures in common.

Receive, etc.

## DESPATCH OF GENERAL POZZO DI BORGO TO THE COUNT DE NESSELRODE.

France is ours—I am peremptory, without well knowing what are our demands respecting the Porte—The French Government has despatched a courier to induce the Divan to accept them, such as they will be—The influence of Austria vanished with the illusions of Prince Metternich—England will never be dominant here—Canning arrives at Paris to examine the Cabinet, and the different Parties—Various embarrassments drive England to her ruin—A war would be impossible for her—The Charter in Portugal—A movement in Spain probable—Consequences foreseen—The interior situation of France—Pleasures and Enjoyments—Villèle—Markets of Bayonne—Finances—Jesuits—The Censorship—The Army—The King and his Ministry labour to avoid every decided and dangerous situation—In doubtful circumstances, they will incline towards Russia—Want of experience in the Cabinet—It is not worthily represented at any of the Great Courts.

Paris, the 27th July (8th August), 1826.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,—The prevalence of sound views in the councils of the King, and the occurrence of difficulties in some parts of Europe, invariably leads the French Ministry to draw closer to, and coincide with, the Imperial Cabinet. The first impression produced by the protocol of the 23rd of March once weakened, each day and each event has given me the proof of the desire not to separate in anything from our august Master.

Without analysing from what principles this tendency originated, I am anxious to acknowledge, to encourage, and make use of it in the different questions which present them-

The most interesting of all to the Imperial Court is indisputably that which concerns the affairs of the East. I have, therefore, shown myself firm and even peremptory towards the French Ministry on all points relating to the Eastern question.

Although it has not entered with me into any detail relative to the nature of our demands towards the Porte, a courier has been sent to Constantinople to advise the Divan to accept them such as they are, since *the safety of the Ottoman Empire depends on this condescension, and because the generosity of our august Master offers it, by his moderation, the only means left of prolonging its existence.*

General Guilleminot started with the same instructions, awaiting those which will be forwarded to him when the protocol of the 23rd of March shall be communicated, and the proposition which was to be made to the Porte, through the medium of England, formally recognised.

I have no reason, Monsieur le Comte, to doubt that France will persevere in these sentiments towards us, without even the contrary insinuations of other Courts being able to alter them.

Austria is systematically open to suspicion. If she has had some passing influence with regard to the questions of the East, the cause must be attributed to the conviction that Prince Metternich has endeavoured to inspire, that his ideas would be ultimately adopted. These illusions have been for some time destroyed, as your Excellency has been informed, and there now exists no probability of their ever returning.

England will never be dominant here, because the interests of the two countries are incompatible, and because the character of Mr. Canning, who is a mixture of violence, low cunning, and egotism, united to much cleverness, defeats itself in the long run, and destroys the confidence which he wishes

to inspire. *Whatever was exclusive in the protocol of the 25th of March, they here attribute to him, and they felt obliged to our Court for not having kept it a secret, and for having explained it in a satisfactory spirit.* In the new world, the French find obstacles at every step, and complain of Great Britain. In Portugal we see a constitution enforced or supported which threatens to overthrow Spain, and, consequently, to harass and agitate France herself. Nevertheless, it is during the existence of these grievances and their evident consequences, that Mr. Canning proposes to come to Paris. The pretext is a visit to his friend, Lord Granville; but we must not be led into error as to the motive, which is to dive into the secrets of cabinets and parties, and to leave them in uncertainty and divided.

The courage of the French Government, or rather the degree of fear with which England inspires it, is in proportion to the embarrassments which its rival experiences in her administration, and in her home-policy.

Ministers neglect nothing in order to be well informed on important subjects, and they imagine they know accurately and precisely, the evils and the difficulties which trouble Great Britain.

The commercial crisis, far from being terminated, develops and extends itself with alarming effects; and the partial suspension of its manufactures, places that part of the population which is most difficult to restrain, in the necessity, either of rising and forcing the authorities to support it, or of dying of hunger.

The Irish Catholics are assuming a menacing attitude; hence the Ministry will either yield, which amounts to a sort of revolution in the government, or increase the means of resistance, which always insure a heavy expense and great

The people want the ports to be opened for foreign corn. This change will affect the proprietors, who would have to renounce the monopoly, and the farmers, who have raised the price of beans, in the expectation of the continuance of the exclusive system.

Every three months there is a diminution in the revenue. It is true Parliament has reduced a great number of the taxes; but it is also true, that it has reckoned on having sufficient for all expenses with the product of what it has reserved. If it should be otherwise, and it is obliged to have recourse to new contributions, there will be great clamour and great difficulties.

Though all these observations do not prove that England hastens towards her ruin, yet they show, and sufficiently, that a war,—that is, an increase of expense,—united to the new difficulties which her navigation would experience, would cause sacrifices, losses, and perhaps evils equal to those that she herself would inflict.

The introduction of the Revolutionary Charter in Portugal, greatly alarms France, and has raised to its height her mistrust of England.

Whether or not Mr. Canning be the author of this dangerous innovation matters little, if he approves of it by policy or conviction, and takes every possible means to get it adopted and executed.

It would be difficult to blind ourselves to the fact, that the Revolutionary Portuguese, on one hand, are seeking to introduce their maxims and their forms of government into Spain, by all the odious expedients which are inseparable from this dangerous proselytism. On the other hand, the King and the Spanish Royalists, alarmed by the example, and irritated by the attack, will endeavour to use reprisals. Hence will ensue complaints, insults, and, finally, open

quarrels. If once confusion, and probably civil war, should commence, it will be impossible for any one to foresee the number of incidents which may result from them. If the King of Spain defends himself against the Charter, the Revolutionists would recognise some other head, possibly even that of Portugal. The question then becomes vital—it concerns the existence of the Spanish dynasty, and that of all the Bourbons. If they should ever reach this point, which is not at all impossible, what will England do after having probably detached Mina, and the party who are under her influence?

France still remembers the war of succession; as soon as the question should again arise, she will think she has reason to fear the same policy on the part of England. Prudence forbids my discussing this point at present. M. de Damas has spoken to me with such interest about it, that I presume the Council must have been engaged respecting it. This Minister has even assured me that, if necessary, his Cabinet will come to an explanation with Mr. Canning, and that it will not disguise from him, that all things are possible; that is to say, they may resort to extreme measures, and incur every risk rather than suffer events to mature, which might lead to such fatal results.

This mode of viewing matters on the part of the French Government appears to me correct with regard to its own interest, and that of all others. Though the war of succession united Europe against France, the revolutionary war would unite the Continent to France; because a change of government accompanied by a change of dynasty, would place them all in the most imminent danger.

Up to the present time, Mr. Canning has protested that he was not the author of the Portuguese Charter, but that he could not avoid recommending it, and, in fact, prescribing its adoption. We have declared that we will not be mixed up



in this unpleasant transaction, protesting, in our turn, that Great Britain ought to do all she can to prevent any attempt of the *soi-disant* Portuguese Constitutionalists or Revolutionaries from exciting the same movements in Spain.

The English Minister is aware of our moderation. We must hold fast this principle, maintained, however, with such firmness, that it will be mistaking it to doubt the consequences if it be violated.

Matters of such importance are so obvious and palpable, that sophisms are misplaced. If the English Cabinet will prescribe to the innovating government and party in Portugal not to attempt to trouble Spain, it will be obeyed; if it be otherwise, Spain must be defended. Supposing that Mr. Canning is convinced of this truth, I think two salutary effects will result from it: the first is, that Spain will not be molested; and the second, that the revolution, confined to Portugal, without the power to extend itself, and troubled by its vices and conflicting interests, will devour and destroy itself; for it will naturally perish if it cannot spread, and especially when it is circumscribed in a corner of Europe, under the weight of the disapprobation and indignation of all the Continental Governments. This plan appears to me preferable, because it does not compromise the alliance with Great Britain, because it strengthens France, the principal instrument in the struggle, and because it is adapted to re-assure Spain.

Though fully convinced, I abstained from entering into these circumstantial details, and from developing my idea, either to the French Ministry or to my Colleagues, till the communications of the Cabinets should have fixed amongst themselves the rule of conduct which they proposed to follow. This reserve on my part, has been equally occasioned by the fear of *some indiscretion, which might give to*

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*Mr. Canning the pretext to take alarm, and possibly to injure other affairs, in which it is important for us that he should act consistently, and without his ordinary tergiversations, of which he has given us many examples.*

Party spirit, the license of the press, some serious faults in the Ministers, ambition in all its forms, and the regret for the past, lead people to consider France to be in a much more perilous situation than she actually is. It is true, that all these evils exist more or less; but they are either neutralised by other causes of preservation, or their intensity is not so great as it has been represented. In the midst of the universal obstruction of European commerce, this country is perhaps the one least affected by it. It is true she feels the effect of the common distress, but finds, in her own resources, the means of meeting it, or of keeping it within tolerable bounds. Her system does not embrace the world, and does not cover the surface of the globe; if it is more contracted it is deeper, and sufficient for her. A population of thirty millions labouring on a fertile soil, brought together within a few days' march, produce, consume, exchange, and form a mass of capital from which the state draws a thousand millions yearly without constraint, and without injury to the reproductive forces of the soil. This state of things is still susceptible of great ameliorations. A ministry strong enough to attend to them, would obtain them without any great difficulty. Material prosperity influences the moral conduct of a people addicted to pleasure and enjoyments, and above all of this capital, which serves as an example to the rest of the monarchy, and tranquillity is maintained amidst the efforts made by factions to disturb it. There is an evil which M. de Villèle does not sufficiently consider,—namely, his confidence in the stability of the existing order of things, which very often renders him improvident, and emboldens him in certain faults, merely

because he has escaped from preceding ones. He unfortunately attributes his preservation to his dexterity, and as soon as he thinks it necessary, he is not deterred from attempting any favourite plan, whatever it may be. All the hazardous, and often injurious measures which he has proposed, result principally from this disposition of his mind.

The Chamber of Peers has just quashed the process concerning the markets of Bayonne. After two years' investigation, they acknowledged that the question of the State, concerned the conduct of the superior administration, and consequently of the Ministry, and not that of the victuallers. Accordingly, the King has been forced to manifest his desire to see this shameful affair buried in oblivion. He obtained this through the condescension, meritorious on this occasion, of the old Richelieu Ministry, who are in the Chambers. MM. Pasquier, Portal, Laine, Mounier, and others, voted to stop all further inquiries, a step that gained the Centre, which would have given the majority to either of the two parties with which it united. This sacrifice was dictated by the most praiseworthy sentiments, and in order not to offer, especially to England, the spectacle of a debate which would either have dropped or loosened the reigns of authority at a moment when the general policy and the interests of the State require to be represented under a more respectable aspect. It is to be hoped that the Minister of Finances may not make a bad use of their flourishing condition. After having granted a thousand millions, as indemnity to the emigrants, which was only the just expiation of a great crime, they now speak of saddling the treasury with one hundred and fifty millions, which the Negroes of St. Domingo do not pay. M. de Villèle has failed entirely in his operation; he is in the alternative either to saddle this debt on the nation, or to consider it as dishonoured. When he is put to the proof, in

my opinion, he will do neither: he will invent some specious measure, which the Deputies will adopt, and which will place them in a position to wait for and have recourse to future contingencies.

The struggle between the politico-religious party, the Jesuits, and the majority of the clergy, on the one hand, and the people on the other, becomes daily more animated. It is a dissolvent which will keep this country in interminable divisions, and which will prevent her enjoying the happiness of her position, and of contracting that feeling of security which is the fundamental basis of states.

The King begins to be afraid of the violence of his own creatures, and M. de Villèle himself told me that he was determined to oppose the progress of an evil which threatened to become intolerable. In order to give a specimen of his projects and strength, the Minister has appointed to the archbishopric of Bordeaux, a man known for his moderate opinions, and has named a similar person procureur-general at the royal court of Paris. These acts have produced a good effect; but they have roused the theocratic party, which, on its side, will neglect nothing to obtain its revenge. It is not in the character of M. de Villèle, and perhaps not in his power, to combat it desperately: it will be a conflict in which the successes and defeats will be balanced. The question will, therefore, remain open until some extraordinary circumstance places the existence of both in danger.

The Minister intended, as he said, to re-establish the censorship, but he declared that he is prevented by the public outcry, which would attribute the measure to the project of defending the Jesuits, and Ultramontanism; it is strange that two great expedients invented to re-establish order, should be the cause of maintaining license. It is a problem which experience solves daily before our eyes. The army keeps quiet,

its spirit is neither good nor bad. Routine answers the purpose of attachment and discipline in the service. It makes some slight, though almost imperceptible, progress ; as regards its sentiments, they are not very decided, and resemble those of the masses, to which it chiefly belongs. It will only obtain the character in which it is at present deficient, when the occasion offers to put it to some severe test. Prudence requires that an experience so uncertain, if not dangerous, should be avoided, or at least deferred as long as possible.

Prince Polignac, the ambassador at London, arrived here about a fortnight ago. He is the chief of the religious party, and has more than one title to the good favour of the Monarch.

His partisans encourage him to request the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. M. de Villèle opposes it, because the confidence of the Sovereign would be divided. My opinion is, that the President of the Council will triumph, if he insists on it, as it is supposed he will when it refers to the preservation of his supreme power. The introduction of M. de Polignac in the Ministry will only, in my opinion, contribute to divide and weaken it still more.

The contents of this report offer nothing new—its end is only to preserve in the Imperial Cabinet the tradition and continuation of truths which concern the policy and the interior state of France, without allowing them to be lost or confounded through a long silence and great breaks in the chain of intelligence.

The King and his Ministry will labour in general to avoid all decided situations, all perilous questions and enterprises. They will associate themselves zealously with plans tending to preserve peace, and, in this spirit, will contribute to that which will be adopted to terminate the troubles of the East. In doubtful cases, they will incline rather towards Russia, because it is the sole Power from which they apprehend no

evil, and because they flatter themselves that we form a similar judgment of them.

Respecting the affairs of the Peninsula, they feel the necessity of avoiding an overthrow in Spain, and fear that this misfortune may result from the example of Portugal, and at the direct or indirect instigation of England. In this attitude they would have united, I think, in any system in which the Continental Powers could agree, in order to prevent and to stop the revolution which menaces to show itself again in that part of Europe, which is unfortunately the most exposed to it.

As to the conduct of the same policy in details, and above all, in secondary questions, it is often inconsiderate; for want of experience, and especially of persons possessing capacity. M. de Villèle himself confessed to me, that except the Count de Laferronaye, they had not at any of the great Courts a single person equal to his duties.

The manner of acting in order to preserve the influence needed in serious emergencies, in a state of affairs and a Cabinet composed like that of France, requires much circumspection. Their self-love must be humoured, and other weaknesses, when they do not affect the essential interest of affairs; and we must especially enter into their public and private interests, when we wish to determine them to take some serious resolution. *By observing this rule, I hope they will not deviate from the path which our august Master desires to see them follow.*

Advice respecting internal affairs is more difficult to give, unless it is demanded. There is no doubt, that since the existence of the present Ministry, France has been agitated about questions which ought not to have been raised.

The religious and penitential dispositions of the King,

have resuscitated all the discussions which the age no longer comprehends, and which France understands still less than any other nation. In order to prepare her more effectually for heaven, they risk alienating her from the King without drawing her nearer to God. It is a malady excited by ambition in support of holy ideas. It worries the State, and takes from Government the confidence of disposing of its resources. This evil will last a long time ; for the moment, though serious, it is not extreme. It is to be hoped it will never become so.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, Monsieur le Comte, your Excellency's very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed)

POZZO DI BORGO.

### THE ENSLAVING OF POLAND BY RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY.\*

CATHERINE II., having placed, in 1764, Stanislaus Poniatowsky upon the throne of Poland, commenced, some days after the election of the new King, her negotiation with the Republic, in favour of the Polish Dissenters. She was induced to do this, she said, "by the most respectable interest, which united her to the inhabitants of that Republic professing the same religion with herself."

This intervention, which was officially renewed during four consecutive Diets, and followed up by all kinds of intrigues, finished by leading to that which was the real object of this famous Russian Protectorate, the enslaving and partition of Poland. This end attained, the cause of the Dissenters was put aside.

We shall now present a series of documents, for the most part unpublished, which will furnish at all times precious materials for political studies, and which, *à fortiori*, in the actual situation of Europe, are of a nature to offer a subject of serious reflection to those minds which are anxious respecting the future.

But in order more easily to appreciate all that is most offensive, hypocritical, and absurd, in this religious intervention of Russia in Poland, it seems to us essential to bring forward some characteristic traits of the religious spirit amongst the two nations, such, especially, as it has manifested itself at all times in the acts of their respective Governments.

\* This introductory section is written by the Polish Editor of the French version.



The Russian Church, which claims for itself the title of orthodox, is the true offspring of that of Constantinople; it preserves her two distinctive features: like the Church of Constantinople, it denies its mother; like her, it is the docile slave of the secular power. At the time of the invasion of the Tartars, it was the slave of its Pagan masters. The great dignitaries of the Russian Church made then, as well as their Princes, forced pilgrimages to the Great Horde, to receive the orders which had for them the authority of a supreme law. It is a well-established fact, that the great Khans have powerfully contributed to the propagation of Russian orthodoxy; for, having granted to its clergy a redemption of the poll-tax, many of the nobles felt a vocation for the church; so that, from the rule of the Tartars, dates the increase of convents in Muscovy.

If there be any sure and faithful index of the religious spirit of a nation, it is undoubtedly the history of its saints. The Muscovite orthodoxy only reckons one, Saint Alexander Newski, the contemporary of Saint Louis, King of France. Now this saint was neither martyr nor crusader, although opportunities were most certainly not wanting to him to be so. Whilst his country was oppressed beneath the Tartar yoke, the only great action of his life was an irruption upon the Swedish territory, and a brilliant victory gained on the banks of the Neva. The great enemy of Russia, the Khan of the Tartars, inspired him only with the most degrading submission, and none other of the Russian princes have ever made so many journeys to the Great Horde. "The lieutenant of the Khan," we quote Karamsin, "exacted that Novgorod should pay the tribute;" and the hero of the Neva, to his sorrow, was charged with this painful mission. Accompanied by the Tartars placed over him, "Alexander went to Novgorod to fulfil the fatal duty. At this news, the inhabit-

ants were filled with fear. In vain some among them, such as the Possadnik, endeavoured to persuade them that all resistance would prove useless. The people put the Possadnik to death. The young Vassili, son of Alexander, himself set out for Pskof, declaring that he would no longer obey a father *who brought chains and disgrace to free men*. . . . The great Prince, irritated by the disobedience of his son, had him arrested at Pskof. He mercilessly executed all the boyars, perfidious counsellors of Vassili: some had *their eyes dug out, others their nose cut off*," etc.

Whatever virtues may have adorned the life of such a Prince, we certainly do not find in him that exaltation of the human soul, which surrounds with its glory the chosen spirits of Catholic Christianity.

After the dissolution of the Tartar power, the Russian Church remained as much as ever in its state of subjection. "The Grand Duke of Muscovy," wrote Skarga in 1577, "does not send his metropolitan to Constantinople to receive investiture there—he invests him himself. He alone punishes him—he alone puts him to death when it seems to him best. The example of the master is followed by the inferior classes. The Russian clergy is placed in an anomalous condition by the side of the laity. It is the laity who control the doctrine; for, in truth, they are more learned than the ecclesiastics."

A Swedish theologian, John Bothwidi, a Protestant bishop of Linköping, published at Stockholm, in 1620, a work under this title—*Utrum Muscovitæ sint Christiani?* and he must have had reasons for his plausible scepticism; for a church which is only ruled by a secular and despotic power, invariably loses all sanctity, and all spiritual elevation; and is, in reality, only a tissue of religious pomps and ceremonies. For example, the piety of Ivan III. was not at all fitted to prove his Christianity. This Czar had carried his orthodoxy

to such a length as to "transform his palace into a monastery, and his favourites into monks." At three in the morning, he went to ring a bell for matins; during the service he prayed with so much fervour, that the marks of his prostrations were always left on his forehead; whilst dining, he read some salutary instructions aloud; the remains of the repast were given to the poor; at night, he went into the prisons *to apply the torture to the prisoners, and he returned with his countenance beaming with content.*" (Karamsin.)

If Ivan, stimulated by his ferocious temperament, exaggerated his orthodox practices, it is no less true, that this orthodoxy of forms has never ceased to characterise the state religion in Russia.

We do not wish to be supposed to represent the religious dispositions of a whole nation in an unfavourable point of view, because we have just given evidence of the materialism of the Russian orthodoxy. We reject this suspicion from the very bottom of our heart.

A Russian who is spiritually-minded, may, in the simplicity of his heart, or in an enthusiastic rapture of thought, sanctify his religious practices by the most pure devotional feeling; the Russian popes may, through an honourable exception, be able to raise their souls towards the lofty regions of their vocation; but in proportion as we shall admire these exceptions, we shall also detest that iniquitous system which degrades the sublimest attribute of the human soul to the disgraceful service of a policy so frequently immoral and criminal.

There are two circumstances of great importance which combine in making the church docile to the government—the absence of preaching in the church and the degraded state of the clergy. The orthodox church in Russia has no pulpit; it does not explain to the people either its

dogmas or its morals. An official catechism, in which the name of the Czar stands by the side of the name of God, forms the whole of its religious instruction. Its advocates attempt to justify the system by the fear lest preaching should create heresies in the bosom of the church.

What a strange idea of Christianity ! No ; it is only the fear of inflicting an injury on the orthodoxy of despotism, by free speech uttered in the name of the Gospel, which has in Russia reduced to a cipher the most noble vocation of the ministers of religion. As to the condition of the Russian popes : who has not heard of their scandalous lives, of their ignorance ? In order to give some examples of this, the nature of the subject will make us descend to coarseness :—“ Hold your tongue, you brute,” said, one day, the Emperor Alexander to an intoxicated protopope, who wanted to address him in a religious ceremony ; “ and give me your hand.” He then embraced him with humility, to the edification of the multitude, who, from a distance, admired the devotion of the Czar.

This well-authenticated anecdote sufficiently characterises both the people and the ruler. The popes meddle, sometimes, in theological disputes. In an assembly of that nature, the discussion turned on the two kinds of transubstantiation. As wine is rare in Russia, an innovator ventured to propose brandy in its stead ; the majority raised a hue and cry against this indignity. “ Bah !” interrupted a pope, who was a practical theologian ; “ I have tried it, and think it will answer the purpose.”

The despotism which the Russian Government exercises over its ecclesiastics is sometimes manifested in objects for which the people entertain the highest veneration. The Polish Ukraine having fallen to the portion of Russia, the Poles remarked, amongst the Russian functionaries who came to take possession of the country, a great number of images

of St. Nicholas, which the popes were hawking about from village to village, in order, by this means, to exact contributions. It happened that at Berdytchow, during one of the now celebrated fairs which are held in that city, one of these wandering images, hawked about in a street to the sound of a bell, frightened the horses of the carriage of a rich Polish lord, M. Grocholski, and the carriage was upset. The Pole rushed upon the pope, gave him a good caning, and broke the image of St. Nicholas to pieces. This scandal was soon magnified into a state offence, for St. Nicholas is almost as God Himself in the eyes of the Muscovites; almost every hut is adorned with his image. To lessen the crime, the most effectual means were taken to prove to the police that the Pole was intoxicated at the time he committed the sacrilege. This happened in the reign of Paul I., whose character, a compound of atrocious tyranny and of the noblest sentiments, can only be explained by the continual conflict that was excited in the mind of this man, by traditional crimes which were become maxims of state, in perpetual struggle with the celestial light of eternal justice. All the province awaited with anxiety the decision of the Autocrat in this affair. The thunder burst forth in these laconic terms :—"The Lord Grocholski is forbidden to get drunk; St. Nicholas is forbidden to be a vagabond."

This government protection of the orthodox religion, which the Russian policy, with so much ostentation, and so much bad faith, offers to foreigners, weighs only too heavily upon its own church, and upon the afflicted souls of the best part of its nation.

Symptoms of impatience have presented themselves at all times. Under the Czar Alexis, the Patriarch Nikon conceived the idea of a reform in the constitution of the church. Being summoned to appear before a synod, he refused to

acknowledge that jurisdiction, and maintained that the Pope of Rome alone had the right of judging him; in consequence of this, he was banished to a castle on the banks of the Volga, where he died in expiation of his projects. We know that the bondage of the Russian church was finally consummated under Peter I., by the establishment of the Very Holy Synod; which, as it has been correctly styled, is a real political office, directed by an imperial agent, often an officer of the army. To give an idea of the orthodox spirit, and *of the tolerance, of the founder of this Synod*, we cannot avoid, here, relating the following event:—

In 1705, during the war against Charles XII., the Czar Peter I. arrived with his army at Polock, a city of Poland, of which he was the ally and friend, according to the stipulations of a recent treaty. Immediately on his arrival, the schismatic popes entertained him with complaints against the Basilian brotherhood—monks of the united Greek religion—who, by their donations and their influence, excited the jealousy of the schismatic clergy. The ferocious character of the Czar, exasperated by his recent defeats, burst forth into fury. Surrounded by his staff, he ran to the cathedral of St. Sophia at the moment the Basilians were chanting vespers, and there, drawing his sword, he fell upon the Abbot Theophanus Kolbieczynski, the first Basilian whom he met, and smote him dead at the foot of the altar of St. Joseph. At the same time, he caused the Abbot Kizikowski, the superior of the order, with two other Basilians, to be seized and hanged. This done, he delivered up the cathedral and the monastery to be pillaged by his soldiers.\*

\* These facts are related, in all their horrible details, in a Polish work, full of learning, by the Abbé Stebelski, printed, without any date (probably towards the year 1780), in three volumes, at Wilna, under the title: —*Dwa Światła na horyzoncie Polockim*, etc.; that is, “Two lights upon

We will abstain, at this time, from presenting a multitude of facts which occur to us, showing the violence, the rapine, and cruelties, which the Russian orthodoxy has exercised many times in Poland. All this does not prevent the Russian Government from proclaiming everywhere, and always, that it acts only in the spirit of the Gospel. King George III. having one day asked the Russian Ambassador, Count Woronzow, who was then at London, why the Jews were not admitted at St. Petersburg, the Count, after a moment's reflection, replied with perfect seriousness:—"Sire, it is because they crucified our Lord Jesus Christ!"

It is then under the inspiration of this orthodox religion, which only promotes the political designs of Russia, that Catherine II., a Protestant by birth, a schismatic by her position as Czarina, philosophical from design, after having inaugurated her reign by actions opposed to religion and morality, conceived the idea of a religious intervention in Poland.

We know the teacher and his doctrines; let us pass now to the unhappy pupil. Poland, emerging from the shades of barbarism, enters the field of history, independent and Christian. It would be difficult to find in the annals of the world, a more pious nation, or a more honest government. It was her glory—it has become her ruin—it is her hope. Martyrdom does not kill the soul. Christian and free, Poland was always

the horizon of Polock; or, the Lives of St. Euphrosyne and St. Parasceva," etc. This work having been mostly destroyed by the interested party, copies of it are, at this present time, very rare. One is now in the Polish library in Paris. The hand of a pious painter has retraced the recollection of this horrible martyrdom of the Basilians, in a picture which was preserved for a long time in the sacristy of the cathedral at Polock, probably till the Russians occupied it after the partition of Poland.

tolerant. Religious fervour may sometimes have drawn her into some blameable excesses; but against some days of forgetfulness she can produce ages of charity. The severe regulations against innovators at the beginning of the Reformation, did not long hold out before the liberties of the country. If King Sigismund I. punished with death some Dantzic innovators, he made them suffer for a violent revolt that they had excited under the pretext of religious reform. Deeply pious, a sincere Catholic, endowed by the Holy See with the privilege of suspending the interdict, through the mere fact of his presence wherever he entered, he never aspired to the character of a persecutor of consciences. His contemporary, Henry VIII., a tyrant and theologian, had just launched his famous philippic against Luther. The celebrated Professor Eckius, in dedicating one of his works to the King of Poland, invited him to follow Henry's example. The answer of Sigismund to Eckius has been preserved, breathing all the spirit of evangelical elevation and purity. He writes as follows: "The sciences, which not long since were buried in oblivion, are renewed in our times. Ages succeed one another, and the spirit of governments modifies itself according to the exigencies of the time. Formerly, ignorance produced crimes: now they spring up in the broad day-light of learning. Let Henry write against Martin; thou and Krzycki may address to him the praises he deserves. For my part, let me be king of sheep and goats. I pray the Most High that He will deign to sanctify the literary taste of Leo X., by adding to it the piety of Leo I. For otherwise, if it should happen that in the bosom of Christianity, corruption is made to pass for good morals, scandal for edification, hatred for brotherly love—that fatal time would come, when the kings of the people, and the shepherds of the Lord's fold, would present themselves to the world cased in threatening steel, and the



altars of the true God would be degraded to serve in the worship of blasphemy, against virtue and faith." Stephen Bathory, after his glorious expedition to Muscovy, in the instructions addressed to the nation, assembled in the Diet, after recommending them to return thanks to the God of victories, submits religious affairs to their deliberations in these terms: "Although his Majesty," such is the passage, "would be happy to see, and also ardently desired, that all the citizens of his States should profess one single and ancient religion, and that they should uniformly praise the all-powerful God: still, as in these latter times, by the permission of God, men have been excited through an exaggerated zeal in matters of belief, we have taken measures and established laws, in order that this schism may not cause troubles or destroy the national unity. In order to complete our legislation, it is only necessary to regulate our procedures with respect to those who would infringe these laws and persecute their fellow-citizens on account of the difference of their creeds." Whilst in Germany a fierce war, waged in the name of the God of mercy, made that country a prey to fire and sword, awarding despotic authority to the conqueror, whether Catholic or Protestant, a religious revolution was taking place in Poland by the sole power of true piety and the evangelical gentleness with which Sigismund III. adorned the throne of the Republic. The Polish aristocracy, which from the first were inoculated by the German doctrines, yielded by degrees to the influence of the King, and returned to the faith of their fathers. True liberty, the indissoluble bond of nationality, and the source of national life, were thus saved. Nevertheless, the Dissenters insisted on enjoying full liberty of conscience, and even political rights; they assembled their synods, founded their schools, composed their theological works, and it was precisely under this reign, which they de-

nounced as intolerant, that the Socinians printed at Rakow those impious works, which now pass for bibliographical rarities. But the sects, weakened in reality, though admirably trained as they were by their theological struggles in the art of sapping the authority of the church, began to attack the authority of the throne, and prepared against Sigismund III. that tissue of calumnies which was alike opposed to patriotism and truth. It is to his steady piety that the loss of two crowns has been attributed. A strange and mistaken regret! For in what way could this accession of kingdoms have contributed to the happiness of Poland, which only required, in order to be great and happy, the strict observance of the advice given by a holy hermit of Mount St. Valerian, near Paris, in the time of Henry IV., to an illustrious Pole: "*Timete Deum, honorate reges,*" without giving any answer to any other questions. Providence soon rewarded the wisdom of Sigismund, even during his life. During a Diet in his reign, at the same place of meeting in which the backsliders, rising from their seats, fulminated their accusations against the throne, some years later a Czar of Muscovy stood a captive demanding the clemency of Sigismund,—a brilliant triumph, which imprinted this high lesson in the records of Poland, that her most religious, was also her most successful King. At his death, Sigismund left the Republic greater, more Catholic, and more united than ever, and his son succeeded him as peacefully on the throne as if it had been bequeathed to him by inheritance, notwithstanding some tricks of the Dissenters. A very popular work, attractive in its style, splendid and fervent in thought, has rendered the name of John Sobieski familiar to every one. In this reign, Poland was in a state of complete anarchy. The genius of the King was not sufficient to provide for herself alone; how could it then be expected that she could afford succour to others? Nevertheless, this miracle was

accomplished at the cry of: "Save Christendom." The King, the Diet, the Nation, formerly in continual disputes with each other, suddenly became united as by enchantment. At the end of three months, a period which in our days would not suffice to arrange a note of problematic protection, the Polish army was concentrated, marched to the rescue, Vienna was saved, and the most marvellous crusade was crowned with the most matchless victory.

Nevertheless, the Dissenters and Schismatics, drawn on by their heinous passions, yielding to foreign suggestions, abusing the leniency of Government, often proved by their conduct that they little deserved the liberties and privileges which they enjoyed in Poland. They showed themselves always, with few exceptions, at the head of the opposition; they finished by being the partners in treason. At the moment when the Republic, under John Casimir, was overwhelmed with the greatest disasters, when the Swedes, the Muscovites, and the Transylvanians, invaded her simultaneously, the Dissenters, though forming a weak minority of the population, betrayed the most sacred duties, by taking part with the external enemy. Their conduct provoked in its turn measures of safety. The Diet of 1658, restored to its vigour the ancient statute of Ladislaus Jagellon against the heretics; and the Socinians, declared allies of Charles Augustus of Sweden, the invader of Poland, were proscribed. When later, as a sequel of the unfortunate treaty of Augustus II. with Peter I., a new irruption of Swedes and Muscovites brought Poland to the brink of ruin, the nation, exasperated, attributed, not without reason, all these evils to her Protestant or Schismatic neighbours. An armed confederation was formed. During two years, a disastrous war ravaged the country,—a singular war of the Poles against the Saxon troops of their own King, which finished by a mediation of the worst augury.

Peter I., who, by his alliance with Augustus II., had opened the source to all these evils, was blindly called, by the confederates themselves, jealous of their liberties, to become the pacifier of Poland, and hastened to seize this opportunity. The treaty between the confederates and the King, signed at Warsaw, the 3rd of November, 1717, and ratified by a mute Diet, stipulated the retreat of the Saxon troops from the country, and established peace. It is to be remarked, that this treaty, whose negotiations were actively directed by Prince Dolgoruki, a plenipotentiary of the Czar, materially narrowed the liberties of the Polish Dissenters; but it reduced, on the other hand, the army of this vast country to two thousand four hundred men, and it was ratified (unparalleled imprudence!) by the Diet of a free country, without any discussion. It is since this epoch, that the Muscovite supremacy has been established without control in Poland.

At the death of Augustus II., when the Muscovite schism concentrated its armies in order to protect the liberties of the Republic and the election of the new King, the Diet of Convocation, seeking to purge the conscience of the Legislature from dangerous suggestions, closed the entrance of the Diet and tribunals of the Republic to the Dissenters and Schismatics, with a severe prohibition against seeking the protection of the stranger. The free exercise of their religion, however, was not taken from them, and in this respect they have always enjoyed an uncontested right.

It is against this exclusion of the Dissenters from the Legislature of the State, into which they brought a deleterious element, a measure of precaution which was taken also by other civilised States of Europe, and which contained in itself no violation of conscience, that Catherine II. directed her first intervention in Poland. A particular circumstance occurred which admirably assisted the designs of the Czarina.

It is known that the Saxon family, at the commencement of the Reformation, exercised a decided influence upon its establishment. Luther was born in Saxony, in Saxony he proclaimed and propagated his doctrine, and the Elector of Saxony protected it by his arms. Bernard of Saxe-Weimar was the first, during the thirty years' war, who placed himself under the flag of Gustavus Adolphus, and became his active and fortunate support. At the end of the seventeenth century, one of the descendants of these Protestant heroes, Frederic Augustus, Elector of Saxony, entered into the pale of the Church through a providential interposition of Catholic Poland. This event could not but disconcert the Protestant States. France and Austria took advantage of it, to impose still harder conditions on the Protestants of the Empire, at the peace of Ryswick in 1697. The evening before the signature, William III., King of England, wrote to Heinsius, the Great Pensionary of Holland: "Our duty requires us rather to continue the war, than to consent to the smallest restriction with regard to the exercise of the reformed religion in the Empire . . . but we are wanting in the assistance of Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland, and what is more, we have *just lost Saxony*." The English Government, affected by this conversion, and by the consequences which it foresaw, sought at least to dissuade the Prince-Royal of Poland; and it employed agents, and a correspondence was carried on to that effect, but to no purpose. Poland having thus occasioned the defection from Protestantism of a dynasty which had laid its foundation, naturally drew on itself the ill-will of all the Protestant States. Accordingly, this predisposition on their part showed itself on the occasion of the unhappy affair at Thorn, in 1724, where, in consequence of a regular trial, and a judgment confirmed by the Diet, the accused being found guilty, were condemned and executed. As the criminals in

this affair were Protestants, the States professing this religion all hastened, on the occasion of a criminal trial exclusively connected with the local courts, to molest the Polish Government with their notes and representations, and Peter I. made himself conspicuous at the head of these preachers of clemency. If, added to this circumstance, which has contributed to impress the Protestants with unfavourable ideas of Poland, we call to mind the anti-religious spirit of the age, and the sarcasms of Voltaire against Catholicism, at that time so relished by the public, we shall easily understand how everything conspired to assist the great designs of the Czarina.

The State of Poland before the accession of Stanislaus Augustus to the throne, presented the most distressing picture of a complete political dissolution. Since the election of Augustus III., decided against Leszczyński by an armed intervention of the Czarina Anne, to the great detriment of the French influence, the Russian troops constantly occupied the territory of the Republic under various pretexts. The prolonged peace which Poland had enjoyed during fifty years, had occasioned her more evils than the seventy years of disastrous war which preceded them. Augustus III. neither reigned nor governed in Poland, which lingered on, so to speak, without knowing it. He felt himself the vassal of Russia, and Brühl, his prime minister, was only an agent of the Chancellor Bestuchew. The Poles were thankful for the peace which procured them the enjoyments of private life, which kept them in a state of indifference respecting the future, and saved them from all solicitude and sacrifice for the public good. They thought their liberties were guaranteed, as long as they could dissolve their Diets and hinder their Government. In this golden age of the Republic, the Diet and the Government seemed to them pernicious, or at least useless, things ; and the

result of the long peace, which is considered to save civilisation, was this deceptive happiness covering men's minds and arms with rust, and ultimately occasioning a complete prostration of all the forces of the State.

Stanislaus Poniatowski, a distinguished member of the family and powerful party of the Czartoryskis, educated in those political views which had been for a long time fostered and propagated in the country by this family, became king alike through the influence of this party, and by the will of the Czarina, and ascended the throne with the truly royal determination of reconstituting in Poland both State and Government. The commencement of his reign was signalised by a wise and productive activity, which developed the germs of all the elements of political life. Diets, ministries, tribunals, all the branches of administration, all the principles of physical and intellectual strength, advanced at a rapid pace. The most precious fruit of these efforts was, that Poland recovered the consciousness of her own existence—the most deeply-seated feeling of a nation's life—and became alive to a sense of duty, of devotion, and of honour: the connecting link between the soul of the citizen and the destiny of his country. This consciousness, which then vivified Poland, emerging from her long lethargy, was never lost again; it has survived the most terrible catastrophes, unheard-of humiliations, the partition of the country, *and it has resisted*, as has been remarked by a cool observer from his throne, *time and all its vicissitudes*.\*

But in this glorious mission, Stanislaus Augustus had to struggle against his two implacable enemies,—1st, The Republican party, which, careless about the future, only paid

\* See the Speech delivered by King Louis Philippe, at the opening of the Chambers, the 23rd of July, 1831.

court to those pernicious liberties, which, whilst they flatter the individual, destroy the Republic; and 2nd, Catherine II., his benefactress, who jealously watched, with an eagle eye, over the future of Poland, and was very wroth if she discovered there the shadow of a hinderance to the ambitious designs of Russia.

These two enemies of the King, separated by the hatred which divides liberty from slavery, were attracted by a common sympathy—the desire of maintaining anarchy in Poland.

Catherine II. knew beforehand the projects of the Czartoryski family; and although quite decided, from many particular reasons, to favour the election of Poniatowski, she had taken precautions against the danger she foresaw, by a treaty of alliance with Prussia, the secret and principal article of which we shall introduce in the sequel. But at first she preferred acting alone. Her Ambassador at Warsaw, Prince Repnin, was commissioned to represent, with much noise and bullying, the protectorate and supremacy which Russia had arrogated to herself during fifty years in Poland, guaranteeing to her peace and degradation. Repnin was furnished with all the instruments of success. He had troops at hand and money at his disposal; and, above all, an assortment of declarations and manifestoes, in which each act of violence was veiled by the most touching and positive assurances of the integrity of the possessions of the Republic—of the most constant and disinterested friendship of the Czarina. It must never be forgotten that Russia alone has the secret of committing violence *by legal means*. Unhappy those with whom she begins to negotiate! Repnin succeeded admirably: conformably to his instructions, he managed to annul the authority of the King—to neutralise all firm characters—to intimidate the weak—to corrupt the cowardly. Poland



was destitute of alliances, of finances, and without armies ; she only possessed them in embryo ; and in order that the sacred fire of national life, which had only just begun to be kindled, might not be extinguished, it was necessary to yield to the pressure of force and the snares of duplicity. Perhaps she cherished a hope that there might be some truth in the declarations of the Empress, whom the world incessantly applauded as great and magnanimous. Poland would not negotiate : she fell.

Catherine began to put her designs in execution by assuming the protectorate of the Schismatics and Dissenters. She thus gave weight to her fellow-worshippers in Poland ; she gained the applause of Europe ; she attached the Protestant States to herself ; and, above all, she brought trouble on Poland, which was genuinely Catholic. The Diet of 1766 replied with dignity to this dangerous intervention. It confirmed, by an enactment, tolerance for Dissenters, but opposed, by its silence, a final refusal to their legislative pretensions. Stanislaus Augustus, in a private correspondence, amidst the compulsory phrases of politeness, strove in vain to justify the proceedings of the Diet to Catherine, by strong and solid reasoning. The answer of the Czarina, obscure and illogical, was marked, on the one hand, by an icy coldness, and, on the other, by a haughty and menacing obstinacy.

Little embarrassed by the legal negative, Catherine set aside both the Diet and the King. She decided to act alone ; and at first through the Schismatics and the Dissenters. Manifestoes were published at St. Petersburg, filled with the complaints of those Polish subjects whom no one thought of persecuting. Confederations were proved to exist there, when as yet nothing was known about them in the country. These confederations were formed at length by means of a heavy tax on the poor Dissenters, and the effect was deplorable. They

show clearly the small number of these imaginary martyrs, who had caused so much noise. Nevertheless, the Czarina prepared a decisive and unfailing blow on the part of the Dissenters. She introduced into her declarations the solution of the enigma addressed to the Republicans. She pointed with her finger to the frightful enormity of the party of the Czartoryskis. "The true patriots," says she, "have deeply lamented this alteration in the principles of government, and the obstacles to the freedom of voting introduced by the majority . . . and it has been effected through the attempts of a party decided to gain the supremacy over a free country, and that would raise its power upon the ruins of public liberty. . . . If ambition has already gained a superiority sufficiently decisive to paralyse an independent assembly so contrary to its views, her Imperial Majesty invites all noble Poles who consider the safety of their liberty as important, to unite with her."

It is easy to conceive the enthusiasm of the Republicans, excited by declarations emanating from the exalted wisdom of so powerful a protectress; it was at its height when Repnin insinuated to some of his friends, who were not very discreet, the possibility of forfeiture. The Republicans fell in a mass into this snare; respectable men suffered themselves to be taken in; and even the lofty soul of Soltik, bishop of Cracow, yielded itself. A general confederation, crowding under the banner of Catholicism and liberty, was constituted at Radom in 1767. Radziwill, a bitter enemy of Russia and of the King, a Republican of the old stock, became its marshal. The blindness of these confederates was such, that they did not even take notice of the passage of the Russian declaration, where it is said: "That her Majesty has commanded the reinforcement of that corps of her troops which remained in Poland since the interregnum, in order to prevent

disorder. . . .” They did not perceive it till the moment when, in order to enter their chamber of deliberations at Radom, they were obliged to clear a road through the Muscovite bayonets, and beheld, at the side of their marshal, a Russian colonel placed on guard.

The Confederation of Radom, summoned in the name of the Catholic religion, attended, in fact, to nothing but the Schismatics and Protestants, and sanctioned their admission to all political rights. It was soon converted into a Diet, and was transported to Warsaw, still accompanied by the military cortege, under whose auspices it continued its deliberations. It was then that, to crown her work in a more solemn manner, Russia exacted a new treaty from Poland. The old treaties existed, and sufficed for all the relations established between the two States. Whilst the Czartoryskis were in power, they had already persuaded Russia to desist from these vexatious propositions. But now Poland was reduced to negotiate; the seal of ignominy must be put on this slavish legislature; and as the discussion in full Diet, in spite of all this appearance of intimidation, would have been lengthened out, they transferred, at the request of Repnin, all the powers of the Diet to a committee, which pusillanimously hastened to decree about all that is most sacred in the life of a nation: its independence, its religion, its constitution, its honour, and its good sense. The party of the Czartoryskis, the party for the regeneration of Poland, reduced by this outbreak of Republicanism to impotency, reserving its hopes for a distant future, bent its head. Some senators of the contrary party, more impatient, atoning nobly for their errors, raised an independent voice. They were immediately arrested, and sent into the heart of Muscovy.

The nation, exasperated, flew to arms. The struggle of the Confederation of Bar was prolonged for five years. It

could only be profitable to Russia; it ruined and devastated the country, and finally it brought on the partition.

Degradation was the object and the effect of the Russian friendship and of the Russian protectorate. To impose your own terms, in contempt of rights, is to degrade a country: to degrade is to subjugate. After the treaty of 1768, the partitions were only a consequence. Europe remained silent at the cries of distress sent forth by Poland. Napoleon the Great was yet in his cradle.\*

Amongst the documents which follow, we shall find some extracts from diplomatic despatches. The profound indifference that will be observed in them regarding the most decisive question in Europe, will overwhelm the reader with astonishment. The most criminal act in the history of the Christian world, accomplished without trouble and in perfect security on the part of Russia, has cast a shadow of bad augury upon the Cabinets of the West. Very soon this shadow thickened, and was converted into a cloud big with tempests. Poland submitted to the partitions under the sanction of the apathy of Europe, which, in leaving a free course to violence, has thus prepared her own dangers.

Behold a new victim sinking in the present day beneath the snares and the arms of Russia. Europe seems at last to be rousing from her apathy; but the forces of the West are stricken with impotence. A cowardly and causeless discouragement neutralises the obstacles which the most powerful and civilised states could effectively oppose to the ambition of the Czars. By the melancholy reasoning of materialism,

\* We borrow this passage from the celebrated sermon of the Abbé Woroniez, who was later Archbishop of Warsaw, pronounced on the occasion of the consecration of the eagles of the Polish army, organising under the auspices of France.

people resign themselves to everything; and already, at the present time, the most eminent writers broach the question of the dissolution of Turkey, and always overwhelming Russia with their civilities, exclaim, as formerly the victims devoted to the wild beasts: "*Ave, Czar! morituri te salutant!*"

It matters not—Poland does not despair of life!

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE EMPRESS OF  
ALL THE RUSSIAS AND THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

DATED ST. PETERSBURG, 11TH APRIL (31ST MARCH), 1764.

PRELIMINARY NOTE.

THE name of Poland reminds us of the word anarchy, and by a natural association of ideas, we are led to form a summary judgment, which explains, and perhaps justifies, the destiny that weighs upon this unhappy nation. Nevertheless, is this judgment based upon a fundamental knowledge of the case? Has Polish society in its own nature been hopelessly steeped in anarchy? Has it perished, merely the victim to its internal troubles? We are quite certain that every serious man of good faith would answer those questions by a negative, if he would only thoroughly study the history of Poland; and certainly the subject is worth the trouble.

It cannot be denied that the constitution of the Polish republic, already vitiated by a Utopian liberalism, established two fruitful sources of anarchy—the *election of Kings*, and the *liberum veto*. The first of these privileges, which was held, in the eyes of the Poles, for the safeguard of their liberties, necessarily mixed up the foreigner in the vital affairs of the state. The *liberum veto*, on the other hand, which Poland in her decline preserved as *the apple of her eye*, made it almost impossible to govern there. These were, undoubtedly, culpable extravagances, but they were extravagances

of that sacred and inextinguishable desire for liberty, without which the history of man would only be natural history. Instead of contempt, do we not rather owe some sympathy—some green spot in our memory, to this bold Republic, which in the midst of despotic neighbours, and, at one period, surrounded by universal despotism in Europe, alone preserved intact the most precious treasure of humanity? You hail with joy the precocious flower of spring, which bursts through the snow, and opens to the sun, at the risk of dying beneath the cold north wind, and the absurd idea never occurs to you of cursing the soil that gave it birth.

If the abuses which the Poles have made of their liberties have been pernicious and blameable, the public spirit of the nation, which, notwithstanding the defects of its constitution, so long succeeded in maintaining an often brilliant existence, deserves the attention of every conscientious thinker. The *élite* of the nation, braving the popular prejudices, have often been on the point of introducing salutary ameliorations into the constitution, and each time the hand of a foreigner has hastened to destroy the work. One of the boldest acts of this nature was attempted in the eighteenth century, by the family of the Princes Czartoryski, and nominally by the two brothers, Prince Augustus, Palatine of Russia, and Prince Michael, Grand Chancellor of Lithuania. Catherine knew their projects, and, at first, encouraged them; but she soon took precautions by the secret article of a treaty concluded with Frederick II. Is it possible to imagine a more contemptible crime than this plot of two powerful Courts—than this contract, made with premeditation and a cynical solemnity, against an unhappy and inoffensive neighbour, struggling in the wreck—a plot and contract destined to wrest from him the plank of safety, and to plunge him into the abyss? But by the side of this scandalous Machiavelism, is it not also

singular to see the part which France then played? The Cabinet of Versailles foresaw well enough the consequences of the aggrandisement of Russia; it saw with pain its own influence in the north diminished, and perfectly understood that it could only be re-established by Poland. What did it do then? In order to make its policy dominant in Poland, it kindled and encouraged civil war; to strengthen it, it supported the favourers of abuses fatal to the Republic; to thwart the plans of Russia, it only did that which must hasten their accomplishment. In vain did Stanislaus Augustus, by a sure and secret agent, call for free and decided assistance from the Cabinet of Versailles; in vain did he promise that in that case he would make common cause with the Confederates of Bar. Choiseul would listen to nothing.

The noble historian who has drawn a striking picture of these struggles of Poland, has been doubly wrong in placing the word *anarchy* on the title-page of his work; for, in the first place, anarchy is not the fundamental subject of which he treats, but the plotting of despotic governments against a republic—a plot of three against one—an impious plot, which would have been sufficient, when promoted by the cowardly apathy of other European Cabinets, to annihilate the strongest and best-governed state. Besides, Rulhière, as historian of the Cabinet which acted in Poland only in furtherance of anarchy, and in opposition to reform, should not have stigmatised, by the title of his work, the republican system, which in the French policy, as well as in the contents of his history, rouses only his sympathies. However this may be, we are certain that the document which follows will disarm the austere judges of their severity with regard to an unfortunate nation, which has so well deserved public liberties, even by the impressive instruction that she presents of the disastrous effects of their abuse.



## SECRET ARTICLE.\*

As it is for the interest of his Majesty the King of Prussia and of her Majesty the Empress of all the Russias, to use all their efforts to support the Republic of Poland in her right of free election, and that it should not be permitted to any one to render the said kingdom hereditary in his family, or to make himself absolute there,—his Majesty the King of Prussia and her Imperial Majesty have promised, and are mutually engaged, and in the strongest manner, by this secret article, not only to prevent any one from depriving the Republic of Poland of her right of free election, of rendering the kingdom hereditary, or to make himself absolute there, in all cases where it might happen; but also, to prevent and annihilate, by all possible means, and with one common agreement, the views and designs which might tend to this end, as soon as they shall be discovered, and, in case of need, to have even recourse to arms to guarantee the Republic from an overthrow of its constitution and its fundamental laws.

This present secret article will have the same force and vigour as if it were inserted, word for word, in the principal treaty of the definite alliance signed to-day, and will be ratified at the same time.

To ratify this, two similar copies have been made, which we, Plenipotentiary Ministers of his Majesty the King of Prussia and her Majesty the Empress of all the Russias, authorised to this end, have signed and sealed with the seal of our arms.

Done at St. Petersburg, the 11th of April (31st of March), 1764.

(L. S.)	C. DE SOLMS.
(L. S.)	PANIN.
(L. S.)	GALITZIN.

\* Martens, vol. i., p. 229.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE IMPERIAL TITLE OF  
THE SOVEREIGNS OF MUSCOVY, BY THE REPUBLIC  
OF POLAND.

EXTRACT FROM THE ENACTMENTS OF THE DIET OF WARSAW,  
SEPTEMBER 5, 1764.

PRELIMINARY NOTE.

WE consider it indispensable to say a few words before we give this important document, and to recall certain historical facts, which are too often forgotten when we reason about Russia. The Slavonians, who originally inhabited the vast eastern continent of Europe, consisted of many communities, without any political tie between them, and their primitive names were probably derived, either from their principal towns, their rivers, or from the nature of their localities. It was not till the Varengians, a Norman race, made an incursion upon them in 860, that the greater part of the Slavonian country received the common name of Russia. Its populations, till then solely occupied by peaceful agricultural labours or by commerce, not at all fitted for war, and without any means of resistance, flocked humbly under the flag of a foreign, military, and conquering monarchy. This monarchy, after a glorious existence of two hundred years, was dissolved in 1054, at the death of Jaroslav the Great. There remained for that part of Slavonia only the accidental name of Russia, and numerous branches of its princely family, who, stimulated by dynastic pretensions, only succeeded in carrying on petty wars, without aim, without glory, and without result.

Slavonia, bearing the name of Russia, gradually resumed

her ancient form of separate communities; but that part which extended along the western banks of the Dwina and Dnieper, yielding, either to the influence of geographical position, or the want of a protector against the Tartars, through the influence of a more advanced civilisation, of a milder government, or in short, through the tradition of ancient conquests, became gradually incorporated at one time with Lithuania, and at another with Poland; and after the union of these two nations, constituted an integral part of the crown of Poland.

A century after the fall of the empire of the Varengians, George Dolgoruky, sprung from that family, obtained for his portion a wild country, which was not reckoned to belong to the Russian country, and was called in consequence the land of Susdale. George, ill treated by his relations, repeating continually that the Russian country brought him no good, took refuge on his estates with the idea of vengeance, the first symptom of which was seen in the founding of Moscow, in 1147.

The learned Russian professor, M. Pogodin, offered to the Grand Duke Alexander, son and presumptive successor of the Emperor Nicholas, at his first entrance into Moscow, a historical work, in which he proves beyond contradiction, that the city of Moscow, "that little drop which has become an ocean," is the only true and genuine kernel of the modern Empire of Russia. He frankly rejects all other historical deductions, and regards all as founded upon the conquests of Muscovy. In fact her conquests rapidly extended, and soon the Grand Dukes of Muscovy carried out the frontiers of their possessions to the banks of the Dwina and Dnieper.

Having reached these rivers, they saw on the opposite banks, the same race, but another nation; the same language, but other ideas; the same religion, but another creed. They

saw there princes sprung from the blood of Rurik, but who loved to seek and to find glory under the White Eagle of Poland. They saw there that aristocratic world, which makes a parade of incomprehensible enigmas, although in the Russian idiom ; *Czesti moiej ne dam nikomu*\*—"My honour is mine, I yield it to none." In vain Muscovy attempted, by numerous efforts, always vigorously resisted, to cross these rivers. Her ambition was brought to a stand here, which lasted for four hundred years. The infamous policy which gave her a passage, soon after opened those of the Danube and the Rhine, Peter I. not having, like Octavius, in his will limited his Empire to these rivers.

There are, then, two Russias : Muscovite Russia, amalgamated during centuries with Muscovy, and Polish Russia, an integral part of Poland ; each differing in manners, dialect, industry, in the costumes of their inhabitants, and in the time even of their independent existence, but connected through traditional hatred. At the present time, the Russian peasants of Poland still detest the Muscovites, and only call them by their true name of *Moskali*. They are aware that the *Podouchne*, taxes on souls ; the *Rekroute*, the burial of a living man ; the *Knoute*, a merciless rule ; were not known in the time of Poland.

Many persons will be astonished to learn that the names of Chlopicki, of Kniaziewicz, engraved on the great Arc de Triomphe at Paris, as well as those of the celebrated writer, Orzechowski, of Czartoryski, of Niemcewicz, of Mickiewicz, and of so many others of the illustrious of Poland, are only Polish-Russian names.

If other proofs are required of this difference in the two Russias, a fact well known in the country, we have only to consult modern travellers, who choose to direct their attention

\* A device of one of the ancestors of the Princes Czartoryski, engraved on his sword.

to the subject. Besides, we have in our archives a report of the senator Derjavin, presented to the Emperor Alexander, in which this difference is proved in precise terms.

Poland, then, was necessarily the last amongst the European States, to recognise the title of "Emperor of all the Russias" in the Muscovite Sovereigns; but in order that this evidently fallacious title should not give to Russia any right with regard to the Polish possessions, the Republic demanded, and Catherine II. verified by the following declaration, all that could be predicated most clearly and definitely to determine a fact, and to establish a right.

We much doubt whether the formidable armaments recently anchored in the Bosphorus, to protect a just cause, can finish their campaign by a clearer declaration in favour of Turkey. But that which no one doubts is, that this declaration will be only a dead letter. Russia, in her stipulations, takes in earnest the expression of Cicero: *Litteræ non erubescunt.*

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Since the ratification of the declaration, presented by the Ministers of the Court of Russia, and inscribed in the enactments of the last Diet at Warsaw, on the subject of the title acknowledged by the Republic, of *Empress of all the Russias*, after having been confirmed by the seal and signature of her Most Serene and Imperial Majesty, was only sent to us after the closing of the Diet of convocation, we have ordered that this same ratification, transcribed from the original, shall be placed among the enactments of the present Diet of election. The following are the precise words of the contents:

"We, Catherine II., by the grace of God, Empress and Autocrat of all the Russias, of Muscovy, of Kiovia, of Vladi-

miria, of Novgorod, of Kazan, of Astrackhan, of Siberia; the Sovereign of Plescow and Grand Duchess of Smolensk; Duchess of Esthonia and Livonia, of Carelia, of Tver, of Iugoria, of Permia, of Viatka, of Bulgaria; Sovereign of other countries; Grand Duchess of Lower Novgorod, of Czernigovia, of Resan, of Rostov, of Jaroslav, of Bielo-Oseria, of Udovia, of Obdovia, of Condinia; Sovereign of all the northern regions, of the country of Iberia; Sovereign of the Czars of Kartalinia and of Grouisia; Sovereign and Hereditary Ruler of the land of Cabardia, of Circassia, of the mountains, and of other countries; make known to all, and each in particular, and especially to the parties interested, that:

“ We have sent to the Most Serene Republic of Poland, and to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ministers with our orders and consent, to expound and explain our true and sincere opinions respecting the use which we propose to make of the title of Empress of all the Russias, our Ministers having obeyed our commands by the following declaration :

“ ‘ We, Hermann-Charles Keyserling, Count of the Holy Roman Empire, at this time Privy Counsellor of her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, Knight of the Order of St. Andrew, of St. Alexander Newski, and of the White Eagle, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; and Nicolas, Prince Repnin, Major-General of the Imperial Armies, Knight of the Order of St. Anne, and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Most Serene Republic, declare by the present instrument :

“ ‘ It is known that the treaty of peace, concluded in 1686, between Russia and the Most Serene Republic of Poland, contains an exact enumeration of the countries, provinces, and lands, which are and will be in the possession of the two contracting parties, and that there can arise no doubt and dis-

“ ‘ But apprehensions are often entertained without reason, and it is thus that a danger has been anticipated from this title : *Empress of all the Russias*. In order that all may see and understand the spirit of justice, and the benevolent dispositions of the Empress of all the Russias, towards the Most Serene Republic of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, we declare, in answer to the complaint which has been addressed to us, that her Imperial Majesty, our august Sovereign, in taking the title of Empress of all the Russias, *does not think of arrogating to herself any right, either for herself, for her successors, or for her Empire, over the countries and the lands which, under the name of Russia, belong to Poland and to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania ; and, acknowledging their rule, she rather offers to the Most Serene Republic of Poland, a guarantee or confirmation of its rights, of its privileges, as well as of the countries and lands which belong to it by right, or which it actually possesses ; and she promises to support and protect it always against whoever may attempt to trouble it.*

“ ‘ We, moreover, promise to take care that her Imperial Majesty our august Sovereign, ratifies and confirms in the course of seven weeks, with her own hand, the present declaration. In proof of which we have signed this act, and have sealed it with our arms.

“ ‘ Done at Warsaw, 23rd May, 1764.

“ ‘ HERMANN-CHARLES KEYSERLING,  
Count of the Holy Roman Empire.

“ ‘ NICOLAS PRINCE REPNIN.’

“ This declaration being entirely conformable to our will and our orders, we approve its text in the most solemn manner, ratifying, and signing it with our own hand, and placing to it the Imperial signet.

"Done in our Imperial Palace, at St. Petersburg, the 9th of June, 1764, the second year of our reign.

"CATHERINE.

"By order of her Majesty, we certify this to be the exact copy.

"N. PANIN.

"PRINCE ALEXANDER GALITZIN,

"Vice-Chancellor of the Empire."

Since we have already, in the Diet of Convocation, after the example of other Courts, but with the caution of this ratification, acknowledged in the Most Serene Empress of Russia, the title of *The Empress of all the Russias*, this ratification having taken place, *we acknowledge the title in question, under the reservation which is there expressed.*



## DECLARATION OF THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN.

GIVEN TO THE KING AND TO THE STATES OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
POLAND, BY MR. WROUGHTON, MINISTER OF THE COURT  
OF LONDON, THE 4TH OF NOVEMBER, 1766.\*

## PRELIMINARY NOTE.†

THE declarations of the Courts of Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and England, in favour of the Dissenters and Schismatics, were sent to the States of the Republic, first on the 14th of September, 1764, during the Diet of Election, secondly on the 28th of November, during that of the Coronation; and subsequently also to the Diet of 1766.

We have reproduced (p. 93) the declaration of Catherine II., presented at that last Diet, a document strikingly characteristic of Russian diplomacy: those of the other Courts dictated by Russia, scarcely merit our serious attention. We shall, nevertheless, present some observations upon the note of the English Minister, Mr. Wroughton, in order to show more clearly to what extent his conduct compromised the dignity, the impartiality, the veracity, and even the discernment, of the diplomacy of the great Power which he was called to represent in Poland.

Mr. Wroughton maintains, that "His Britannic Majesty interposes in favour of the Dissenters, as guarantee for the treaty of Oliva;" now, it appears that the English Diplomatist did not give himself the trouble even to read the treaty to which

\* History of the Revolutions of Poland. Paris, 1778. Vol. i. p. 370.

† By the Polish Editor of the French version.

he alludes, or he would not have committed such gross and inconceivable errors.

1st. "The guarantee being given in favour of the contracting parties, does not authorise the Power giving the guarantee to interfere in the execution of the treaty without being requested to do so. . . . The party guaranteeing obtains no right for himself." We quote this clear principle, founded on justice and forming the basis of these sorts of obligations, in the very terms of Vattel (L. ii. chap. xvi. §. 236). "Neither the Dissenters of Poland nor Russia were contracting parties in the treaty of Oliva; they could not, therefore, request the assistance of England, and she, yielding to the solicitations of the Court of St. Petersburg, acted, in consequence, against the principles of the law of nations."

2nd. The treaty of Oliva, and this is an essential point, had no concern with the interior policy of the contracting parties, nor was it called upon to regulate religious affairs. That which has given a pretext for this gratuitous supposition, is that the second article of the treaty stipulates *a general amnesty*. Now, "an amnesty," says Vattel, "is a perfect forgetfulness of the past; but the effect of which cannot be extended to things which have no reference to the war terminated by the treaty." To forget, is not to decree respecting a distant future, nor to impose shackles on the general legislation of a state. This is the text of the article in question: "There will be a general amnesty, for all and each one, of whatever profession, rank, or religion they may be. This war *will injure no one* in his rights, privileges, general and special habits, as well in ecclesiastical as in civil and profane matters, which were enjoyed before the war, but *each one shall continue* to enjoy them *according to the laws of the Kingdom*. The actions and prosecutions which had been commenced against those who had followed the enemy's party,

shall be suppressed, and landed property shall be restored to those from whom it had been confiscated." \*

The reader will perceive that not only the rights, but even the name of *Dissenters*, is not mentioned in this article. They are only designated there, as being allied by their action to the aggressor of their country. However this may be, the Polish Government, faithful to the stipulations of Oliva, never persecuted the Dissenters on account of their conduct during the Swedish war, and it is inconceivable that an English diplomatist, in 1766,—that is to say, after a hundred years,—could invoke a particular clause in an amnesty, which had only a temporary effect, in order to change a constitution since then regularly established, and become the law of the kingdom. M. de Lumbres, the Minister of Louis the Fourteenth, and the principal promoter of the treaty of Oliva, relates in his unpublished memoirs: "That Poland was determined to demand the re-establishment, or at least the free exercise, of the Catholic religion in that part of Livonia which remained to Sweden, a concession that the Swedish Commissioners main-

\* Sit utrinque perpetua oblivio et amnestia eorum omnium quæ quocunque loco modoque, a quacunque paciscenti parte hactenus hostiliter facta sunt, ita ut nec eorum nec ullius alteriusve rei causâ vel prætextu, ulla pars alteri posthac quidquam hostilitatis aut inimicitiae, specie juris aut via facti, inferat, aut per suos aliosve inferri faciat.—§ II. Hac generali amnestiâ gaudeant omnes et singuli cujuscunque status, conditionis et religionis fuerint, ut et omnes communitates, quæ ab utrinque partes hostiles secutæ sunt, aut in hostilem possessionem devenerunt. Nec ullis hoc bellum præjudicio et noxæ sit, in suis juribus, privilegiis ac consuetudinibus generalibus et specialibus, tam in ecclesiasticis quam in civilibus profanisve, quibus ante hoc bellum gavisî sunt, sed iis in totam fruantur *secundum leges regni*. Nec ullis communitatibus aut privatis actio ratione adhæSIONIS hosti intentabitur, ita ut nemini liceat alicui negotium *facessere* ratione adhæSIONIS ullius hostilis, aut eam exprobare.—*Volumina Legum*, t. iv, p. 738.

tained was *contrary to the constitution of their Kingdom*, which suffers no other religion than that conformable to the Confession of Augsburg, although I had represented to them that this constitution related only to their Kingdom, and not to the provinces that had been ceded to them, or that had given themselves up freely. All that it was possible to obtain from them was, liberty of conscience for the Catholics of Swedish Livonia, with permission to perform their private devotions in their own houses, without being called to account for it." In the face of this conduct of Sweden, a high contracting party, which laid down its constitution and its established religion as the very basis of its negotiations, even on the subject of a province newly acquired, who could have supposed that it was attempted to impose on Poland, in the same treaty, any legislative limits in matters of religion?

3rd. But this is not all. We maintain that no such guarantee even of the treaty of Oliva by England ever existed. The thirty-seventh and last article of this treaty, leaves it open to the Powers friendly to the contracting parties to join in it, provided this be done within six months. "The Austrian Commissioners," says M. de Lumbres (in the memoirs previously mentioned), "in the formula of the ratification of their Master, having inserted the power which they had reserved to themselves, to name on his part the King of Spain as guarantee for the treaty, the Swedes opposed it, maintaining that it was not in the act of ratification, but in the treaty itself, that this nomination should have been proposed. Nevertheless, the Austrians stubbornly adhering to their point, that it was not possible to do this in the treaty till after the guarantee of France, the Swedes acquiesced. In consequence of which, the Electors changed also the formula of the ratification of their Master, reserving to him the liberty of naming likewise the same King, and the United

Provinces; this caused the Swedes to reserve also for their Master the power of *naming the Republic of England, and the States of the Empire*. But, although it had been thus determined, neither the name of the most Catholic King, nor those of the others, were mentioned in these formulæ, owing as much to the uncertainty in which the Commissioners were, whether those who had taken no part in the mediation would yet stand as guarantees, as because the parties would not bind themselves to make the nominations which they had proposed." Now we do not find, either in the course of M. de Lumbres' memoirs, or in the *Volumina Legum* of Poland, or in the collections of Boehmius, or in any other diplomatic collection, this act of guarantee of England, of which Mr. Wroughton speaks; which, besides, would not give a particle of right to the intervention invoked.

After all the preceding observations, we would willingly believe, for the honour of the London Cabinet, that its Minister at Warsaw had taken upon himself to act in this matter without sufficient authority, and perhaps even without instructions. The note in question bears the date of the 4th of November, and the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Conway, wrote to him the preceding 5th of October: "His Britannic Majesty is not a *directing party* in any of the political views relative to the affairs of Poland; and, acting only through *motives of humanity and justice* towards some oppressed and ill-treated people, he wishes to co-operate in assisting them as the case shall demand, but without sharing in any measure of violence, which the *ambition of any Power* whatsoever might dictate on that subject."

The only clear and undeniable assertion of Mr. Wroughton is that in which he avows, that *his Britannic Majesty is forced, by a strict alliance with Russia*—or perhaps read: Mr. Wroughton, by his submission towards Prince Repnin—

to assist the Czarina in her acts of violence against Poland. This contemptible motive for the proceeding of the English Resident, suffices to explain how he forgets justice, the rights of nations, and the dignity of his mission.

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His Britannic Majesty, always disposed to protect, in every way, Protestant Christians, and especially those who, in virtue of *particular conventions*, have the right to seek his assistance, finds himself obliged to reiterate his pressing representations in favour of that oppressed part of the Polish nation, known by the name of *Dissenters*. In consequence, the undersigned, conformably to *the new orders of the King*, his Sovereign, has the honour of representing to you, Sire, and the Republic of Poland, that his Britannic Majesty, besides many solid motives of *justice and humanity*, which give him room to hope for a happy settlement of existing difficulties relative to this affair, feeling himself compelled, by a *strict alliance between the Courts of Petersburg, of Berlin, and Copenhagen*, to interest himself for Dissenters in all matters of law, and *in his character of guarantee for the treaty of the peace of Oliva*,—hopes that, at the present Diet, *that virtuous\** but unhappy party of *the subjects* of Poland, may be re-established as members of the state, in possession of their rights and privileges, as well as in the peaceful enjoyment of their worship, which, every one knows, *belonged to them before the signing of the treaty of Oliva*. At the same time, his Britannic Majesty considers how intimate is the connection of the very interests, even of the Republic, with the justice

\* This certificate of the virtues of the Dissenters is very unseasonable; for it is delivered at the very moment when we see them deliver themselves up as instruments to the enemies of their country.

of this affair, as well as with the fundamental laws of the kingdom—laws which had not only been observed for two centuries, but renewed by such solemn treaties with the Northern Powers, that nothing ought to be changed in them except by the general consent of the contracting parties. Thus his Britannic Majesty—full of confidence in the equity and penetration of his Polish Majesty, who, at the beginning of his reign, gave so many pledges of zeal for the happiness of the human species, and love for the administration of justice, and the Republic—does not doubt that, at last, his just desires will cease to be obstructed by inefficient enactments, established in the midst of internal troubles, and contradicted by formal protests and express declarations on the part of foreign Powers.

Although the rights and privileges of the Dissenters are founded upon a doctrine, whose principles of charity and benevolence present the true characteristics of Christianity; and although the divinity of its Author, who first preached it, renders it still less doubtful, it is nevertheless that religion which is troubled in its exercise, whereof the professors are *excluded from all honourable employments, and are deprived of all ways of serving their country.\** Nevertheless, their rights and privileges have been confirmed to them by the ordinances of the kingdom, secured by treaties, supported upon such holy foundations, and so evident to the eyes of all nations, that the undersigned, the Minister of a Monarch who feels the most sincere friendship and goodwill for the Republic, by giving proofs of this on all occasions, flatters himself that the mediation of the King his master will produce the effects which might naturally be expected; that the wisdom of the assembled nation will supply remedies for the evils

\* And the English Catholics?

which rend the State and oppress Dissenters ; and with regard to ecclesiastical, as well as civil affairs, that it will establish them in the same state in which they were before the conclusion of the treaty of Oliva. Besides, the sincere wishes of his Britannic Majesty *for the glory of the King of Poland, and for the prosperity of the Republic*, are so notorious, that it would be useless to renew the assurances of them. Nevertheless, the undersigned cannot dispense with repeating them, as an incontestible proof of their reality.

(Signed)      WROUGHTON.



### RESOLUTION OF THE DIET OF 1766, ON THE OCCASION OF THE DECLARATIONS OF FOREIGN COURTS.\*

The Diet of Poland, pressed by the menacing Declarations of Foreign Courts, and especially by Russia, acts with much Moderation and Dignity, and with admirable Tact—It Declares that it will preserve to Dissenters the Right to render, with all Liberty of Conscience, *to God that which is God's*; but putting aside by its silence their Legislative Pretensions, it merely prevents them from rendering *to the Enemies of the Country that which belongs to the Country*—It leaves to Catholic Priests the Decision with regard to the Grievances which relate to their Worship, in order to give evidence, that in Poland the Catholic Religion is Dominant and Tolerant at the same time.

WE have received, with all the respect due to them, the declarations in favour of the disunited Greeks and Dissenters, now living in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; at first presented, on the part of her Majesty the Empress of all the Russias, by his Excellency Count Repnin, Ambassador Extraordinary; afterwards, on the part of his Majesty the King of Prussia, by M. Benoit, his Plenipotentiary Minister; and, lastly, on the parts of their Majesties the Kings of Denmark and England, by MM. de Mestral de St. Saphorin, and Wroughton, resident Ministers.

We assure the before-mentioned Majesties that we maintain, and will maintain, in their integrity, the rights and liberties of the disunited Greeks and Dissenters, in so far as they may undoubtedly be of profit to them, both through our

\* *Volumina Legum*, tome vii., p. 484.

national laws, and especially by the enactments of the year 1717 and later years, and all in conformity with the treaties.

With respect to the grievances of the Dissenters on the subject of the exercise of their religious rights, the College of the Right Reverend and Reverend Archbishops and Bishops, under the Presidency of the Prince Primate, will arrange these difficulties with their usual justice and love for their neighbour, and will place this regulation in writing in the archives of the Crown, from whence, as we stipulate by the present instrument, each one shall have the right to take a copy.

## ARTICLES GRANTED BY THE CONVOCATION OF BISHOPS TO THE DISSENTERS AND NON-UNITED GREEKS:\*

[Although these Articles were only drawn up by the Bishops, their abstract was read in the Assembly, and approved by the States. This fact has not been recorded in the decree, but it is not the less certain and clear. The Articles of the Polish Bishops greatly resemble the Iradé of the Sultan Abdul-Medjid in the present day!]

I. THAT the Dissenters and non-united Greeks shall continue in the peaceful exercise of their religion, according to the tolerance permitted by the laws, and shall remain in the peaceful possession of the churches which they have legitimately acquired, without their being subject to any annoyance whatever.

II. The non-united Greeks and the Dissenters who will not abandon their churches on becoming Roman Catholics, or who have not lost them by decree, will be able, according to the laws of 1630, 1660, and 1717, to make the necessary repairs for their preservation, or for their restoration, by previously gaining the consent of the bishop of the diocese, and under the condition of not increasing their extent.

III. There will be granted to the non-united Greeks, and to Dissenters, a convenient piece of ground, marked out by the bishop of the diocese, and appertaining to their churches, where they can bury their dead, but without processions, without funeral pomp, as the laws prescribe.

\* Manifesto of the Confederate Republic, in 4to, 1770: annexed notes, 9.

IV. It is permitted to the non-united Greeks, and to the Dissenters, to build near their churches, upon the ground appropriated to them, habitations for their respective priests, obtaining to that effect the permission of the bishop of the diocese. The ecclesiastical authorities consent also that, in the places where the non-united Greeks and the Dissenters shall have no church, they may quietly attend to the exercise of their religion, but in the interior of their houses, without ostentation and without concourse of people, according to the decree of the year 1717.

V. The non-united priests and their families, throughout the kingdom, shall be judged, for whatever cause, according to the tenor of the laws. With respect to the Dissenting priests, they shall make their appearance *in foro competenti*, which was accorded to them by the decree of the year 1632.

VI. All causes relative to the funds annexed to the churches of the non-united Greeks and the Dissenters, shall be judged in the tribunals or jurisdictions prescribed by the laws of the kingdom.

VII. The non-united Greek priests and Dissenters shall contribute to all the taxes of the Republic, according to the tenor of the ancient laws.

VIII. The lords in possession of the right of presentation shall exact no payment from the non-united Greek priests, and cannot displace those who are in possession of benefices, without the consent of the bishop of the diocese.

IX. It shall be permitted to the non-united Greek priests to baptize, to give the nuptial benediction, and to bury, in their respective parishes, without any hinderance, according to the custom of tolerated religions. It is permitted also to Dissenters, in places where they possess churches, to baptize and inter, reserving the right of fee to the Catholic curates, the sum of which shall be moderate; and to prevent the

abuses which this article might occasion, as well as with regard to the subject of Christmas boxes and notes of pascal confession, the Episcopal College will take care that no payment shall be exacted from the Dissenters, under the pretext of a fee, which shall exceed that levied on the Catholics, excepting the conventions previously made, and those which might be made in future, with the curates or bishops of the dioceses, by paying a certain sum for the extinction and abolition of all rights.

These are the articles which the Episcopal College promises to maintain towards the non-united Greeks and Dissenters, with all possible exactness; engaging themselves, besides, to recommend their execution, by mandates addressed to all the curates of the respective dioceses.

Done at Warsaw, in the year 1766.

VENCESLAS SIERAKOWSKI, Archbishop of Leopold.

CAJETAN SOLTYK, Bishop of Cracow.

ANTHONY OSTROWSKI, Bishop of Cujavia, etc.

LETTER OF STANISLAUS AUGUSTUS TO CATHERINE  
THE SECOND.

WARSAW, THE 5TH OF OCTOBER, 1766.

You wish, for the good of Poland, to ameliorate the condition of the Dissenters, but their admission into the Legislature is contrary to this good—They are not admitted either in Holland or in England—The Reason of this Measure—Repnin threatens us with a Military Execution—This is not likely to be for our good—In this case what will Poland say, which already suspects me of conniving with you in this affair?—It is necessary either for me to expose myself to your Blows, or that I betray my Nation—I am not capable of the latter act.

MADAM AND SISTER,—The desire of not displeasing your Imperial Majesty, has always been, as you well know, the most powerful motive of my conduct. The same motive has until now prevented my writing to your Imperial Majesty upon the affair of the Dissenters. But I feel at length that I have unnecessarily denied myself the delightful satisfaction of addressing myself with confidence to the friendship of your Imperial Majesty, which I have so long experienced, and I fear that I may have to reproach myself for not having used all possible means for the succour and *the preservation of my State*. May heaven direct your attention and your heart to listen favourably to me. The principles of universal benevolence have undoubtedly guided your magnanimous soul in wishing a happier fate for the Polish Dissenters, and through the same an

amelioration in this Kingdom; but the degree of advantages which should be accorded to the Dissenters must be determined with great justice, to produce in fact this good for Poland, which your Imperial Majesty wishes to procure for her. The nature of a free state, such as ours, is incompatible even with the most limited admission *to the legislature* of those who do not profess the dominant religion.

The more national liberties there are in the constitution of a government, the more need there is of conformity of action, and of strict and respectful submission to the laws on the part of citizens controlling the movement of the machine. Now, an avowed diversity of opinion upon a matter even as politically essential as religion, cannot fail often to produce differences, from the first very dangerous, where the supreme authority, not being absolute and united in the person of the sovereign, does not offer a prompt and sufficient corrective to transgressions. Examples can be adduced in support of this reasoning:

Holland and England are not suspected of being governed by prejudices, but they are so by the laws which exclude all Nonconformists alike from the direct legislature and the magistracy, because they regard the magistracy as embodying a portion of authority which, having weight in the State, is able to shake it. The Aulic Council, composed of Catholic and non-Catholic judges, is the result of thirty years' war, and forms the tribunal, not of a republic like ours, but of an assemblage of independent Sovereigns, having armed retinues, and whose frequent wars sufficiently prove the political incoherency of such a system.

If I were less persuaded that the great principles of equity are truly those which form the basis of your policy, I should have thought it superfluous to have employed reason against power. It is also this which makes me think, that

even when your Ambassador announces to us on your part that you will resort to the most terrible extremities—when he *tells us that your armies are going to exercise all the power of the sword, if the Diet does not admit the Dissenters to the legislature*,—I think, I say, that all this proceeds merely from the idea, *that in obliging us even by the strongest measures to adopt that which your Imperial Majesty considers as for our good, you do not mean us any wrong*. I believe I have clearly explained to your Imperial Majesty why we regard all that exceeds mere tolerance as an essential evil, to which from conviction we cannot give our consent, and it is impossible for me, who know your Imperial Majesty, to believe that *you could ever desire to force any one to do himself an injury*. The use you have constantly made till now of your immense power, has produced the public confidence which so many States are accustomed to place in you. It is too inestimable an advantage for you to sacrifice it willingly, because, *without war, it will make your influence superior to that of every other Power in Europe*. No, once more, I do not believe it; you will not make war on Poland, you will not cause the troops you keep there to act in a hostile manner, because the nation will not admit the Dissenters to the legislature and judicature. You are too just and too humane for this.

After discussing such broad questions, which embrace the fate of whole nations, I feel much diffidence in speaking of myself personally; but may it please your Imperial Majesty to cast a glance upon my particular situation. *Being suspected* ever since my election of *a secret intelligence* with you, Madam, in connection with the affair of the Dissenters, and basely calumniated by the evil-intentioned, what will be the public opinion of the nation, when she sees your troops exacting, in this same matter, things that she abhors, and that have



always been objected to me as the true and fatal term to which the projects of simple tolerance would lead, which I proposed to them of my own conviction, and in concert with your Imperial Majesty?

When you recommended me to the choice of this nation, you surely did not wish me to become the object of her maledictions; neither could you have reckoned upon converting my person into a target to be aimed at by your arms. I conjure you, nevertheless, to observe that if all that Prince Repnin announced to me is verified, there remains no middle course for me: *I must either expose myself to your blows, or betray my nation and my duty. You would not have wished me to be King, were I capable of the last.* The thunder is in your hands; but will you hurl it at the innocent head of him, who for so long a time has been so tenderly and sincerely attached to you?

Madam, your Imperial Majesty's good brother, friend, and neighbour,

STANISLAUS AUGUSTUS.

ANSWER OF CATHERINE II. TO STANISLAUS  
AUGUSTUS.

DATED ST. PETERSBURG, 17TH OCTOBER, 1766.

The Affair of the Dissenters may cause some Annoyances—My Object is the Safety of your State—You are for a Negative; so be it—Your Reflections are not solid—Policy ought not to be the Slave of Speculation—The example of Holland and England cannot be applied to Poland—Neither can that of the Aulic Council—A more decided Will might ameliorate your Situation—Your Conduct dissipates the Suspicions of which you spoke to me—Between my Friendship and your Duties your choice is made—You speak of Tolerance for the Dissenters—It is for that I come to their Assistance—I abandon this Affair to its own Fate—I close my Eyes to the Consequences—If it is expedient, Strength will settle the Matter.

SIR AND BROTHER,—I do not conceal from myself, on reading your Majesty's letter of the 5th of this month, the almost desperate state of things for the Greeks and Dissenters, as well as all the annoyances which this affair might occasion. *In the arrangement made on the part of your Ministry, and of all those who have any influence in the affairs of your State, the strings are so stretched that it is no longer possible to prevent some of them from breaking.* All that I could say in addition, on this subject, will arrive *too late*, and could not now alter a resolution very long meditated, and which we have not confessed till the moment of the crisis, in order to carry it into execution with the greater certainty; but *my friendship for your Majesty and for the Republic is too pure and too disinterested*, for me ever to hesitate to let you know my way of thinking, whatever attention you may think

proper to give it. For it is a thing due to me, and not a mere act of complaisance on your part, that you should perceive and represent, in so just a measure, *the only motive which guides me* in demanding the rights of a part of your subjects to be recognised, who have been for so long a time a prey to injustice and oppression—*the desire to do good for good's sake*, without any other views than your personal tranquillity and *the safety of your state*. If I had *really* discovered in your Majesty the disposition, which I might have expected from an enlightened friend and sovereign, to listen to and co-operate efficiently in so just a demand for the advantage of your people, you would have already found, in the declarations and memorials which I have communicated to you confidentially on this subject, sufficient grounds for entering into negotiations, and it would have been easy thenceforth to determine the degree of advantages to be accorded to that part of the citizens of the Republic. It is, then, erroneously, and only as a blind, that this difficulty is brought forward, and it is easily seen who has refused to remove it, or rather, who was very glad to let it remain. *The part*, of an absolute negative, which it pleases your Majesty to adopt so decidedly, prevents me from going deeper into this question; and it neither enters into the plan of my answer, nor in that of my ulterior measures, to labour to overcome that resistance on your part or that of your Ministry.


Your Majesty will allow me to examine the solidity of your reflections upon the inconvenience of a diversity of religious opinions in the persons who have a share in the legislature. In theory, those principles are admirable. The philosopher who takes large views, and would raise all to absolute perfection, would assuredly not overlook a defect of this nature; but no empire has yet existed in conformity with the ideal and principles of perfection. *A wise policy*, which



in Poland; yet more, instead of making this tribunal responsible for political incoherence, it would be better to confess in its praise, that since its establishment, not one pistol shot has been fired on account of religion in Germany; whilst before that time there had been *a war for thirty years, which your Majesty represents as a religious war*, and the example of that event should be a powerful motive for deciding the Republic *to do* at home, of her own accord, that *which one day necessity might force her to do*.

Your Majesty can judge from this, if I have not a just idea of the situation of the Republic, if I am not honest in pressing it so strongly to provide permanently for its safety, and if I have cause to fear that I have inflicted any injury on it, or rather if I am not quite certain of having proved my sincere friendship to it.

Your Majesty does me justice as to the use I always propose to make of my power. I do not change my opinion on the present occasion, although perhaps I ought to do so, in order to attain the end anticipated by the public confidence, and to show if I understand how to deserve it. It would be a misapprehension of my sentiments towards your Majesty, to think I could for an instant be forgetful of your particular position. I know it. I feel all your embarrassment; but I *cannot disguise the fact, that a more decided will* would have prevented, and might perhaps still remedy it. I have, however, never heard a single word respecting suspicions of a secret intelligence, nor of that infamous calumny with respect to the affairs of the Dissenters; but if anything is calculated to justify your Majesty, it is *the conduct which you pursue at present*, and when I reflect on the weightiness of the motive, I am astonished that you have felt any embarrassment in your choice between my friendship, and those duties which you think would be compromised by it.



I cannot finish without testifying to your Majesty, my astonishment that, on your side, persons always speak of *simple tolerance*.

*The Greeks and Dissenters would never have considered themselves proscribed in Poland*, had not the accumulated persecutions against them established this idea as a reality. The Jews are tolerated, and I cannot sufficiently admire your having granted the same favour to members of the State, legalised in their religion by the decrees of the Republic, which many of the Kings, your predecessors, have sworn to observe. If a mere toleration of the Dissenters is now represented as an act of favour, their total ruin and expulsion must have been previously resolved on. It was actually necessary for me to come to their succour, in order to secure them even this slight advantage. It would be useless to labour to persuade those who will not even listen.

*The only part which remains to me, then, is to abandon this affair to its own fate, and to the situation in which it will be placed on the arrival of this letter. I close my eyes to the results and the consequences; flattered, nevertheless, that your Majesty could perceive sufficient disinterestedness in all that I have done for you, and for the nation, not to reproach me with having sought to make Poland a target for my arms. They will never be directed against those to whom I wish well; but I will never withhold them, when I believe the use of them to be advantageous.* Such is my way of thinking, which nothing can alter or make me change. It springs from the *sincere interest which I take in the good of the Republic*, as well as in the invariable personal sentiments in which I am, my good brother, your Majesty's good sister, friend, and neighbour,

CATHERINE:

EXTRACTS FROM THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE ENGLISH MINISTRY ON THE AFFAIRS OF POLAND, 1763-1766.

MR. WROUGHTON.\*

Warsaw, March 12th, 1763.

If a plurality of votes were introduced, instead of the unanimity which is the occasion of the troubles in Poland, Russia and Prussia also might see the rise of a *Power which would eventually be formidable to both of them*. Will they allow a change of so great importance to be even attempted?

MR. WROUGHTON.

Warsaw, June 15th, 1763.

It is commonly thought here that there is an understanding between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Russia, regarding *the partition* of the greatest part of the Polish possessions.

LORD STORMONT.

Vienna, December 3rd, 1763.

The Czartoryski family are authorised to declare, that neither the Empress of Russia, nor the King of Prussia, *intend to, or will, seize a single inch of land in Poland*; and that far from entering into such views, the Czartoryskis would in

\* Wherever the name of the party for whom the letter is designed is omitted, it must be understood as addressed to the Cabinet of London.

that case be the first to invoke the protection of this Court, and claim its assistance.

LORD STORMONT.

Vienna, September 12th, 1763.

Count Poniatowski was elected King of Poland, on the 7th inst. There has never been a more pacific or unanimous election in that country. There were about thirty thousand electors, which is a large number, considering that they were not the entire body of the nation, but only representatives of each palatinate. There was not one dissenting voice.

BUCKINGHAM.

St. Petersburg, January 23rd, 1765.

Count Orloff, who had always been opposed to the election of M. Poniatowski to the throne of Poland, expresses *great discontent on the subject of his conduct with regard to the Dissenters*. He says that he will soon become too powerful, and too independent; and that probably, forgetting his obligations to the Empress, *he might become at last a grievous and formidable neighbour to Russia*.

SIR. G. MACARTNEY.

St. Petersburg, October 18th, 1765.

The King of Poland has lately resolved to send a Minister to France, to notify his accession to the throne. *This measure is highly displeasing to the Empress*, and M. Panin lately told me very openly that he should wish the Court of France not to recognise the King of Poland at all, *for he said that his efforts to destroy French influence at Stockholm would be perfectly useless, if that influence should re-appear at Warsaw*. Your Grace will have observed that M. Panin's plan consists in holding all his neighbours *in the greatest possible dependence*, and he has in a great measure succeeded.



MR. WROUGHTON.

Warsaw, September 3rd, 1776.

It was supposed that the Czartoryski family were opposed to the views of Russia regarding the Dissenters, but I have had occasion to speak with the Prince Palatine of Russia, who assured me, "that he, as well as his brother, the Chancellor, perceived the advantages which their country would derive by protecting the Protestants from all kinds of chicanery, to which they were exposed by the mistaken zeal and prejudices of the Catholic clergy, but that a few individuals have not sufficient influence to direct a whole nation in religious affairs;" and I could not but observe myself the agitation which reigns in the minds of the people even in the capital; an agitation which has reached a much higher degree in the provinces.

MR. CONWAY TO MR. WROUGHTON.

London, October 5th, 1766.

His Majesty is not an *influential party* in any of the *political views* relative to the affairs of Poland; and, acting only from motives of *humanity and of justice* towards an oppressed and ill-used people, he would wish to assist them as their cause should require, but *without joining in any measure of violence which the ambition of any Power whatever might dictate*, independently of that object.

SIR. G. MACARTNEY.

St. Petersburg, October 23rd, 1766.

Panin has declared to me that if the Diet of Poland does not consent with a good grace to what is demanded of it in favour of the Dissenters, he will march an army of forty thousand men on his side into that country, whilst the King of Prussia will bring an equal number from his. He added, that when once things are brought to that extremity, *he will*

*consider himself disengaged from all stipulations, and free to present new demands.* He said: "If it be necessary to have recourse to violent measures, it will involve considerable expenses; and I flatter myself *that in that case, Great Britain, by a generous effort, will furnish us with pecuniary assistance, and will thus efface from my mind the unfavourable impressions occasioned by her parsimony in Sweden.*"

This proposition appeared to me *so strange and so ridiculous*, that I cannot regard it seriously; and although he persists in declaring it is so, *I have continued to treat it as a jest*, and would not do otherwise.

MR. WROUGHTON.

Warsaw, October 27th, 1766.

The King has represented to me the state of affairs, as well as the manner in which both he and his nation are treated, *in a most touching light.* He sees himself, he told me, on the verge of most serious dangers, but is determined to suffer all rather than betray his country, or act as a dishonest man; he adds, that *the Empress had never pretended to procure for the Protestants anything more than the full and free exercise of their religion*, and he had laboured in furtherance of it for some months, but that the sudden and violent resolution of the Empress to place them on an equal footing with the other subjects of the Republic, cannot but convince us, *that religion was only a pretext in all that affair*, and that she and the King of Prussia, *repenting of having placed on the throne a King who is devoted to his country*, take measures to overturn that which they themselves had done. He told me, that the Empress *is opposed to everything tending to establish a good government here, and consequently he cannot feel a very cordial friendship towards her.* But how could the King have flattered himself that the Empress of Russia would

forget *the interests* of her own Empire, and would suffer the elevation of a neighbour, who might one day become so powerful? And did not the King of Prussia declare, the very day of his election, that if there was any idea of introducing the smallest change in the form of government, he would oppose it with all his might? Repnin told me that the Empress had written to the King: that all his conduct convinced the nation, *that he did not act openly with her*; that if he thought that his duties were incompatible with his friendship to her, he must choose between them; but that, as to her, her resolution with respect to the Protestants was taken, and the result will be in the hands of God, who disposes of events according to His will.



## APPENDIX.

### A. THE SULTANS.

THE following is the chronology of the Ottoman Sultans, from the founder of the dynasty to the present day :—

Othman became Sultan A.D. 1299; Orkhan, 1326; Amurath I., 1359; Bajazet I., 1390; Mohammed I., 1403; Amurath II., 1422; Mohammed II., 1450; Bajazet II., 1481; Selim I., 1512; Solyman, 1520; Selim II., 1566; Amurath III., 1574; Mohammed III., 1595; Achmet I., 1604; Mustapha I., 1617; Othman II., 1618; Mustapha II., in 1622; Amurath IV., 1623; Ibrahim, 1640; Mohammed IV., 1648; Achmet II., 1690; Mustapha II., 1695; Achmet III., 1702; Mahmoud I., 1730; Othman III., 1754; Mustapha III., 1757; Abdul-Hamid, 1774; Selim III., 1789; Mustapha IV., 1807; Mahmoud II., 1807;\* Abdul-Medjid, the reigning Sultan, since 1839.

We presume the reader will be by this time prepared to hear that the next Sultan is expected to be the present illustrious head of the house of Romanoff; and that, by some diplomatic mistake or oversight, it is anticipated that the Holy Synod will shortly disseminate its charity and light from the shores of the Bosphorus, as a preliminary to some farther steps in the way of progress.†

\*“ He (Mahmoud) has been compared to Peter the Great, but you will think me extravagant if I say that the comparison does not do him justice. Mahmoud, in the wildest excitements of his provocation, never forgot the ties of nature and the tenderness of a father; and after subduing his subjects, he achieved the still more difficult conquest of subduing himself.”—*Walsh*, vol. ii. p. 319. For the reforms introduced by Mahmoud, see Chap. 10 and 11., vol. ii. of *Walsh*; Spencer’s *European Turkey*; Urquhart’s *Turkey and her Resources*; Miss Pardoe’s *City of the Sultan*; etc., etc.

† “Constantine, the second son of Nicholas, is always studying oriental languages, and all relating to Turkey. His name of Constantine is not a vain prognostic in his eyes, and he is profoundly versed in the language of Turkey, and all political, social, and financial questions connected with the Ottoman Empire.”—*Leeson le Duc*, p. 108.

## B. THE TURKISH LANGUAGE.

The Turkish tongue is a dialect of the Tartar, imported to Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453. Since that period it has become greatly enriched by a large number of expressions derived from the Arabic and Persian, introduced by the Mussulman religion, the necessities of commerce, or the frequent wars of the Turks in Asia. But instead of modifying its new acquisitions, as has happened in Europe with modern tongues that have borrowed from the classics, the Turkish has received the foreign words without mutilating them.

These acquisitions and additions are naturally more frequent amongst the educated than amongst the vulgar, and more common in the written than in the spoken language. It follows from what we have observed, that it is almost indispensable to have some slight acquaintance with Persian, and particularly with Arabic, in order to speak, and especially to write, Turkish correctly. From the Arabs they have derived their characters, their system of numeration, and all words expressing religious and moral ideas, as also those relating to science, letters, and art.

Regarded in itself, and in connection with the northern origin of the nomades who first spoke it, it is clear that it has no greater affinity to Persian and Arabic, than Hungarian has to French; but though we may admit that it is inferior in some respects to the noble tongue of Mohammed, yet it greatly surpasses the Persian in number, harmony, and elegance, and it is one of the most beautiful, and undeniably the most majestic, tongues in the East.

It must be admitted, however, that, owing, either to the recent origin of the language, or the warlike and unæsthetical character of the Turks, it has comparatively but few distinguished authors, not one poet comparable to Ferdousi, Saadi, or Hafiz; no philosopher to approach Averroës, or Avicenna; nor can the Turkish literati boast of a single discovery or observation in the exact sciences, their literature being confined to a rather large collection of works on theology, Ottoman history, geography, medicine, and some romances in prose and verse, mostly translated or imitated from the Persian.

But though historically the Turkish tongue presents perhaps less interest than Persian, it is of the greatest moment in a diplomatic point of view, being the only diplomatic language used in the Levant; the only tongue used and spoken in the remotest parts of the Empire by public officials; indispensable to all commercial enterprize in European and Asiatic Turkey, in the Western provinces of Persia, on the banks of the Caspian, even at the Court of Teheran, where the Shah, the ministers, and agents of the Persian government, speak little save Turkish; and lastly, without oriental hyperbole, it may be safely asserted, that the traveller can make himself understood in Turkish from Algiers to Candahar, on the frontiers of India. A tongue so widely spread must be subject to variations of idioms; hence the Turkish spoken in Roumelia differs much from that of Anatolia, and especially from the Turkish spoken in the country watered by the Halys, in those traversed by the Araxes, and near the source of the Tigris and Euphrates. Yet this difference is incomparably less than that between the different idioms of France. It must also be observed that in Turkey, and in all the regions where these semi-barbarous conquerors penetrated, the language of the aborigines still lives. Thus the masses speak Arabic at Algiers and Tunis, in Egypt and Syria; various dialects of the Slavonic in Bosnia, Illyria, Servia, and Bulgaria; Vlachian beyond the Danube; Romaic in the Morea and the Archipelago, at Stamboul and Smyrna; and lastly Armenian and Kurdic in Asia; yet in all these countries you cannot meet a man with any pretensions to education, who is unable to speak Turkish. But at Constantinople, the heart of the vast Empire, and especially among the court ladies, the purest, softest, and most elegant Turkish is spoken.

The unsound state of polity in the Levant, owing to the crafty diplomacy and encroachments of Russia, may render a few farther particulars relating to the Turkish tongue interesting and instructive to the reader, though the sonorous speech of Othman will probably, like Polish, soon cease to be a spoken language, owing to the misapprehensions of British diplomacy.

According to Kieffer and Bianchi, three-fourths of the ingredients of the present Turkish tongue are Persian or Arabic.\*

\* *Dictionnaire Turc-Français*, Preface.

The Turks had writers in many branches of literature before the conquest of Constantinople; and since that period, historians, astronomers, geographers, travellers, poets, moralists and economists, have greatly enlarged the boundaries of their literature. There are even in Turkish many Ottoman histories,\* not written after the manner of our historians, but presenting a connected picture of events rigorously observing a chronological order. Few histories can be more interesting than that of the Ottoman Empire, by its military and political relations with the great Powers of Europe. One of the most valuable points in their histories is that they preserve numerous specimens, in the speeches of the viziers and generals, of that manly eloquence, whose inspirations used once to electrify the Sultan's hosts.

The Turkish tongue contains, moreover, valuable translations from the Persian and Arabic,—*e. g.*, the Prolegomena of Ibn-Khaldoun by Pîrizade, which is superior to the original in exactness. The same remark applies to the Humaïoun-namé, a Turkish translation of the Euvârî-Souhêlî, by Ali Tchelebi; this version may be regarded as a real creation of the translator, much preferable to the original, through its numerous beautiful verses and sublime thoughts.

As previously observed, however, the Turks have had abundance of original writers, and M. von Hammer enumerates 2,000 Turkish poets, whilst the Persian only amount to 200.

The most select Turkish poets are, Achik Pasha, Cheikhi, Baki, Nefi, Mescihy, Kemal Pasha, Zadè, amongst the ancients; and the first moderns are, Nebi Effendi, Rayhyb Pasha, Seid Reefet Effendi, Aini Effendi, Pertey Effendi, Kiahia Bei, or home secretary. Contemplation and mysticism are the characteristics of Turkish as of Persian poetry. It is almost always adorned with a gentle philosophy resigned to destiny, and with a wise spirit calmly estimating the shortness of life, and admiring the wonders of creation.

Mescihy's "Ode on Spring," translated by Sir W. Jones, gives a fine specimen of this sort of poetry.

\* In Arabic.



## C. CRACOW.

We shall proceed to examine the magnanimity and justice of Russia and Austria, in their treatment of the strictly neutral and independent Republic of Cracow.

On the north bank of the winding Vistula—at that point where the huge Empires of Russia, Austria, and Prussia converge—there lies beneath the rugged shadow of the Carpathian hills, a small gently undulating plain of oblong form, presenting a surface of 500 square miles, and sustaining a population 141,200 souls. Within this narrow territory, on the river, stands its chief town, Cracow, once the brilliant capital of a nation numbering 20,000,000, and of an empire that proudly stretched from the shores of the Baltic to the walls of Smolensk. But that was the unhappy age when the kingdom of Prussia was a small duchy, dependent on Poland, and when John Sobieski saved Vienna and Christendom from the Turks.

We cannot pause to analyse the splendour and glory of Cracow. Suffice it to say, that it once numbered seventy-two churches, of which thirty-nine remain, and that Thorwaldsen, in gazing on the gilded dome of the Cathedral of St. Stanislaus, said, “Rome, thou dost not stand alone in the world.” We shall proceed briefly to narrate the extinction of this last stronghold of freedom in the north-east of Europe.

The first partition of Poland, in 1772, gave Austria the right bank of the Vistula, but left Cracow still attached to the kingdom of Poland.

On the outbreak of the war of liberation, Alexander of Russia seized and retained it, pending the decision of the Congress of Vienna. For a time he refused to deliver up his spoil, but Prussia and Austria, feeling it to be the key of Germany, struggled hard for its recovery; and yielding at length to the opposition of the European Cabinets to the farther aggrandisement of Russia, the Imperial diplomacy\* considerably suggested the creation of a

\* It has always been the policy of the Court of Russia to encroach by *degrees*—to assume the *protection* of a territory before the sovereignty. This show of moderation had done much to disarm the jealousy of other countries; but it has imposed only on the blind.—*History of Russia, L. C. C.*, p. 298. Most of the European Powers seem to want couching.

Protectorate, the darling child of despotism, fostered by the charities of the three Northern Powers.

The general acts of the Congress contained, among other articles, the following :—

Article 6th declares the town and its territory free, independent, and strictly neutral, under the protection of Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

By the 8th Article, the Emperor of Austria guarantees for ever to the town of Podgorze, near Cracow, in the Austrian territories, all the privileges of a free commercial city.

Article 9th guarantees neutrality, both to the free town and its territory; and this Russia, Austria, and Prussia bind themselves to maintain, not only among themselves, but against all others. This article further stipulates that *on no pretext whatever*, shall an armed force be ever permitted to enter the territory.

The internal constitution granted to Cracow, and annexed to the general act of the Congress of Vienna, established a sovereign and independent legislative, executive, and judiciary power.

After the Polish revolution of 1831, Russian bayonets drove crowds of fugitives into Cracow, and General Rudiger entered and occupied the Republic during two months, only leaving it on the remonstrance of Austria. But liberty was henceforth at an end. In 1833, the original constitution of 1815 was replaced by a different *ukase*, vesting all real power in the hands of the three representatives of the protecting Powers. In 1836, Austria took military possession; no less than 500 persons were seized, conveyed to Trieste, and from thence shipped to America. In 1837, the Austrians retired, and returned in 1838, for the purpose of a thorough *purification*, and continued in possession up to 1841. During this military occupation, the last trace of independence vanished, and if the Republic was nominally suffered to linger on, it was to save appearances, and reconcile the sad necessity to the tender consciences of the high contracting parties.

The diplomatic correspondence, relating to the suppression of Cracow, and the establishment of order in that most dangerous Republic, presents the usual bland and paternal policy of Russia and Austria, and the subtle and suspicious character of British statesmen.

The despatch of the British Minister from Berlin, dated, by an unlucky accident, April 1, 1846, contains the following conclusive reasoning and brilliant eloquence :—"The chargé d'affaires of France, M. Hamann, has communicated to me a despatch from M. Guizot, and which he is directed to lay before Baron Canitz, in which he expresses his conviction, that the independence of the state of Cracow, such as it was established by the treaty of Vienna, will not be *broken in upon*. M. Guizot states that, upon this point, he has already received the assurances of the government, both of Austria and Prussia." Within twenty-four hours of the receipt of this despatch, Lord Aberdeen, of course, receives a second epistle from the same hand, in which he is informed that "General Canitz has received from M. Hamann the communication of the letter from M. Guizot, which I mentioned to your Lordship in my despatch of yesterday's date. The remark he stated to me that he had made upon it was, that he (Canitz) had not authorized any declaration to be made as to the future conduct of his government with respect to the affairs of Cracow . . . That there was, therefore, some misapprehension in that part of M. Guizot's letter which alluded to it."\*

By some fatality, there is apt to be misapprehension in all diplomatic transactions and correspondence, especially if they relate to the East of Europe. Let us now examine the Vienna correspondence, and see if there was any misapprehension there. Our unhappy Minister at that gay capital was made to date his despatch also on the 1st of April, and in it he states : "I have no reason to believe that there exists any idea of a permanent military occupation of that city (Cracow) upon the part of this Cabinet. The respect which Prince Metternich has for what is consecrated by solemn treaties, forbids such a supposition; and his Highness farther *told me*, that the explanations which the Austrian Ambassador in London had given respecting their intentions, had been received by your Lordship as he, Prince Metternich, wished and expected."

\* Speaking of the dismemberment of Poland, a recent writer observes : "The iniquity of these partitions is fully equalled by the folly. The barrier hitherto offered to Russian aggression was thrown down; and the road to Berlin and Vienna lies as open as that from Moscow to Bender."—*Hist. of Russia, Lord. Cab. Cycl.*, vol. ii. p. 282.

On reading such extracts, one is pained to see on the one hand the duplicity and equivocation of our eminent statesmen ; and on the other, we feel deep compassion for the integrity and frankness of the Austrian ministry, so basely deceived by our unprincipled diplomacy.

We have only to add, that in accordance with the promises and oaths of the three Northern Powers, Cracow has been occupied, purified, and restored to order. Every vestige of freedom and nationality is effaced, German is taught instead of Polish in the University, and the last trace of self-government has been trodden under foot by the Croat.

Prince Metternich, to extenuate his generous policy, remarked that Cracow had become a retreat for smuggling and brigandage, that it was poor and depopulated, and exposed to material and moral misery. The smuggling had been encouraged by Russia and Austria for their own advantage, and the depopulation of Cracow is proved by the following facts : The commerce and trade of Cracow have, notwithstanding the onerous restrictions imposed upon them by the contracting Powers, been at all times very considerable. The value of British manufactured goods exported thither, is estimated at about £120,000. A glance at the map of Europe is enough to show that in a few years Cracow, under favourable circumstances, might become one of the most important points in Eastern Europe.

Even under incredibly adverse circumstances, its prosperity has been remarkable. The amount of population which it supported is greater in proportion to its extent of territory, than is to be discovered elsewhere on the Continent. Its agricultural population exhibits a degree of intelligence and activity that we look for in vain elsewhere in this quarter of the globe.

Colonel Du Plat, British Consul at Warsaw, in his despatch of March the 10th, 1846, gives the following account of Metternich's geographical atom :—" Cracow, since its elevation to an independent state, has always been the depôt of very considerable quantities of British merchandise, sent thither by the Black Sea, Moldavia, and Galicia, and even *via* Trieste, and which afterwards find their way to the surrounding countries."\*

\* For the history of northern dealings with Cracow, see *Eastern Europe*, vol. i.; and *The Topic*, p. 263.

With these and other such facts, we can scarcely admit Cracow's insignificance, as advanced by the Northern Powers to justify their proceedings. Magnitude is not always a symbol of value—quality is not implied in quantity. Infanticide is still murder. Moreover, if we admit such principles, what becomes of the petty Principalities of Germany, with their thirty-eight dynasties? When is aggrandisement and incorporation to stop in Europe? Switzerland, Belgium, and Sardinia, the only countries on the Continent where a man can breathe freely—are European atoms, and would be swallowed up to-morrow. But to talk of principle in canvassing Austrian policy,\* is preaching vegetarianism to a cannibal. Some persons may think it some palliation that Cracow is a victim to Austrian, not Russian, aggression; but this is cold comfort. The charities of the middleman and the steward seldom exceed those of his lord, as Hungary can testify. Moreover, a little reflection may possibly lead the reader to infer that Prussia and Austria (nay, all Germany) are mere puppets in the hands of Russia, often degraded to the rank of mere provinces, and almost as much under the political synod as any of the semi-barbarous hordes. Might we not go farther still, and say that, since 1849, the Continent lies at the feet of the Czar? Naples is docile at his word, the barricades rise or sink in Paris to orders issued from St. Petersburg, and the British Cabinet is immersed in domestic debates; while the Russian, with more enlarged views, extends his diplomacy and his arms to neighbouring countries. Europe, in fifty years, was to become republican or Cossack. Thirty-five have nearly elapsed, and it is already a cross between the Cossack and the Croat.

\* The Tartars and the Christian Principalities south of the Caucasus, as well as the Mohammedan world, were convinced that the meeting of the Czarina and Joseph II. (of Austria), at Cherson (1787), augured no good to the cause of Islam. What passed in the interview between the two potentates can only be a matter of conjecture; but that it concerned the approaching war with Turkey is undoubted. . . . The Emperor Joseph sent 80,000 Austrians into Moldavia, while a powerful fleet in the Black Sea prepared to co-operate with the allies, and another in the Baltic was ready to sail for the Mediterranean. Perhaps, the reader may remember Nicholas and Francis Joseph at Olmütz, and doubt the sincerity of Austria.—*History of Russia, L. C. C.*, vol. ii. p. 292.

## NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

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### NOTE A, PAGE 3.

Those who are desirous of forming a correct notion of the encroachments of Russia, are referred to the later chapters of the 2nd vol., and the whole of the 3rd vol., of the *History of Russia* in Lardner's *Cabinet Cyclopædia*. From this work it appears that between 1696 and 1796, the date of the death of Catherine II., Russia annexed—1st, Kamtschatka, with 4000 square miles; 2nd, Azof, with 179 square miles; 3rd, Ingria, part of Finland, Esthonia, and Livonia, ceded to Peter I. in 1711, at the peace of Nystadt, 3,000 square miles; 4th, by the same Czar, Persia was constrained to cede Daghestan, Shirvan, Ghilan, Mezenderan, Astera-bad, containing 1500 square miles—these regions were subsequently restored, but only to be resumed; 5th, in 1731, the Khirgish Tartars submitted, and placed under the sovereignty of Russia, a territory comprising above 31,000 square miles; 6th, the following year another body of Tartars submitted, whose country covered an extent of above 15,000 square miles; during the reigns of Elizabeth and Peter III., little was done; but, 7th, the three partitions of Poland brought Russia above 8000 square leagues of territory; 8th, from Turkey she obtained above 2500. (P. 298) These possessions were *incorporated* with the Empire, besides which she protected many countries, such as Georgia, Mingrelia, etc. One hundred and fifty years ago the Russians did not possess a single foot of coast. Before Alexander's time, they had only 170 German miles; before Catherine's, 120; in the time of Peter the Great, not more than 100. The English have contributed largely towards this increase of Russian naval power. The destruction of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen was equally welcome to the Muscovites with Navarino.—*Kohl*, p. 190.

### NOTE B, PAGE 3.

A few specimens of the Grand Dukes of Muscovy may interest the reader:—

Sviatopolk, successor of Vladimir in 1015, made no distinction between his bastard and legitimate sons; and plurality of wives, together with the licentiousness of manners, having multiplied the princes of the blood, he attempted the lives of his brothers, one of whom escaped. This was Jaroslav, who hurled him from the throne. But Sviatopolk, stained with a triple fratricide, re-ascended

the throne by a parricide, introducing the Poles into the heart of Russia to help him, and when in power, trying to get rid of them by treachery. (Segur, P. 34.) Jaroslav was a better prince and man, and permitted the translation and circulation of the Scriptures.—Wars, horrible punishments, and Machiavelian policy, all were employed by Vassili to render Novgorod the tributary of Moscow. (P. 106.)—The life of Ivan III., 1462, like all great lives, had one uniform object—autocracy. From the age of twenty-three he proved himself capable of regulating its march, and of subjecting it to the slow prudence of a policy, at once insidious even to perfidy, and circumspect even to cowardice. (P. 120.)—Vassili Ivanovitch extended his power over Poland, from which he wrested Smolenak; over the revolted Kasan, which he drained to exhaustion; and over the Republic of Pskof, where were sadly breathed forth the agonising sighs of Russian liberty.—The odious reign of Ivan IV. (1533) opened with the intrigues of his mother, the Regent Helena, and her lover. The indignant uncles of Ivan, in opposing this scandal, suffered death in horrible dungeons; their partisans were crushed by torture, by the cord, and the axe. The Regent at length died suddenly, probably from poison, and Ivan was brought up amidst scenes of bloodshed and brutality. His reign exceeds in horrors that of a Nero or Caligula. As with the policy of Catherine and Nicholas, attempts have been made to justify the atrocities of Ivan IV., by attributing them to madness. It is an unlucky accident that the majority of Russian Sovereigns, Ruriks or Romanoffs, have been misrepresented. According to the annals of Pskof, there were 60,000 victims at Novgorod alone. Let us draw a veil over the atrocities of Ivan's reign, and pass to Peter the Great, the hero of Russia, who deliberately put his son to death; to Elizabeth, a rival of Augustus Cæsar in clemency; to Catherine, who murdered her husband, and of whose many lovers the favourites were her husband's murderers; and let us conclude this picture by stating on sufficient authority, that Alexander, Russia's best Sovereign, and Nicholas, have in vain used every effort to destroy venality and corruption.

## NOTE C, PAGE 13.

Dr. Walsh, in his *Residence at Constantinople*, informs us that under Mahomet II., very advantageous stipulations were made in favour of the Wallachians. They were to pay a certain tribute, and in return their Vaivode was to be elected by bishops and boyars; no mosque was to be erected, or Turk to enter the country as a resident, and if as a trader, he was immediately to depart when his business was done. These and other stipulations continue to be observed till this day, excepting the election of the Vaivode. They were deprived of this, because Constantine Bessarabba, their Vaivode in 1711, agreed secretly to supply Peter the Great's army with provisions. The rank and office of Vaivode was after this confided by the Porte to Greek princely families of the Fanar quarter at Stamboul. (P. 31.) On the breaking out of the Greek revolution, it was restored to natives, Ghika and Stourdza, and this popular measure was opposed by the Russians, who appealed to *treaties*. This appointment was what the people of the Provinces earnestly desired, as they had been much oppressed by the Greek princes and their satellites. (Pp. 32-33.)

"The Bulgarians are now admitted to bear testimony, and their oath before the tribunals is of the same weight as that of the Turks. If they wish to become Mohammedans, they must consult their bishop for three days, who shall do his best to instruct them. (Ranke's *Servia*, p. 390.) Since 1848, the parts played by Turkey and Russia respectively have been completely reversed. The Turk has ceased to be the oppressor, the Russian to be the protector, of the Christians of the East. The Sultan has become the sole support of the Serbs, as of the Roumanians, against Muscovite aggression. No Moldo-Wallachian would now be mad enough to go to St. Petersburg and complain of the Porte. The Bulgarians feel, too, that their nationality has no more dangerous enemies than these very instigators of revolt, who came to them from St. Petersburg with their pockets full of lying proclamations."—*Cyprian Robert*, p. 393.

Speaking of the events of 1851, M. Cyprian Robert observes: "During this time, Russia was playing her diplomatic game on the Bosphorus. The question of the Hungarian-Polish refugees served as a pretext for threats, urged with increasing force by M. de Titoff, and for the enormous preparations for war which were made in all the ports of the Black Sea. In reality the demand for the extradition of the refugees from Hungary, was meant to throw dust in the eyes of Europe. Substantially the action of Russia was entirely subordinated to the issue of the two insurrections in Bosnia and Bulgaria, which had been stirred up by the same Power, though on diametrically opposite principles; both were expected to be ended by Muscovite arbitration, and to furnish a parallel for the fable of the Oyster and the Litigants. The good sense of the Slave Christians baffled these machinations by declaring for the Sultan and his reforms. Thus the present Cabinet of Stamboul has all the old Mussulmans against it, and for it are the Christians, who are becoming more and more the principal support of the Empire."—*Ranke's History of Servia*, p. 390 (Bohn.) "The priests and bishops of the Greek Church in Turkey are almost all spies and agents of Russia."—*Frontier Lands of Christian and Turk*, vol. i.

#### NOTE D, PAGE 23.

"The moral characteristics of the Turks present the following contrasts to those of the Greeks:—The Turkish sailors are the honestest fellows in the world, and always mean to take as good care of their ships as they can, with the help of the Prophet. The Greek sailors are known to be the greatest rogues in the world, and nobody will insure their ships willingly, at least without a high premium."—*Fraser's Winter Journey*, p. 255. Kohl's *Russia*, p. 243.

"Mohammedanism has abolished caste as well as idolatry, the two worst plagues of the East. It has established equality and fraternity, and admits of no priesthood or priestcraft. The old Sultans who built those beautiful places of public worship (Stamboul mosques), accompanied their foundations by that of schools, libraries, and hospitals. Generous and true charity mingled with their piety."—*The Greek and the Turk*.—"Have the Turkish men no redeeming qualities among their fierce and brutal ones? They have many which might serve as models to more enlightened people. Their unfeigned and ardent piety—their strict but unaffected regard to the laws their religion imposes—their noble pride



in estimating only personal merit—their charity to all who are distressed—their exceeding sobriety and moderation in all their appetites—their immoveable integrity—and their being carriers of untold gold to our merchants, who trust them with the most implicit confidence, and never yet had occasion to withdraw it . . . and the moral solidity of their characters, are general qualities in which few Turks, . . . of whatever rank, are found deficient. I know nothing more grateful or pleasing than the unaffected kindness of a Turk. There is a natural courtesy in him, that is altogether independent of fictitious manners. He addresses his equals by the name of brother, his elder he calls master, and his junior son, and he regulates his deportment to each by the feelings arising from such relations. Such qualities must make the people in whom they are found, and their transition from ignorance to knowledge, highly interesting.”—*Walsh's Residence at Constantinople*, vol. ii. p. 486.

“Though the Turks have made but little progress in literature, their Sultans seemed well disposed to promote it. So early as 1353, Orkhan founded a new mosque at Brusa, to which he attached an academy for the culture of literature and the liberal arts, which drew many students from Persia and Arabia. After this example, several Sultans endeavoured to imbue their subjects with a love of literature. Whenever Amurath II. conquered a town, he established in it a mosque, a khan for travellers, a minaret or khan for pilgrims and schoolmasters, and a medresie or academy. But the Augustus of the Turkish Sultans was Mahomet II., who among his atrocious qualities, cherished the very incompatible one of the love of literature. He attached to St. Sophia a splendid academy, with apartments for students and professors, and a large income to support it. Since that time various Sultans distinguished themselves by similar attentions to literature; Bajazet, Selim, Solyman, Achmet, and Mustapha, are memorable for founding academies which still exist.”—*Walsh's Residence in Turkey*, vol. ii. p. 470.

#### NOTE E, PAGE 29.

As it is often remarked, in extenuation of Russian aggression, that it contributes like that of England or France to the spread of Christianity and civilisation, we will examine unreservedly what Circassia would gain by annexation.

M. Segur remarks:—“The character of despotism and servitude is deeply-rooted in Russia. After what has been said, it will excite little astonishment that the Russians of these days were inclined to dissimulation. They were selfish and cheating because they were poor, and because the major part of them had to purchase their liberty. The priests, the only teachers of that age, were too coarse-minded to inspire morality. Even in the presence of the Czar himself people could venture to say, ‘Thou liest!’ without conceiving that they were offering an insult. Sodomitism was formerly charged upon the Russians. The impure source of such depravity in so recent a nation is to be found in the boorishness of its customs. When adultery, incest, and Sodomitism, are results of the luxury of our old capitals, and found flourishing equally in those smoky dens where whole families are confusedly heaped together, we are indignant, without being astonished. Ivan IV. introduced his nefarious informers into public village

assemblies. Before his reign, Russians had said, 'If I break my word, shame be my portion.' He extinguished the few remaining sparks of honour. A father was as despotic in his wooden hut as the Czar in the Empire. A father could sell his children four times. It is absurd to affirm that this picture of Russia applies to the present day. (Book v. ch. 2.) But it is pretended by the author of the *Revelations of Russia*, that there are probably more robberies and murders committed every winter in St. Petersburg than in all the united capitals in Europe. In 1839, 15,443 ecclesiastics passed through the hands of justice for crimes committed. These amount to one sixth of the whole orthodox clergy of Russia. (*La Russie Cont.*, p. 217.) Masters can now abuse their female serfs at their option, separate husband and wife, mother and child. M. Leouzon le Duc has lived with Russian noblemen who made a cruel joke in their serfs of all that nature holds most venerable and sacred. M. de Harthausen, the great apologist of Russia, admits that every one is beaten in Russia, that the very back of the Russians gets quite seasoned to this discipline without any degradation being felt in it. The virtue of pretty serfs is the property of their master."—P. 274.







